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“Perhaps I can best illustrate the meaning of my thoughts by going
back to Oppenheimer’s felicitous metaphor of the house called
“science”. I would like to see us build a new room in that vast and
rambling structure. This room, like the others, would have no door
and over the entrance would be the words, thought, reflection,
contemplation. It would have no tables with instruments, no whirring
machinery. There would be no sound except the soft murmur of words
carrying the thoughts of men [and women] in the room. It would be
a Commons Room to which men [and women] would drift from those
rooms marked geology, anthropology, taxonomy, technology, biology,
paleontology, logic, mathematics, psychology, linguistic, and many
others. Indeed, from without the walls of the House would come poets
and artists. All these would drop in and linger. This room would have
great windows, the vistas our studies have opened. Men [and women]
singly or together would from time to time walk to those windows to
gaze out on the landscape beyond. This landscape in all Its beauty,
sometimes gentle, sometimes terrible, cannot be seen fully by any one
of the occupants of the room. Indeed, It cannot be known fully by a
whole generation of men [and women]. Explorers of each generation
travel into its unknown recesses and, with luck, return to share their
discoveries with us. So the life of the new room would go on -
thought, reflection, contemplation - as the explorers bring back their
discoveries to share with the room’s occupants. This landscape that
we gaze on and try to understand is an epic portion of the human
experience."1
Real-world problems and challenges are rarely confined by the artificial
boundaries of any single academic discipline and approach but require diverse
thoughts, reflection, and contemplation (You, 2017). Moving beyond the
artificial fragmentation of knowledge and joining a common room in the house
of science can be a fruitful endeavor for the pursuit of truth. Indeed,
collaboration among disciplinary approaches is currently one of the most
promoted goals at the level of scientific administration, both in the natural and
social sciences (MacLeod, 2018). It is often argued that collaboration among
multiple disciplines is needed to meet the demands of many societal,
environmental, industrial, and scientific problems that cannot be adequately
1The citation is from Margaret Mead’s Book "Blackbery Winter, as reported in Stember (1991).
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addressed by a single discipline alone (Bridle et al., 2013). Several policy
reports put a strong emphasis on interdisciplinary research and promote the
institutional changes needed to support it. For instance, the Royal Society
argues that: “Many of the major challenges that society faces today will
require solutions developed through interdisciplinary research and
cross-disciplinary collaboration. Improving support for and addressing the
barriers to this work could contribute to major scientific breakthroughs at the
interface of disciplines, develop new technologies, and ultimately support the
economy and develop novel solutions to societal challenges”.2 Science Europe,
the association of European funding organizations, also claims that the “key to
future scientific breakthroughs lies in interdisciplinary research”. Finally, the
Global Research Council, which is constituted by funders such as the U.S.
National Science Foundation, the Research Councils UK, and the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, also produced its own report on interdisciplinary
research.
For most of modern history, science and knowledge followed a pyramidal
structure, where subordinate elements moved under the direction of a leading
science such as theology, law, arts, and medicine (Salter and Hearn, 1997). It
has been only recently, mostly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
that our modern individual disciplines emerged and claimed their
independence. The rapidly changing and urbanizing society generated new
problems and challenges. This period saw the formation of new categories of
knowledge. Social sciences, including anthropology, economics, and political
science emerged. Soon after that, the subdisciplines of sociology, psychology,
and history followed (Easton, 1991).
This conceptual specialization has yielded remarkable gains in knowledge,
but fragmentation resulted in some disciplines to become so isolated and able
to understand and contribute to only a small part of a complex problem. The
dissatisfaction with the compartmentalization of disciplines and knowledge
has its origin in the idea that any field is enriched by theories, concepts, and
methods from other fields (Ross and Staw, 1993). As a result, during the last
decades, there have been clear signs indicating that clusters of disciplines are
moving again toward unity, but not following a medieval system of
subordination of certain disciplines to others. Instead, the goal is the creation
of a coexisting open-minded coalition motivated by the idea that knowledge
can be understood and advanced through interdisciplinary work (Stember,
1991).
In such a collaborative model, the integration creates a community of
learning that fosters creative intellectual inquiry and facilitates solving related
problems at a different level of analysis and from different perspectives. One
consequence of this trend is the regrouping of disciplines according to the field
of study. For instance, economics involves mathematics, sociology, business
administration, etc. Another tendency has been the creation of new disciplines
that merge traditional boundaries. Behavioral and neuro economics are recent
examples of this effort, as they are disciplines that propose merging the
economic approach with insights from psychology, biology, and neuroscience
with the goal to better study human decision making.
2The Royal Society (2015): Response to the British Academy’s call for evidence on
‘Interdisciplinarity’. The report is available at https://royalsociety.org
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1. Different disciplinarities
In recent years, it became evident that there is a growing emphasis on the
development of teamwork that requires a multidisciplinary approach (Choi
and Pak, 2007). There is also more attention from funding agencies which
often call for research that involves multiple disciplines (Choi and Pak, 2007)
and pressure from universities to establish multiple disciplinary departments
and teaching programs (Slatin et al., 1991). However, there is still little
consensus on the definition of the terms used to define an effort that goes
beyond each discipline’s boundaries. Terms like multidisciplinary,
interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary are often used interchangeably and are
ambiguously defined (Whitfield and Reid, 2004). In what follows, I briefly
describe to the unfamiliar reader the main differences between these
approaches and I will later contextualize the research presented in this thesis
using this framework.
Figure 1.1: Different levels of disciplinarity
A comparison of multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary approaches. The
image is adapted from McPhee et al. (2018)
• Intradisciplinarity. Indicating work that remains within the boundaries
of a single discipline and that addresses a specific problem of that
discipline.
• Multidisciplinary. This approach is a level higher compared to
intradisciplinarity, as it draws from different disciplines. Following the
definition proposed by Klein (1990), multidisciplinarity is a process that
juxtaposes disciplines in an additive fashion, but that avoids integration.
Thus, the individual disciplinary perspective is not changed, but only
contrasted. Thus, the independence of each discipline is preserved and
the collaboration with different disciplines does not result in changes in
the existing structures. An example of such an approach is scholars from
different disciplines working together, but each referring to the
knowledge of their discipline. For instance, an ancient song can be
studied not only from the perspective of musicology but also within
anthropology and linguistics. Multidisciplinary teams work in parallel or
3
sequentially from their specific disciplinary base to address a common
problem.
• Interdisciplinarity. While multidisciplinarity requires little interaction
or collaboration across disciplines, interdisciplinarity acknowledges the
limitation of the compartmentalization of each individual discipline and
integrates knowledge and methods from different disciplines, using a
real synthesis of approaches. This results in an effort that synthesizes
and harmonizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and
coherent whole (Choi and Pak, 2007). The disciplines involved in an
interdisciplinary effort generate a common uniform conceptual and
methodological framework which transcends the structure of a single
discipline and allows integration and exchange between different
schools of thought which synthesizes two or more disciplines and
establish a new level of discourse and integration of knowledge (Klein,
1990). The discipline of neuroeconomics is an example of such an
approach, where the economic study of decision making incorporates
insights, theories, and methods from psychology and neuroscience.
• Transdisciplinarity. A transdisciplinary approach is concerned with the
unity of intellectual frameworks beyond the disciplinary perspectives
(Reilly, 2001). Transdisciplinarity provides holistic schemes that
subordinate disciplines, looking at the dynamics of whole systems Klein
(1990). Etymologically, “Trans-” can be defined as “across; over; beyond;
on the further side. This approach requires to consider the existing
elements constituting a discipline, breaking them down into essential
elements, and recombining them to form a new coding or new
knowledge. Relatively to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary
approaches, a transdisciplinary approach is more than a coordinated
input from multiple disciplines that work toward a shared goal and that
interact with each other. The interdisciplinary approach concerns the
transfer of methods from one discipline to another, allowing research to
spill over disciplinary boundaries, but staying within the framework of
disciplinary research. Instead, in a transdisciplinary approach,
researchers from different disciplines work jointly, intending to create
new conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and translational
innovations that integrate and move beyond discipline-specific
approaches. Solving the problem results in the generation of new
insights formed via the integration of those domains that contribute back
to them in an overarching unity of knowledge. Another distinctive
feature of transdisciplinary research is the inclusion of various
stakeholders. These are both from within academia, as well as
non-academic stakeholders such as companies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), media, and local citizens are also participating in
solving the problem together (Rice, 2013).
4
2. Barriers and facilitators to interdisciplinary research
While many papers and policy reports advocate the importance of moving
beyond an intradisciplinary approach (MacLeod, 2018), several obstacles
hinder the progression towards collaboration among disciplines. For the sake
of brevity, I only mention the ones that in my view are the most relevant:
• Academic structure. University is traditionally organized in faculties
and departments. Each department focuses on providing organizational
support to advance learning and research primarily in its field.
Collaboration between departments or faculties could be difficult when
these bodies have structures that do not align with each other. In
addition, there is also a physical limit of disciplinary scholars usually
located in distinct buildings on campuses.
• Attitude and communication. Idiosyncrasies of each individual
discipline might represent an obstacle to successful collaboration as
different language use: jargon and technical language do not promote
an environment and terminology that is easy for everyone involved to
understand. Additionally, other disciplines might be considered as less
important or rigorous in their methods relative to the perceived
superiority of the “home discipline”.
• Promotions and career prospects. Within universities, funds are often
allocated to departments that also grant promotions and tenure which
rely on departmental contribution and publications. Research that
involves multiple disciplines and departments may take longer than
traditional disciplinary work. This could result in less publication in
peer-reviewed journals, which is one of the main criteria for tenure in
most universities. In addition, there are fewer avenues for publishing
interdisciplinary research than single-discipline research.
Interdisciplinary research can thus pose particular challenges. However, Morse
et al. (2007) presented several recommendations regarding interdisciplinary
collaboration and research that can facilitate these endeavors. In addition to
the necessary structural support from the University (e.g., vision in hiring,
promotion requirements, fundings, etc.), I summarize three recommendations
that I find the most important:
• Define focal themes and research questions jointly and clearly. A
shared team vision can promote team engagement and a clear research
agenda from the beginning. Common vision facilitates the integration of
multiple disciplinary backgrounds.
• Target interdisciplinary training. To tackle cross-disciplinary
differences, seminars that cover interdisciplinary topics and methods
provide useful insights to team members and can help foster creativity
and generate a commitment to interdisciplinary work.
• Select team members thoughtfully and strategically. The selection of
team members is crucial for an interdisciplinary team. Members are
required to be flexible and work well in dynamic settings where the
boundaries of the home disciplines are redefined.
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3. Overview of this thesis
Broadly speaking, the research presented in this thesis is the result of an
interdisciplinary effort in the study of economic relevant decisions. This
approach originates from an effort that integrates insights from economics, but
that also welcomes theories and methodologies from psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. The use of laboratory experiments is the common denominator
underlying the studies discussed in the following chapters. Relatively to other
empirical methods available to study human decision-making, one of the
biggest advantages of conducting experiments – and in particular lab
experiments – is the opportunity to create the environment which is best
suited to investigate specific processes without losing control of unobserved
characteristics. This is crucial when the aim is to establish causality between a
variable and behavior, to elicit economic preferences, or test the predictions of
theoretical models. There are several features of experimental research
discussed in this thesis that are worth to be mentioned. All of them are crucial
to allow replicability, which is an essential feature of scientific research, and to
maintain control over the experiment and subjects’ behavior.
• No deception rule. This rule ensures that participants believe the
instructions. The concern here is that if participants in a study don’t
believe the researcher, their decisions will be unreliable.
• Real financial incentive. Providing incentives for choices and outcomes
leads to more meaningful and reliable choice behavior. Specifically,
incentives that encourage subjects to make honest and non-arbitrary
choices will accurately reveal the characteristics of their preferences.
• Randomization and anonymity. The concerns here involve ensuring
that participants in an experiment are randomly allocated to treatments.
Under the random assignment, the treatment groups should not differ
significantly, and it is thus possible to establish a causal relationship
between the intervention and the behavioral outcome. Anonymity in
experiments is used to eliminate observer and experiment demand
effects and to promote behavior that would be present in private
settings.
Description of the Chapters
In Chapter 2, Love and retaliation, I describe a study that investigates the
roots of human justice in the context of reciprocity that takes place in social
punishment and reward. This project adopts the neuroeconomics
interdisciplinary approach and integrates insights from Economics with
Psychology and Neuroscience. Specifically, we test the involvement of two
areas of the prefrontal cortex of the human brain (the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex) in the decision to reciprocate selfish
behavior with punishment and kind actions with rewards. We consider
different social contexts, which vary in personal involvement (i.e., second vs.
third-party) and in the cost to punish and reward (i.e., cost vs. no cost). To
test the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in these situations, we use
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). With this technique, it is possible to
stimulate brain areas from outside the head as it delivers a magnetic pulse and
allows to stimulate neurons in the underlying brain area.
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The study provides evidence of the involvement of these prefrontal regions
in punishment and reward. The experimental design exhibits several desirable
features as we are able to (1) analyze how punishment and reward relate to
each other at the behavioral level, (2) discuss whether the different
mechanisms associated with these prefrontal regions extend beyond the
contexts in which they have been originally tested, and (3) provide evidence
of the differences and similarities between punishment and reward regarding
the engagement of the right dorsolateral and the medial prefrontal cortex. In
addition, we provide insights into how punishment and reward are related to
motives such as outcome maximization, norm enforcement, and reciprocity.
In Chapter 3, Intertemporal Social Preferences, I continue my investigation
on social preferences, and I discuss an experimental study on altruism with
time delays. Despite the importance of these decisions, intertemporal and
social domains are traditionally analyzed separately, and surprisingly little
research has been devoted to understanding intertemporal social decision
making. People are often confronted with situations that involve a trade-off
between immediate and delayed benefits and costs (i.e., intertemporal
decisions), and between one’s own and others’ welfare (i.e., interpersonal
decision). In an intertemporal context, activities that yield immediate benefits
and whose costs are delayed are intuitively preferred over plans with
immediate costs and delayed benefits. However, it is unclear if this preference
holds when another person benefits rather than oneself. For instance, are
people more generous when they can immediately benefit the receiver
compared to situations where their decisions affect others only in the future?
Or are they more willing to help someone when the costs for doing so are
delayed compared to cases when the costs are immediate?
In Chapter 4, In search of the sunk cost bias, I present a study where we
investigate the sunk-cost bias, which refers to the stronger tendency to
continue an endeavor once an investment has been made (Arkes and Blumer,
1985). The sunk cost bias has been put forward as an explanation for why
politicians continue over budget public-works (Ross and Staw, 1993), why
firms continue to invest in hopeless projects (Arkes and Blumer, 1985), why
people stay in failing relationships (Strube, 1988), or why researchers
continue less promising projects instead of starting new ones. A rational
decision-maker should ignore the initial investment and base the decision on
whether to make the additional investment solely on the expected utility of
the available options. On the contrary, for an individual that falls prey to the
sunk cost bias, past expenses (e.g., money, time, effort, emotions) constrain
decision-making in the present even though do not affect the attractiveness of
the available options.
We use an experimental design inspired by the classic project continuation
example from the psychological literature: an initial investment needs to be
made to start a project and to advance it to a second investment stage. The
task allows testing several psychological mechanisms that have been proposed
as drivers of the sunk cost effect. Specifically, we focus the discussion on the
role of responsibility for the initial investment, on the role of being in the loss
domain, and on waste aversion. Additionally, after the experiment, participants
answered some of the classic survey questions from the sunk cost literature in
psychology. The data provide surprising findings that underline the difference
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between incentivized and hypothetical scenarios in the study of the sunk-cost
bias.
In Chapter 5 I summarize the main findings of this dissertation and in
Chapter 6 I briefly describe how this research contributes to the field of
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Punishment and reward are crucial for sustaining cooperation in societies.
However, their neural mechanisms are still poorly understood. It is yet unclear
whether the same brain networks involved in punishment are engaged in
reward, as very little attention has been paid to the latter. In this preregistered
study, we use transcranial magnetic stimulation to test the involvement of the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (R dlPFC) and medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) on punishment and reward of greedy and generous monetary
transfers. In a within-subjects design, participants received deep active
continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to inhibit the R dlPFC and the
mPFC in addition to sham stimulation. Participants took part in a novel
dictator game as Receiver (second-party) or Observer (third-party) with the
opportunity to punish and reward the Proposer. In half of the trials,
punishment and reward were costly to participants. Results indicate that the
stimulated prefrontal regions play distinct roles in punishment and reward.
Stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC decreased punishment of greedy
allocations in all conditions except when participants were Observers and had
no costs to punish. These findings are consistent with a broad perspective of
the implication of R dlPFC and mPFC in self-centeredness, which includes both
a personal and a monetary component. Following generous offers, a decrease
in costly reward is observed, presumably because stimulation of these regions
allows selfish economic motivations to overtake norm enforcement or
reciprocity motives. In the absence of cost, however, reciprocity drives the
decision, resulting in increased reward of generous offers. Although reciprocal
fairness is influenced by brain stimulation, individuals’ perceptions of fairness
and social norms remain unaffected.
This paper is co-authored with Leticia Micheli, Teresa Schuhmann & Arno Riedl. The
research presented in this chapter was supported by the grant for primary data collection of
the Graduate School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University.
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1. Introduction
From lending a hand to assist friends to helping strangers on the street by
giving directions or even money, humans are remarkably cooperative towards
both kin and non-kin. This is surprising considering that cooperation often
involves a tension between own and others’ interests and on many occasions
not cooperating makes one better off. Reciprocal fairness, which implies
reciprocating selfish behavior with punishment and kindness actions with
rewards, is essential to discourage defection and to promote cooperation (Egas
and Riedl, 2008; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Research has shown that
individuals engage in punishment when they are directly affected by a
violation of the fairness norm (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008)
but also when they are an unaffected third-party (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004a). Despite being much less investigated than punishment, rewards have
also been proved to promote cooperation in second (Andreoni et al., 2003;
Sefton et al., 2007; Szolnoki and Perc, 2010) and third-party interactions
(Almenberg et al., 2010; Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2014; Sutter et al., 2009).
Given the universal human propensity to punish and reward others, several
studies have attempted to unravel the neural correlates of these reciprocal
behaviors. Despite the accumulating neuroscientific evidence, it is still unclear
whether punishment and reward are simply different sides of the same coin
and governed by the same brain networks or if they depend on distinct
processes.
Neuroscientific studies have repeatedly pointed to the role of the prefrontal
cortex in reciprocal fairness. Specifically, the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (R dlPFC) has been implicated in a wide variety of higher-level
functions, including the control of selfish impulses (Knoch et al., 2009, 2006;
Knoch and Fehr, 2007; Van’t Wout et al., 2005), the ability to adapt behavior
strategically (Ruff et al., 2013; Spitzer et al., 2007; Strang et al., 2015) and
the ability to integrate intentionality and harm for the selection of an
appropriate reaction (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Buckholtz and Marois, 2012;
Buckholtz et al., 2015). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has also been
implicated in reciprocal fairness. In this context, it has been suggested that
this region is associated with a positive affect response to fairness (Tabibnia
et al., 2008), with mentalizing processes when reacting to unintentional
unfairness (Güroğlu et al., 2010) and processing unfairness when it damages
the self (Civai et al., 2015; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013).
However, the differences in the study designs used in the literature make it
difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions about the cognitive mechanisms
associated with punishment and reward that generalize beyond the specific
conditions tested in these studies. For instance, many studies in the literature
focus solely on cases where the person who can reciprocate is the target of
someone’s actions (e.g., Knoch et al. (2009, 2006)) or where they are
unaffected observers (e.g., Buckholtz et al. (2008, 2015)). In the few cases
where personal involvement was varied within a study (Civai et al., 2015;
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013),the cost of reciprocating was also varied,
making it hard to disentangle the effect of personal involvement from the
effect of costs. In addition, it is still unclear whether R dlPFC and mPFC play a
similar role in regulating rewards as they do in punishment, considering that
very little attention has been paid to the neural mechanisms of reward in the
reciprocal fairness literature (see Knoch et al. (2009) for a notable exception)
and we are not aware of any studies that simultaneously investigate the neural
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mechanisms of punishment and reward at the individual level.
To fill this gap, we present a unified methodological framework where, in a
comprehensive within-subjects design using transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) to inhibit the functionality of the R dlPFC and mPFC, we provide
evidence of the involvement of these prefrontal regions in punishment and
reward. Participants took part in a novel monetary allocation game with the
opportunity to punish or reward a Proposer after learning how the Proposer
divided a monetary amount with the Receiver. During the task, we
independently vary personal involvement as each participant receiving TMS
takes the role of Receiver (second party) in half of the trials and Observer
(third party) in the other half. Also, we vary the cost of punishing and
rewarding, such that participants face costly punishment and reward only in
half of the trials. Each participant receives stimulation over the R dlPFC,
mPFC, and sham stimulation in three separate sessions before completing the
monetary allocation game. At the end of each experimental session,
participants are also asked to rate the fairness and social appropriateness of
Proposer’s offers.
This experimental design exhibits several desirable features as we are able
to (1) analyze how punishment and reward relate to each other at the
behavioral level, (2) discuss whether the different mechanisms associated with
the R dlPFC and mPFC extend beyond the contexts in which they have been
originally tested, and (3) provide evidence of the differences and similarities
between punishment and reward regarding the engagement of the R dlPFC
and mPFC. In addition, we provide insights into how punishment and reward
are related to motives such as outcome maximization, norm enforcement and
reciprocity. Ex-ante hypotheses are derived from literature and pre-registered
together with an analysis plan (https://osf.io/pg7yc).
Studies investigating reciprocal fairness have often implicated the R dlPFC
in punishing unfair behavior. This region has been shown to be activated when
individuals punish non-cooperative behavior (Kodaka et al., 2012), when they
interact with non-cooperative partners (Suzuki et al., 2011) and refuse unfair
allocations in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003). Since the dlPFC has
been previously associated with cognitive control mechanisms, subsequent
studies using TMS have proposed that this region is necessary to inhibit
prepotent responses to behave selfishly and maximize one’s own economic
resources while facilitating the implementation of costly punishment in
second-party interactions (Knoch et al., 2006; Van’t Wout et al., 2005).
Consistent with this interpretation, studies have shown that activation in the R
dlPFC correlates with the implementation of fair behavior when this is
strategically advantageous (Spitzer et al., 2007; Strang et al., 2015).There is
also some evidence for the involvement of the R dlPFC in costly rewarding
trust in second-party interactions (Van Den Bos et al., 2009). Furthermore,
there is evidence that inhibition of this region with TMS decreases the ability
to reciprocate trust whenever self-control efforts are necessary to reciprocate
in order to build a positive reputation (Knoch et al., 2009). This indicates that
the cognitive control mechanism of the R dlPFC applies also in the reward
domain. This interpretation, however, has been challenged - in studies where
reciprocity is absent - by findings showing that inhibition of the dlPFC using
cTBS increases offers in a Dictator Game (Christov-Moore et al., 2017) and
that cathodal transcranial current stimulation (tDCS) over right lateral
prefrontal cortex decreases immediate selfish responses in voluntary transfers,
while anodal tDCS leads to a higher degree of immediate selfishness (Ruff
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et al., 2013).
Importantly, the cognitive control hypothesis for the R dlPFC in reciprocal
fairness has been exclusively tested in second-party interactions, when it is
costly to punish greedy and reward generous behaviors. Therefore, it is still
unclear whether this mechanism applies also in other contexts. One important
aspect of our study is that we test whether the cognitive control mechanism
extends also to third-party situations and to contexts where punishing and
rewarding are not costly. Building on previous evidence for the involvement of
R dlPFC in reciprocal fairness (Knoch et al., 2006), we formulate our first
hypothesis, which posits that if the R dlPFC is crucial for overriding economic
selfishness impulses, its inhibition with TMS should lead to decrease in
punishment and reward only when these are costly and regardless of personal
involvement (i.e., second and third-party interactions when punishment and
reward are costly). This decrease in punishment and reward should not be
observed when punishment and reward are not costly, given that in these
conditions economic selfishness could not be a motivation of individuals’
behavior. Thus, cognitive control should not be important in facilitating the
implementation of reciprocal fairness.
An alternative explanation for the role of R dlPFC in punishing unfair
behavior has been proposed by a different stream of literature, which
investigates punishment in third-party interactions using hypothetical
scenarios instead of economic games with real incentives. Buckholtz et al.
(2008) discuss fMRI evidence showing that the same region of the R dlPFC
previously implicated in cognitive control mechanisms of reciprocal fairness
(Knoch et al., 2006) is involved when disinterested third-party participants
respond to individuals who are responsible for harming others and make
non-costly decisions about appropriate punishments to such transgressions. A
follow-up study demonstrated that TMS over the R dlPFC significantly reduced
non-costly punishment for wrongful acts in a third-party context (Buckholtz
et al., 2015). According to the authors’ interpretation of the findings, the
underlying process that accounts for the engagement of R dlPFC in third-party
punishment is the integration of information about harm and blame and the
selection of a specific and appropriate response among a range of response
options (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). This integration-and-selection
hypothesis implies a general role of R dlPFC in reciprocal fairness, which
should apply equally in second and third-party interactions (Buckholtz and
Marois, 2012). However, it remains to be explored whether the
integration-and-selection mechanism generalizes beyond the investigated
contexts and applies to second-party interactions and to contexts when
punishment is costly. Based on the existing evidence we formulate our second
hypothesis: holding responsibility constant, if the R dlPFC is needed to
generally determine the appropriate punishment regardless of personal
involvement or costs to punish, inhibition of this region with TMS should lead
to a decrease in punishment in all conditions compared to sham stimulation
(i.e., second and third-party interactions when punishment is costly or not).
Importantly, we note that the integration-and-selection mechanism has not yet
been tested in the reward domain. Here, we speculate that this mechanism
should presumably work in the same way in the reward domain. That is, we
expect that the R dlPFC is important in integrating information to select an
appropriate reward for cooperative and fair behavior. Thus, we hypothesize a
decrease in reward in all conditions following inhibition of the R dlPFC if this
region is involved in integration-and-selection processing.
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Regarding the role of mPFC on reciprocal fairness, existing functional
imaging evidence indicates that the mPFC is significantly more engaged in
second party that in third party interactions. Specifically, Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al. (2013) shows that the anterior mPFC is more active when a participant
is confronted with unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game, compared to a
situation where, as a disinterested third party, the participant observes another
individual receiving an unfair offer and decides on the behalf of this individual
whether to accept or reject the offer. A follow-up study later confirmed the
role of the anterior mPFC in second-party punishment decisions by applying
cathodal stimulation on the mPFC, which resulted in decreased rejection rates
of unfair offers in the second party, but not in the third-party condition (Civai
et al., 2015). This engagement of mPFC in reciprocal fairness is consistent
with neuroscientific evidence which has repeatedly implicated cortical midline
structures -including the mPFC- in processing self-referential stimuli, for
example during self-reflection (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002) and
evaluative judgments that depend on one’s internalized values (Zysset et al.,
2002) (for a review, see Northoff and Bermpohl (2004); Northoff et al.
(2006)). According to this self-referential interpretation, in the context of
reciprocal fairness, the mPFC is especially recruited when punishing
unfairness that is directed towards oneself. However, studies investigating the
role of mPFC on reciprocal fairness have only compared costly second-party
punishment with non-costly third-party punishment. The fact that both costs
and personal involvement were simultaneously varied leaves room for a
cognitive control interpretation of results, according to which the mPFC could
be involved in overriding economic selfish impulses in favor of implementing
fair behavior (Civai et al., 2015). This would also explain the observed
decrease in punishment following inhibition of the mPFC only in second-party
interactions, where punishing was costly (Civai et al., 2015). Based on this
evidence, we formulate our third hypothesis: if the anterior mPFC is important
for self-referential thinking during reciprocal fairness, its inhibition should
result in a decrease of punishment in second-party conditions compared to
sham stimulation, regardless of the cost of punishing. Such an effect should
not be observed in third party conditions. We note that the self-referential
mechanism has not been tested in the reward domain. We propose that a
similar process as in punishment could take place when people decide whether
and how to reward fair behavior. Alternatively, and according to our fourth
hypothesis: if the mPFC is involved in cognitive control mechanisms which
inhibit economic selfishness to enforce implementation of fairness, as
proposed by Civai et al. (2015), inhibition of the mPFC should lead to reduced
punishment and reward in conditions where it is costly, regardless of personal
involvement.
Lastly, previous brain stimulation literature has shown that inhibition of R
dlPFC affects reciprocal fairness without altering judgments of what is fair
(Knoch et al., 2006; Strang et al., 2015). We assume that, just like the R
dlPFC, the mPFC is important for implementing fairness behavior but is not
involved in assessing the fairness of a given situation. Our fifth hypothesis
then posits that inhibition of R dlPFC and mPFC does not affect fairness and
social appropriateness judgments. Table 2.1 summarizes the hypotheses
formulated in the present study.
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Inhibition of the R dlPFC should lead to decrease in punishment
and reward only when these are costly and regardless of
personal involvement (i.e., second and third-party interactions when
punishment and reward are costly). This decrease should not be
observed when punishment and reward are not costly.
H2: Integration and
selection (R dlPFC)
Inhibition of the R dlPFC should lead to a decrease in punishment and
reward in all conditions compared to sham stimulation (i.e., second and
third-party interactions when punishment is costly or not).
H3: Self-referential
(mPFC)
Inhibition of the mPFC should result in a decrease of punishment
and reward in second-party conditions compared to sham stimulation,
regardless of the cost of punishing. Such an effect should not be
observed in third party conditions.
H4: Cognitive control
(mPFC)
Inhibition of the mPFC should lead to decrease in punishment
and reward only when these are costly and regardless of
personal involvement (i.e., second and third-party interactions when
punishment and reward are costly). This decrease should not be
observed when punishment and reward are not costly.
H5: Fairness and social
appropriateness (R
dlPFC and mPFC)




Thirty-three participants (24 women, mean age= 21.9 years, min = 18 years,
max = 33 years, SD=3.4 years, 29 right-handed) took part in the experiment.
The study was approved by the local ethical review committee of Psychology
and Neuroscience at Maastricht University (ERCPN-192_19_04_2018).
Participants were screened to ensure they met the requirements to receive
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Rossi et al., 2009) as well as to guarantee
they were never exposed to experiments involving deception. Only
participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and without any
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders were included.
2.B. Procedures
Participants attended three different sessions, in which they received, in a
counterbalanced order, TMS aiming to inhibit the functionality of the R dlPFC,
anterior mPFC or sham stimulation (control). For each participant, sessions
were scheduled at least one week apart from each other. Out of a total of 96
sessions, 12 were conducted with less time between sessions due to scheduling
restrictions but were always minimally separated by 4 days. In each session,
participants filled in a TMS screening form and provided written consent. At
the start of the first session, participants received general information about
TMS and their active motor threshold was determined (see “TMS Procedures”
for more details). Prior to brain stimulation, they received written instructions
about the experiment task and answered comprehension questions. After that,
an electroencephalogram (EEG) cap indicating the electrode positions of the
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International 10-20 EEG system was placed on participants’ heads to
determine the site of stimulation. Cap sizes were chosen based on participants’
head size and were adjusted so that the Cz position would be placed in the
middle point between right and left preauricular points and between the
nasion and the inion. TMS was then applied and participants started the task
immediately after receiving brain stimulation.
Each experimental session lasted on average 75 minutes and participants
received a participation fee of e7.50 for each one. In addition, decisions in the
experiment were incentivized and participants could earn extra money
(between e0 and e25.30) in each session depending on their decisions and on
the decisions of the individuals they were matched with. On average,
participants earned e25.80 (SD= e 6.60) per experimental session.
2.C. TMS Procedures
A MagVenture MagPro X100 stimulator equipped with the high-performance
cooling system (MagVenture, Farum, Denmark) and a figure-of-eight TMS coil
(Cool- D-B80; inner diameter = 67 mm, outer diameter = 95 mm ) were used
to deliver continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS). This coil was selected
given its balance between depth of penetration and focality. Because of its
geometry, it is suitable for reaching deep regions in the brain (i.e., the mPFC in
our study), while still being able to produce a focal stimulation (Deng et al.,
2013). The protocol consisted of 50Hz triplets delivered 5 times a second for
40 seconds (600 pulses in total) (Huang et al., 2005). This TMS protocol has
been shown to produce consistent and rapid electrophysiological and
behavioral changes that last for approximately 60 minutes after stimulation,
which is considerably longer than other more traditional stimulation protocols
(Huang et al., 2005).
The stimulation intensity was 90% of the individual active Motor Threshold
(aMT), defined as the lowest machine output intensity able to induce a visible
twitch in the stretched out left index finger for 50% of the pulses. The aMT
was determined in the first session and used for the other three sessions
(mean stimulator output= 29.1% of maximum stimulator output, SD = 4.29;
mean realized output = 42 A/µs). The same protocol was applied to sham
stimulation, but the coil was tilted at 180 degrees.
The stimulation sites were localized using the international 10-20 EEG
system, which has been shown to provide a reliable cortical positioning for
large scale cortical areas such as the ones our study targets (Herwig et al.,
2003). In all three sessions, participants wore a cap with EEG electrodes, so
that stimulation sites could be determined. Based on the Talairach coordinates
provided by Knoch et al. (2006) and by Buckholtz et al. (2008) for the R
dlPFC (x=39, y=37, z=22), we placed the center of the TMS coil on the
electrode site F4 while holding the handle of the coil parallel to the cortical
midline. Likewise, based on the MNI coordinates reported by
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al. (2013) for the anterior mPFC (x=0, y=58, z=8), this
brain region was stimulated by placing the coil between Fp1 and Fp2 while
holding the handle of the coil at a 45 degrees angle from the cortical midline.
For sham stimulation, the coil was placed in the middle point between the
stimulation sites of the R dlPFC and mPFC.
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2.D. Task: Dictator game with punishment and reward
In each brain stimulation session, participants receiving TMS (henceforth TMS
participants) made decisions in 140 trials. In our task, a Dictator Game with
punishment and reward, three individuals are randomly matched and are
assigned three different roles: Proposer, Receiver, and Observer (task adapted
from Spitzer et al. (2007)). TMS participants always made decisions in the
role of Receiver and Observer, and never in the role of Proposer. In each trial
of the game, the Proposer is endowed with 240 experimental currency units
(ECUs), the Receiver is not endowed with any ECUs, and the Observer is
endowed with 200 ECUs. All Participants are informed that at the end of the
experiment ECUs are converted to Euro at a rate of e0.10 per ECU. In each
trial, TMS participants are confronted with a Proposer’s decision of how to
share his endowment with the Receiver. Proposers could choose between
different allocation bundles which range from very greedy to very generous.
Specifically, proposers could choose from the offers, 200-40, 160-80, 120-120,
80-160, and 40-200, where the first term refers to what the Proposer keeps for
himself or herself and the second term refers to what is allocated to the
Receiver (see section “Proposers” for a more detailed description of the
possible allocations available to Proposers).
Depending on the experimental condition, either the Receiver or the
Observer can punish or reward by decreasing or increasing the Proposer’s
payoff after learning the allocation decision made by the Proposer. A 2x2
within-subjects experiment design was implemented in which both personal
involvement (Receiver vs Observer) and the cost to punish or reward the
Proposer (Cost vs. No_cost) vary (see Figure 2.1). In both the Receiver with
Cost (Rec_C) and Receiver with No Cost (Rec_NC) conditions, the TMS
participant makes decisions in the role of the Receiver and is thus directly
affected by the Proposer’s choice. In the Rec_C condition, each ECU invested
in punishment and reward, respectively, reduces and increases the payoff of
the Proposer by 5 ECUs, while decreasing the payoff of the Receiver by 1 ECU.
Our design ensured that irrespective of the Proposer’s allocation decision, the
Receiver always has enough ECUs to invest in punishing or rewarding the
Proposer. In the Rec_NC condition, punishing or rewarding the Proposer is not
costly to the TMS participant. That is, every ECU invested by the Receiver in
Rec_NC reduces or increases the Proposers’ payoff by 5 ECUs but does not
reduce the Receiver’s payoff.
In the Observer with Cost (Obs_C) and Observer with No Cost (Obs_NC)
conditions, the TMS participant makes decisions in the role of the Observer.
That is, the TMS participant observes the allocation decision of the Proposer
regarding the Receiver but is otherwise not affected by it. After learning the
allocation, the TMS participant can use the endowment of 200 ECUs to either
reward or punish the Proposer. Equivalent to the Receiver conditions, in Obs_C
an ECU used for rewarding and punishing the Proposer respectively increases
and reduces the Proposer’s payoff by 5 ECU and the Observer’s payoff by 1 ECU.
In the Obs_NC condition, the effect was the same for the Proposer but there are
no costs for the Observer.
In all four conditions (i.e., Rec_C, Rec_NC, Obs_C, and Obs_NC), TMS
participants are informed they can invest up to 40 ECUs to reward or punish
the Proposer. This ensures that in the case of the most greedy allocation by the
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Proposer, the TMS participant in the Rec_C condition has sufficient ECUs to
decrease the Proposer’s payoff to zero. Moreover, TMS participants are
informed they cannot decrease Proposers’ payoff below 0 or increase
Proposers’ payoff above 240 ECUs. These rules ensure that TMS participants
could never incur losses nor cause losses to Proposers.
Within each condition, the TMS participant and the Proposer are the only
individuals who are aware of the decision taken by the TMS participant to
punish or reward the Proposer. This means that in the Rec_C and Rec_NC
conditions, the TMS participant’s decision as Responder to punish or reward the
Proposer cannot be seen by the Observer. Likewise, in the Obs_C and Obs_NC
conditions, the TMS participant’s decision as Observer to punish or reward the
Proposer cannot be seen by the Receiver. This ensures that the decisions to
punish and reward made by TMS participants are not influenced by reputation
or image concerns that could ensue from being observed. Moreover, our set-
up implies that in each condition there is only one person who can modify the
Proposers’ payoff and one person who can only passively watch the behavior of
the Proposer. Hence, information is kept symmetric in all conditions.
In each brain stimulation session, TMS participants face the four different
conditions in a randomized block design. In each block, TMS participants are
confronted with 35 different proposer’s allocations presented in random order,
which vary from very greedy to very generous. After the 35 allocations for a
given condition are shown to participants, a new block starts featuring a new
condition. During this task, facial expressions of the TMS participants were
recorded with a webcam. Results of facial expression analysis are not reported
here.
At the end of each experimental session, one trial was selected randomly for
payment and all three participants in that trial were paid accordingly. Session
earnings and total earnings were revealed to the TMS participants only at the
end of the last experimental session to avoid that earnings in a session would
influence their decisions in the subsequent sessions. All earnings, including
participation fees, were transferred to TMS participants’ bank accounts within
one week from their last experimental session. For a detailed explanation of
how the payoffs of each participant were calculated, see the Appendix.
Although every trial required the participation of three individuals, only the
participant undergoing brain stimulation was present in the laboratory.
Proposers, as well as passive participants (i.e., Observers in Rec_C and Rec_NC
and Receivers in the Obs_C and Obs_NC), were real participants, but they
were not present during the brain stimulation sessions. Nevertheless, the rules
of the task were common knowledge to all of them. The participation of
Proposers and passive participants in the experiment is explained in detail
below.
Proposers
The present experiment does not involve deception, which means TMS
participants faced real Proposers’ allocations and were matched with a
different Proposer in each trial. Proposers’ allocations were collected before
the brain stimulation experiment via the online platform Prolific
(www.prolific.co). Prior to making any decisions, they were informed their
choices could be selected and used in a later study and that the rules of this
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later study would apply to them. Proposers were not informed that the future
study would involve brain stimulation. Proposers (N=211) received £0.75 for
completing the online study, where they read instructions about the dictator
game with punishment and reward and were presented with the four different
conditions of the experiment. In each condition, Proposers were endowed with
240 ECUs and were asked to indicate how they would like to allocate the ECUs
between themselves and a Receiver. Proposers knew they could be contacted
later to receive their earnings according to their allocation decisions and the
received reward or punishment in the selected trial. Proposers selected one of
five possible allocation bundles (see Table 2.2). For each of these bundles,
they were truthfully told that the researchers could select any allocation
within the range of ±3 ECUs from their original choice. For instance, if a
Proposer chose the allocation bundle 200-40, the Receiver could be shown an
allocation between 197-43 and 203-37. This procedure allowed us to collect
allocations that were real and yet showed some variation, as to keep the task
engaging to participants undergoing brain stimulation. Importantly, TMS
participants were truthfully informed about the options the Proposers had and
about the way researchers could select their choices. After the conclusion of
the experiment, Proposers were contacted and paid according to their final
payoff in the trial selected for payment in the brain stimulation study. All
payments to Proposers were transferred via the online platform Prolific.
Table 2.2: Monetary allocations available to Proposers.
Allocation Bundle Classification Proposer payoff Receiver payoff
1 Very Greedy 200±3 40±31
2 Greedy 160±3 80±3
3 Equal 120±3 120±3
4 Generous 80±3 160±3
5 Very Generous 40±3 200±3
Note: Monetary allocations are here for convenience labeled ranging from “Very greedy”
to “Very generous”. These labels were not used in the experiment. Proposers chose an
allocation bundle per condition, and a specific allocation within that bundle (±3 ECUs)
could be presented to a TMS participant during the brain stimulation study. This was
common knowledge to all the participants.
Passive participants
Observers in the Rec_C and Rec_NC conditions and Receivers in the Obs_C
and Obs_NC conditions are passive participants as they could not modify the
payoff of any other individual in the experiment. Passive participants (N=96)
were contacted via the ORSEE online recruitment system for economic
experiments (Greiner, 2015) of the Behavioral and Economics Laboratory
(BEELab) at Maastricht University and asked to participate in a study. They
received instructions about the dictator game with punishment and reward
and its four conditions. Thereafter, they received an email with information
about the Proposers’ allocation decision in the trial selected for payment and
their own earnings in that specific trial. All payments were transferred via
bank transactions.
1In case of receiving the most selfish allocation (i.e., 37 ECUs), the Receiver in the 2p_c
condition could use all his ECUS to bring the Proposer’s payoff close to zero.
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Figure 2.1: Dictator game with Punishment and Reward
Note: In each trial, three players are involved: a Proposer (P), a Receiver (R) and an
Observer (O). The TMS participant (indicated by white circles) makes decisions in the roles
of the Receiver (top panels) and in the role of the Observer (bottom panels). The two panels
on the left refer to the conditions where it is costly for the TMS participant (Receivers in the
Rec_C condition and Observers in the Obs_C condition) to modify the Proposer’s payoff. The
two panels on the right refer to non-costly conditions, where the TMS participant (Receivers
in the Rec_C condition and Observers in the Obs_C condition) can modify the Proposer’s
payoff without bearing any costs.
2.5. Fairness and appropriateness of social behavior
Immediately after the Dictator game with Punishment and Reward, TMS
participants completed two tasks to test whether brain stimulation affected the
perceptions of what constitutes fair and socially appropriate behavior,
respectively. Fairness ratings measure the perceived fairness of the different
proposals and social appropriateness judgments measure descriptive social
norms. Fairness and appropriateness ratings were presented in a
counterbalanced order and were completed within the range of the TMS
intervention (i.e., 25 to 30 minutes after brain stimulation).
Fairness ratings
For each of the four conditions, TMS participants were asked to judge the
fairness of each of the bundle allocations available to Proposers (40-200;
80-160; 120-120; 160-80; 200-40) on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from
“very unfair” to “very fair”.
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Appropriateness ratings
TMS participants were asked for the social appropriateness of the five possible
Proposer’s bundle allocations in each condition using the incentive-compatible
norm elicitation task introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). Social
appropriateness was described to participants as the “behavior that most
people agree is the correct or ethical thing to do”. Appropriateness was rated
on a 4-point Likert scale that ranged from “Very socially inappropriate” to
“Very socially appropriate”. At the end of each brain stimulation session, one
of the Proposer’s allocations was randomly selected. The appropriateness
rating of the TMS participant for the selected allocation was then compared to
the most frequent answer for the same allocation provided by another group
of individuals, whose answers were collected in a separate online experiment
that took place before the brain stimulation experiment. Collecting answers
from a separate group of participants, which were not exposed to brain
stimulation, is important as it allows avoiding any deception, ensures the more
frequent social appropriateness answer is somewhat representative of the
general population beliefs and avoids that these answers are biased by the
effects of TMS. The participants in this online experiment received information
about the four different conditions and were asked to rate, for each condition,
the social appropriateness of each of the five allocation bundles that the
Proposer could choose. Their ratings were incentivized with a e5 payment if
their appropriateness judgment matched the most frequent answer in their
group.
Each TMS participant received e5 if his or her social appropriateness
judgment matched the most frequent answer in the separate online
experiment. This method is commonly used to measure social norm
perception in an incentive-compatible way (Banerjee, 2016; Exley et al., 2020;
Gneezy et al., 2014; Thomsson and Vostroknutov, 2017). TMS participants
were only informed about the earnings of the appropriateness task at the end
of the last experimental session.
2.6. Data Analysis
As the neural mechanisms of reward have never been explored in relation to
those of punishment, we investigate these two domains separately to be able
to identify potential similarities and dissimilarities between them. For
punishment, we focus on trials where TMS participants received Very Greedy
(200-40) and Greedy allocations (160-80). Punishment captures almost all
responses to these allocations, as counterintuitive reward of Greedy and Very
Greedy allocations was rare (less than 5.2% of the cases). For reward, we
consider trials in which TMS participants received Equal (120-120), Generous
(80-160) and Very Generous allocations (40-200). As before, reward captures
almost all responses to these allocations. Counterintuitive punishment of
Equal, Generous and Very Generous allocations was also negligible (less than
6.4% of all cases). In both the punishment and reward domains, the
dependent variable of interest is the impact of punishment and reward on
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Proposer’s payoff. For ease of presentation, we code a decrease in the
Proposers’ payoff due to punishment to positive values. Hence, in both the
punishment and reward domains, a value of zero means no punishment or
reward and a value of +200 means maximum punishment or reward. Our
within-subjects design, where the same participants repeatedly made decisions
in the different conditions, provides a panel data set. In addition, the
dependent variable is censored at 0 and 200 ECUs. Therefore, in our analysis,
we use random-effects Tobit regressions for panel data that are left- and
right-censored with standard errors clustered at the participant level. In all
regression models, we control for gender, fairness (1-7) and appropriateness
ratings (1-4), trial order within an experimental session (1-140), and session
number (1-3).
We start by reporting sham stimulation results. We first describe how fair
and socially appropriate TMS participants considered the Proposers’ offers. We
then report whether, without an effective brain stimulation, it matters that
punishment and reward are costly or not and whether there is a difference in
responses between Receiver and Observer conditions. In the regression model,
dummy predictors are used for the roles of Receiver or Observer and whether
punishment or reward was costly or not.
We then turn our focus to the effect of stimulation of the R dlPFC and
mPFC on TMS participants’ responses compared to sham. First, we conduct a
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test to investigate whether brain
stimulation affects participants’ fairness judgments and socially
appropriateness ratings of the different experimental allocations. Second, to
examine the effect of brain stimulation on punishment or reward, we include
in the regression dummy variables coding stimulation (R dlPFC, and mPFC)
considering sham stimulation as the baseline category, the two-way
interactions between stimulation and cost of punishment or reward and
stimulation and personal involvement, and a three-way interaction between
stimulation, cost of punishment or reward and personal involvement. For
clarity of exposition, we present the marginal effects of brain stimulation
relative to sham in the four different conditions. Marginal effects are
computed at the censored expected value. All p-values associated with the
comparison between the effect of brain stimulation (i.e., R dlPFC and mPFC)
and sham in the four experimental conditions survive multiple comparisons
correction using the False Discovery Rate (FDR) method (Benjamini and
Hochberg, 1995) at 95% confidence level, unless otherwise stated. All
analyses reported were conducted with the statistical software Stata 15.
Identifying Weak Reciprocators
We hypothesize that, depending on the functional role of the R dlPFC and
mPFC, inhibition of these areas with TMS results in reduced punishment and
reward. To test these hypotheses, it is crucial that TMS participants punish and
reward Proposers following sham stimulation, such that there is room to
observe a reduction of punishment and reward between sham and the other
brain stimulation conditions. We identified 8 participants who, across all
experimental conditions in sham, decided to not punish or reward Proposers
in more than 50% of all trials in sham and for whom it would be hard to test
the hypothesized effects of TMS stimulation. We refer to these participants as
Weak Reciprocators and we do not include them in the main analysis reported
in the paper.
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This leaves us with a final sample for our main analysis of 25 participants
(mean age = 22.28, SD= 3.64, 19 women) who each reciprocated Proposers’
offers in at least 50% of the trials and participated in the three brain
stimulation sessions2. Importantly, we note that differences in results obtained
with this sample and the full sample (which included also the Weak
Reciprocators) are not extensive, and mostly related to the punishment
domain. However, as this exclusion criteria was not included in our
pre-registered analysis plan, results for the whole sample of participants are
also presented (see the Appendix).
3. Results
Fairness and social appropriateness following sham stimulation
As fairness and social appropriateness ratings might be related to participants’
punishment and reward behavior, we start by examining how TMS
participants judge the Proposers’ allocations following sham stimulation. As
Figure 2.2 shows, fairness and social appropriateness ratings vary depending
on Proposers’ offers during sham stimulation. Very Greedy (200-40) and
Greedy (160-80) allocations are in general rated as unfair and socially
inappropriate, whereas the equal split (120-120) is the bundle of allocations
considered by participants as being the fairest and most socially appropriate.
Interestingly, Generous (80-160) and Very Generous (40-200) allocations are
perceived as less fair and less socially appropriate than the equal split. There
are no differences in fairness and social appropriateness ratings between the
four experimental conditions (Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test,
p= .998 and p=.979 respectively).
2One participant did not complete all three brain stimulation sessions. Excluding this
participant from the main analysis only changes the significance of results in one specific
condition, which will be mentioned when reporting the respective results.
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Figure 2.2: Normalized fairness and social appropriateness ratings following sham
stimulation.
Note: Fairness and social appropriateness ratings are shown per monetary allocation and
per condition in the sham stimulation. As fairness and social appropriateness questions were
answered using different scales, we normalized both ratings on a scale ranging from 0 (Very
unfair/Very Social inappropriate) to 1 (Very fair /Very socially appropriate) to facilitate
comparison.
3.1. Punishment following sham stimulation
In Figure 2.3, the light grey lines show the pattern of participants’ punishment
behavior following the sham stimulation for the different cost and personal
involvement conditions. After receiving Greedy and Very Greedy offers in the
sham stimulation, participants punish significantly more in the Receiver than
in the Observer conditions (β = 7.92, p < 0.05) and punishment is significantly
lower when punishing is costly than when it is not costly
(β = −74.0, p < 0.001). The interaction term between the cost of punishment
and personal involvement represents the difference of the effect of cost of
punishing for Observers compared to Receivers ([Obs_C – Obs_NC] – [Rec_C –
Rec_NC]). Results indicate that the difference in punishment between costly
and non-costly punishment is significantly larger when the TMS participant is
the Receiver than when the TMS participant is in the role of the Observer
(β=-31.9, p < 0.001).
Judgments of fairness and social appropriateness influence participants’
decisions to decrease Proposers’ payoff during the sham treatment.
Specifically, the more participants consider Proposers’ offers to be unfair and
socially inappropriate, the more they punish Proposers (βfair =-7.10, p <0.01;
βappro = -22.66, p <0.001).
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3.2. Reward following sham stimulation
In Figure 2.3, the black lines show the pattern of participants’ reward behavior
in the sham stimulation for the different cost and personal involvement
conditions. The cost of reward is an important predictor of the decision to
reward Equal, Generous and Very Generous offers under sham stimulation.
Participants reward significantly less when it is costly than when it is not costly
(β = −60.44, p < 0.001). In contrast to the punishment domain, personal
involvement does not affect how much participants reward Proposers
(β = 5.11, p = 0.123). Also, the interaction between the cost of norm
enforcement and personal involvement is not significant
(β = −4.23, p = 0.52). Interestingly, we find a negative relationship between
fairness and altruistic reward (β = −22.05, p < 0.001), indicating that overly
generous offers are rewarded more although they are viewed as less fair than
the equal split. Social appropriateness judgments of allocations have no effect
on participants’ decisions to reward Proposers (β = 1.87, p = 0.53).
Figure 2.3: Altruistic punishment and Reward in sham stimulation.
The figure shows the estimated coefficients for punishment and reward expressed as
the absolute change on the Proposer’s payoff (i.e., 0 = no punishment/reward; +200
= maximum punishment/reward) in different conditions, after sham stimulation. The
circles and diamond markers represent the point estimates for reward and punishment,
respectively. The bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
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3.3. The effect of TMS on fairness and social appropriateness
Figure 2.4 shows the fairness and appropriateness ratings of Proposers’
allocations for sham and for the brain stimulations over R dlPFC and mPFC.
Following any brain stimulation (i.e., dlPFC, mPFC) we do not observe any
differences in fairness and social appropriateness ratings between the four
experimental conditions (Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test: p >
0.941 for both fairness and social appropriateness). We therefore aggregate
the ratings within a brain stimulation session and we find that stimulation of R
dlPFC or mPFC did not alter fairness and social appropriateness judgments
compared to sham (Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test: Fairness p
= 0.222; Appropriateness p = 0.249). Hence, any difference in punishment
and reward following brain stimulation compared to sham cannot be
attributed to changes in TMS participants’ fairness or socially appropriateness
judgments.
Figure 2.4: Effect of brain stimulation on fairness and appropriateness ratings.
Note: Fairness and social appropriateness ratings are shown per stimulation and allocation
bundle offered by the Proposer. The ratings shown here are normalized on a scale ranging
from 0 (Very unfair/Very Social inappropriate) to 1 (Very fair/Very socially appropriate) to
facilitate comparison.
27
3.4. TMS effect on punishment
Figure 2.5 depicts the effect of brain stimulation over R dlPFC and mPFC on
punishment relative to sham, for both roles (Receiver and Observer) and both
cost conditions (Cost and No Cost).
R dlPFC stimulation
Compared to sham, stimulation of the R dlPFC decreases costly and non-costly
punishment of Greedy and Very Greedy offers when TMS participants are in the
role of Receivers (Rec_C: t=-9.38, p = 0.001; Rec_NC: t=8.37, p = 0.04), and
costly punishment when TMS participants are in the role of Observers (Obs_C:
t=-8.15, p = 0.009). Stimulation of the R dlPFC does not affect non-costly
punishment for Observers (Obs_NC: t=0.19, p = 0.96).
Figure 2.5: Effect of TMS stimulations on punishment.
Note: The figure summarizes the marginal effect of R dlPFC and mPFC stimulation relative
to sham stimulation on punishment of Greedy and Very Greedy offers. The horizontal solid
line at zero indicates the point estimate for the sham stimulation in the different conditions.
The black circle and the grey diamond markers represent the marginal effects of R dlPFC and
mPFC stimulation compared to sham, respectively. The bars indicate the 95% confidence
intervals based on the regression analysis.
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mPFC stimulation
Compared to sham, stimulation of the mPFC decreases costly punishment of
Greedy and Very Greedy allocations for both Receiver and Observer roles
(Rec_C t=-7.87, p = 0.007; Obs_C: t=-10.18, p < 0.001). When punishment
is not costly, a decrease in punishment is observed, at a marginal significance
level, for TMS participants in the role of the Receiver (Rec_NC: t=-7.26, p =
0.06, FDR corrected <.10)3, but not for TMS participants in the role of the
Observer (Obs_NC: t=-1.31, p = 0.73).
3.5. TMS effect on reward
Figure 2.6 shows the effect of brain stimulation over R dlPFC and mPFC on
reward relative to sham, for both roles (Receiver and Observer) and both cost
conditions (Cost and No Cost).
Figure 2.6: Effect of TMS stimulations on reward.
Note: The figure summarizes the marginal effect of R dlPFC and mPFC stimulation versus
sham stimulation on reward of Equal, Generous and Very Generous offers. The horizontal
solid line at zero indicates the point estimate for sham treatment in the different conditions.
The black circle and the grey diamond markers represent the marginal effects of R dlPFC and
mPFC stimulation compared to sham, respectively. The bars indicate the 95% confidence
intervals based on the regression analysis.
3We note that when excluding the participant who did not participate in all the three different
experimental sessions, we observe that following mPFC stimulation the decrease of punishment
in the Rec_NC condition becomes significant t=-8.72, p = 0.03). The other results reported in
the paper remain the same when excluding this participant.
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R dlPFC stimulation
Compared to sham, stimulation of the R dlPFC decreases costly rewards of
Equal, Generous and Very Generous allocations when TMS participants are in
the role of the Observer (Obs_C: t=-10.45, p < 0.001), but not when TMS
participants are in the role of the Receiver (Rec_C: t=-2.67, p = 0.29). In
stark contrast, stimulation of the R dlPFC strongly increases non-costly reward
relative to sham, for both Receiver and Observer roles (Rec_NC: t=17.67, p <
0.001; Obs_NC: t=14.27, p < 0.001).
mPFC stimulation
Compared to sham, stimulation of the mPFC decreases costly altruistic reward
of Equal, Generous and Very Generous allocations, for both Receiver and
Observer roles (Rec_C: t=-6.54, p = 0.01; Obs_C: t=-7.14, p = 0.007). In
stark contrast again, stimulation of the mPFC increases non-costly rewards
relative to sham, irrespective of the role of the TMS participant (Rec_NC:
t=14.43, p < 0.001; Obs_NC: t=15.93, p < 0.001).
4. Discussion and conclusion
We present a comprehensive test of the involvement of the R dlPFC and mPFC
in punishment and reward at the individual level (within-participants design).
We independently vary personal involvement (second vs. third party) and the
cost of punishment and reward (cost vs. no cost) in an attempt to test, in
diverse social contexts, the different explanations that have been given to the
role of the R dlPFC and mPFC in reciprocal fairness. Furthermore, we provide a
direct comparison of the involvement of these regions in punishing greedy and
rewarding generous behavior.
We discuss unexpected results which only partly confirm recently proposed
mechanisms for the engagement of these two prefrontal regions in punishment
and reward. Our findings show that stimulation of the R dlPFC and the mPFC
reduces punishment of unfair actions in conditions where punishing is costly
to the punisher and when unfairness is targeted at oneself. A different pattern
of results emerges in the reward domain, where stimulation of the R dlPFC
and mPFC leads to a decrease in non-costly reward and an increase in costly
reward. Below we discuss the relevance of these findings in relation to the
existent literature and potential psychological mechanisms that might be
associated with reciprocal fairness.
The R dlPFC and mPFC on punishment
Compared to sham, we found that disruption of the R dlPFC decreases costly
punishment irrespective of personal involvement. This result is consistent with
a cognitive control mechanism, suggesting that R dlPFC is needed to override
economic selfish impulses when reciprocal fairness is costly (Knoch et al., 2006;
Van’t Wout et al., 2005). Previous studies have proposed this mechanism in the
context of second-party interactions. Here, we replicate these previous findings
and provide evidence that disruption of R dlPFC reduces costly punishment also
when participants are in the role of unaffected Observers. That is, in situations
where punishment is costly, but in which the unkind actions are not directed to
oneself.
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In addition to reducing costly punishment, we observed that stimulation
of the R dlPFC reduces also non-costly punishment when unfair actions are
directed to oneself. The only condition where no effect is observed is when
the uninvolved Observer has no costs to punish the unfair behavior of others.
Because we do not observe a decrease in punishment in all conditions, we argue
that our results are not consistent with the integration-and-selection mechanism,
according to which we hypothesized the R dlPFC would be involved in selecting
the appropriate reaction to an unfair offer regardless of personal involvement
and cost.
Regarding the mPFC, we find that stimulation of this region leads to
decreased costly punishment compared to sham. A marginally significant
decrease was also observed in non-costly punishment when the Receiver was
the target of the unfairness. Our findings replicate those of Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al. (2013) and Civai et al. (2015), as disruption of the mPFC significantly
decreases costly punishment for Receivers compared to sham without affecting
non-costly punishment for Observers. However, as mPFC stimulation also
leads to a reduction of costly punishment when being an unaffected Observer,
our findings do not exclusively support the self-referential mechanism but
suggest the mPFC is also involved in a cognitive-control mechanism.
Altogether, given the similar pattern of results obtained following
stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC, we suggest that these two regions
respond both to the economic costs of punishing and to the target of the unfair
action. We believe our results point to the need of revisiting the cognitive
control and self-referential mechanisms in an attempt to unify these two
accounts. Our results are consistent with a broad perspective of the
implication of R dlPFC and mPFC in self-centeredness, which includes not only
a personal component (i.e., being the target of someone’s greedy action) but
also a monetary component (i.e., economic self-interest). In fact, the only
condition in the experiment in which we do not observe a decrease in
punishment is precisely when a component of self-relevance is absent: the
Observer is not the target of the unfairness and he/she also does not bear the
costs of punishing the unfair behavior of the Proposer.
Our interpretation is also consistent with findings that lateral prefrontal
regions of the brain are also engaged during self-referential tasks, in addition
to mPFC and the cortical midline structures often associated with this type of
reasoning. This was found to be particularly true in situations with a strong
cognitive component, as we believe our task has (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004; Northoff et al., 2006). Importantly, although the literature on
self-referential processing does not investigate economic self-interest per se
(i.e., having costs vs. not having costs associated with actions), we argue that
bearing monetary costs is an aspect of great relevance to self. Future studies
may focus on further unraveling the role of monetary costs on self-referential
processing.
The R dlPFC and mPFC on reward
Stimulation of the R dlPFC and anterior mPFC lead to an interesting
unanticipated pattern of results, which points to a clear-cut difference
between conditions in which rewarding is costly or not. Generally, we observe
an increase in non-costly reward following disruption of both the R dlPFC and
mPFC. In addition, we observe a reduction of costly reward following
inhibition of the R dlPFC mainly when being an unaffected Observer, while
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inhibition of the mPFC reduces costly reward irrespective of the personal role.
The implication of the R dlPFC in the cognitive control mechanism suggests
that this brain area is needed to override economic selfish impulses (Knoch
et al., 2006). Therefore, we expected that inhibition of R dlPFC would
diminish costly reward irrespective of personal involvement. Our results are
not consistent with this idea, as we find a decrease in costly reward for
Observers but not for Receivers. The lack of differences in costly reward for
Receivers following disruption of R dlPFC compared to sham does, however,
replicate previous findings showing that inhibition of R dlPFC has no effect on
the behavior of a trustee in the Trust Game when interactions are anonymous
and building a reputation is not possible (Knoch et al., 2009). Although
reputation building is also not possible for Observers in our experiment, we
still observe a decrease in costly reward compared to sham. In addition, since
we do not find a decrease in reward across all experimental conditions, our
results do also not support the integration-and-selection mechanism for the
dlPFC in the reward domain.
Regarding the role of the mPFC on costly reward, our findings are
consistent with the idea that the mPFC is involved in a cognitive control
mechanism, as stimulation of this brain area leads to a decrease of costly
reward independent of personal involvement. Moreover, as stimulation of
mPFC affects reward also when being an Observer, we do not find support for
the self-referential mechanism in the reward domain.
When rewarding is not costly, we observe a strong and unexpected increase
in reward after stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC for both roles of Receiver
and Observer. This finding could be interpreted as an increase in generosity,
which in our task would be expressed via rewards. In line with this, a previous
study has reported more prosocial behavior after inhibition of the R dlPFC and
dorsal mPFC, although prosocial behavior was characterized by giving in a
Dictator game (Christov-Moore et al., 2017). However, the generosity
interpretation is controversial as less prosocial behavior was observed
following cathodal tDCS of the mPFC (Liao et al., 2018).
A more compelling interpretation of our findings in the reward domain is
that behavior is driven by two distinct motives in addition to the economic
selfish motivation, namely norm enforcement and reciprocity. According to a
selfish motive, an individual should never punish or reward others when it is
costly to do so. According to the norm enforcement motive, the allocation that
is considered the most fair and socially appropriate (the Equal offers in our
case) should be the one that is the most rewarded/least punished.
Alternatively, according to a reciprocity motive, the more greedy offers are, the
more they should be punished, while the more generous offers are, the more
they should be rewarded, irrespective of the fairness and social
appropriateness consideration. In the punishment domain, both the norm
enforcement and the reciprocity motives lead to the same behavioral outcome.
That is, according to both motives greedy offers should be punished more than
the equal split. However, in the reward domain, it is possible to disentangle
norm enforcement and reciprocity motives as the norm enforcement motive
predicts that the most rewarded allocation should be the equal split and the
reciprocity motive predicts very generous offers should be the most rewarded.
This dissociation allows us to test whether TMS affects these two motives
differently.
In the absence of costs, we observe that stimulation of the R dlPFC and
mPFC promotes a reciprocity mechanism and results in an increased reward of
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overly generous offers compared to sham stimulation, where participants seem
to follow a norm-based behavior and reward the most the allocation which is
considered the fairest (i.e., the equal allocation). This pattern of results is
consistent with the idea that the stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC hinders
the enforcement of the norm of an equal split. Thus, the reciprocity
mechanism would be the main force driving the decision, resulting in
increased rewarding of Equal, Generous and Very Generous offers compared
to sham. Reciprocity has up to now been mainly associated with brain regions
not targeted in our study such as the insula, anterior cingulate cortex (Cáceda
et al., 2017) and right intraparietal sulcus (Bellucci et al., 2017), suggesting
that it could have been potentially left unaltered by the brain stimulation. As
robustness check of this interpretation, one could expect to find a difference in
the effects of brain stimulation between equal vs. generous and very generous
offers. Unfortunately, our design was not built to have enough power to
conduct such an analysis. Future studies are needed to provide a further test
for this explanation and to try to disentangle different norm enforcement
motives from reciprocity in the reward domain.
When rewarding is costly, however, stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC
allows selfish motives to drive the decision, leading to a general decrease of
reward. Although this pattern of behavior is present in most of our costly
conditions, we note, that it does not happen in the Observer condition
following stimulation of the R dlPFC. This finding is not in line with any of the
mechanisms considered in this study. Future research should attempt to
replicate this finding and clarify whether there are additional components -
other than personal involvement and cost - that could be responsible for it.
Fairness and appropriateness evaluations
In each of the three brain stimulation sessions, we observe an inverted u-shape
for fairness and social appropriateness ratings, in which equal offers are the
ones considered the fairest and the most socially appropriate, while greedy as
well as overly generous offers are considered less fair and less socially
appropriate. Interestingly, we observe a divergence between fairness and
social appropriateness rating in reward behavior, as we observe that the more
generous an offer is the more it is rewarded, suggesting that the decision to
reward a generous action is not norm based, but reciprocity driven.
We replicate results in the literature showing that fairness ratings are not
affected by brain stimulation of the R dlPFC (Knoch et al., 2006; Strang et al.,
2015). In addition, we extend this finding by showing that the same holds for
the stimulation of the anterior mPFC. This suggests that the mPFC is, just like
the R dlPFC involved in implementing reciprocal fairness without influencing
fairness judgements4. Moreover, we also provide evidence that behavioral
changes following brain stimulation are not due to changes in internalized
social norms of what is considered socially appropriate behavior.
Sham stimulation
Even in the absence of brain stimulation, our novel within-subjects design can
provide insights for behavioral differences in costly and non-costly punishment
4We anticipated that fairness evaluations could change if inhibition of mPFC had influenced
theory of mind processing. This possibility was pre-registered, although we were agnostic about
what would be the direction of the effect on fairness evaluations.
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and reward in second and third-party conditions. During sham stimulation, we
find that participants punish more when it is free compared to when it is
costly, and when they are in the role of the Receiver (i.e., 2nd party
conditions) compared to when they are in the role of the Observer. However,
the latter effect seems to be driven by the conditions in which punishing is not
costly. While some studies have reported that second-party participants tend
to punish more strongly than third-parties when punishing is costly (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004b; Kim et al., 2013; Leibbrandt and López-Pérez, 2012;
Pedersen et al., 2013), we find that Observers punish slightly more than
Receivers when punishing is costly. We note, however, that the discrepancy
between our results and previous literature could be driven by different
experimental setups as all these studies employed economic games that differ
from ours in at least one dimension5.
Regarding reward, we find that participants reward less when doing so is
costly, while no effect of personal involvement is observed. Previous studies
have shown that rewards are frequently used as tools to enforce social norms
and cooperation by second-parties (Andreoni et al., 2003; Sefton et al., 2007)
and third-parties (Almenberg et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2009; de Kwaadsteniet
et al., 2013). Our study provides evidence that second and unaffected
third-parties behave similarly and may ultimately have similar motivations
when engaging in reward of generous behavior.
Concluding remarks
To conclude, our study provides several contributions to the research on
reciprocal fairness. First, we present evidence of the roles of R dlPFC and
mPFC on punishment and reward. Our findings partially support some of the
explanations proposed in the literature for the involvement of these regions in
reciprocal fairness, while challenging others. Regarding punishment, our
results are consistent with a broad perspective of the implication of R dlPFC
and mPFC in self-centeredness, which includes both a cognitive control
(Knoch et al., 2006) and self-referential processing (Civai et al., 2015;
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). However, we note a striking difference in the
functions of these prefrontal areas in the reward domain. There, we find that
when cost is present, stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC allows selfish
economic motivations to overtake the desire for norm enforcing or
reciprocating, which leads to a general decrease of reward. In the absence of
cost, our results are consistent with the idea that reciprocity is the main force
driving the decision, resulting in increased rewarding of Equal, Generous and
Very Generous offers following brain stimulation compared to sham.
Second, our results also contribute to the debate regarding whether
dual-system theories can explain altruistic behavior (Dreber et al., 2016;
5Fehr and Fischbacher (2004b) design the third-party condition such that the participant who
is still affected by the decision of the proposer cannot punish his proposer, but the proposer of
another group. In Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2012), the observer can punish the proposer
and/or the receiver. Pedersen et al. (2013) has also a different design: in the first stage, the
subject (receiver or observer) only witness the proposer taking or giving to the receiver. On a
second stage, the participant (receivers or observers) becomes the dictator while the previous
dictator becomes the recipient. There is no third party in the second stage and the dictator can
take or give from the recipient. Finally, in Kim et al. (2013) played the Ultimatum Game as
Receivers for themselves or on behalf of a friend or strange. Thus, in the third-party condition
the costs of rejecting an offer were not paid by the participants themselves.
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Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2007; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Rand
et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2014). In other words, whether self interest is a
spontaneous response, and people need to deploy self-control to behave
altruistically; or alternatively, whether prosociality is the intuitive response
and self-control is required in order to behave on behalf of one’s self interest.
In the punishment domain, our results cannot contribute to this debate, as the
decrease in costly punishment observed following stimulation of the R dlPFC
and mPFC can be interpreted both as an increase in economic selfishness
(Knoch et al., 2006) and an increase in generosity (Christov-Moore et al.,
2017). On the other hand, the decrease in costly rewards following
stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC can only be attributed to an increase in
economic selfishness in the absence of cognitive control. Hence, in the reward
domain our findings are more in line with economic selfishness being an
intuitive response.
Third, by being able to establish a direct qualitative comparison between
rewards and punishments in reciprocal fairness, we show important evidence
of dissimilarities between these two domains. In the absence of brain
stimulation, our findings suggest that personal involvement may weigh in
differently for punishment and reward, while costs seem to have similar roles
in both dimensions, decreasing the frequency of punishment and reward.
Furthermore, stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC have a different effect on
punishment and reward domains. Although reward in second and third-party
interactions has received considerably less attention than punishment, a few
studies on this participant have already started to show asymmetries between
reciprocating a positive versus a negative behavior (Keysar et al., 2008;
Offerman, 2002). Future studies will benefit from approaches that enable
qualitative and quantitative direct comparisons of behavioral and neural
mechanisms in these two domains, revealing the extent of dissimilarities
between them.
Lastly, our results indicate that stimulation of the R dlPFC and mPFC lead
to a similar pattern of behavior in the punishment domain. The same is
observed in the reward domain, although to a lesser extent. A possible
explanation for the similar effect following disruption of the R dlPFC and
mPFC is that stimulation of one region may have affected the functioning of
the whole network involved. We note that although the two investigated
regions are sufficiently distant from each other so that TMS effects should be
specific and the coil used is known for its good balance between depth and
focality (Deng et al., 2013), brain stimulation is not necessarily focal and we
cannot rule out network effects. Moreover, the connectivity between the R
dlPFC and the posterior mPFC has already been demonstrated to be
responsible for normative decisions in second-party interactions (Baumgartner
et al., 2011). Although in our study we target the anterior mPFC, evidence of
coupling between this region and the right dlPFC has also been reported
(Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). Future studies should focus on unraveling
the functional specificities of these two regions and how they are connected in
reciprocal fairness. Reciprocal fairness is a complex behavior that is likely not
restricted to a single area of the frontal cortex (Ruff et al., 2013). The





In each experimental session, one trial was randomly selected and the three
individuals (i.e., Proposer, Receiver and Observer) were paid their earnings in the task
in that selected trial. Payoff calculations were made in ECUs and then converted to
Euros (1 ECU = e0.10). Proposers’ payoff were always calculated in the same way
regardless of the condition selected for payment while Receivers’ and Observers’
payoff were calculated slightly different depending on the condition selected for
payment. Table 2.3 summarizes how the payoffs were calculated. In addition to the
earnings from the game, TMS participants, who played in the role of Receivers in the
Rec_C and Rec_NC conditions and in the role of Observers in the Obs_C and Obs_NC
conditions received the participation fee of e7.5 and an additional e5 depending on
their answers in the Social Appropriateness task.
Table 2.3: Payoff calculations
Payoffs
Condition Proposers Receiver Observer
Rec_C Ep−A+ 5 × (PR) A− abs(PR) Eo
Rec_NC Ep−A+ 5 × (PR) A Eo
Obs_C Ep−A+ 5 × (PR) A Eo− abs(PR)
Obs_NC Ep−A+ 5 × (PR) A Eo
Note: Ep stands for the Proposers’ endowment of 240 ECUs; A equals
the number of ECUs allocated by the Proposer to the Receiver; PR
equals the amount of positive or negative ECUs used by the TMS
participant to reward or punish the Proposer. Eo stands for the
Observers’ endowment of 200 ECUs.
A.2. Statistical models for the analysis reported in the paper
Sham stimulation – Punishment and reward
Random-effects Tobit regressions for panel data left-censored at zero and
right-censored at +200 with standard errors clustered at the participant level. Only
trials in the sham stimulation are considered. The dependent variable is participants’
decisions to punish or reward the Proposer when the Proposer’s offer was Very Greedy
and Greedy (Model 1) or Equal, Generous and Very Generous (Model 2). Dummy
predictors coding cost of punishment/reward, personal involvement and the
interaction between cost and personal involvement (in table 2.5) are included as
within-subject variables. In addition, we controlled for gender, fairness and
appropriateness ratings, trial order within an experimental session (i.e., 1-140) and
session number (i.e., 1-3). Baseline is composed by Obs_NC condition.
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Trail Number 0.0696+ 0.0266
(0.0378) (0.0407)
Session Number 2 -8.865 -33.80
(20.89) (31.80)











Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Trail Number 0.0771∗ 0.0282
(0.0373) (0.0408)
Session Number 2 -9.312 -33.79
(20.90) (31.81)











Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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dlPFC and mPFC stimulation – Punishment and reward
Random-effects Tobit regressions for panel data left-censored at zero and
right-censored at +200 are run with standard errors clustered at the participant level.
The dependent variable is participants’ decisions to punish or reward the Proposer
when the Proposer’s offer was Very Greedy or Greedy (Model 1) or Equal, Generous
and Very Generous (Model 2) reported in Table 2.6. Dummy predictors coding
stimulation, cost of punishment/reward, personal involvement and the interaction
between stimulation and cost, stimulation and personal involvement as well as the
three-way interaction between stimulation, cost of punishment/reward and personal
involvement are included as within-subject variables. We controlled for gender,
fairness and appropriateness ratings, trial order within an experimental session (i.e.,
1-140) and session number (i.e., 1-3). Baseline is composed by Obs_NC condition in
the sham treatment.
39









dlPFC x Cost -13.42∗ -45.80∗∗∗
(6.821) (7.690)




dlPFC x Receiver -10.19 5.370
(6.633) (7.420)
mPFC x Receiver -7.073 -2.162
(6.601) (7.326)
Cost x Receiver -30.10∗∗∗ -6.437
(6.751) (7.625)
dlPFC x Cost x Receiver 6.991 12.04
(9.692) (10.90)








Trail Number -0.0184 0.0815∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0278)
Session Number 2 15.67∗∗∗ 0.764
(2.509) (2.798)











Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Below the marginal effect on the censored expected value are computed, given that
the observed values are censored at 0 and +200. Control variables include fairness,
appropriateness ratings, gender, trial number and session number.
Table 2.7: Marginal effects for altruistic punishment (model 1 in Table 2.6).
Condition df chi2 P>chi2 Contrast Std.Err. [95% CI]
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 4.38 0.036 -8.37 4.0 -16.21 -0.53
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 10.23 0.0014 -9.38 2.93 -15.13 -3.63
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 0.00 0.96 0.19 3.96 -7.58 7.96
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 6.8 0.009 -8.15 3.13 -14.28 -2.02
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 3.41 0.065 -7.26 3.93 -14.97 0.44
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 7.17 0.007 -7.87 2.94 -13.63 -2.11
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 0.11 0.74 -1.31 3.92 -8.99 6.37
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 10.96 0.0009 -10.18 3.08 -16.21 -4.15
Joint 8 27.25 0.0006
Table 2.8: Marginal effects for altruistic reward (model 2 in Table 2.6).
Condition df chi2 P>chi2 Contrast Std.Err. [95% CI]
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 25.89 0.0000 17.67 3.47 10.86 24.48
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 1.11 0.29 -2.68 2.53 -7.65 2.29
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 17.46 0.0000 14.27 3.41 7.58 20.97
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 15.18 0.0001 -10.46 2.68 -15.72 -5.2
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 18.15 0.0000 14.43 3.39 7.79 21.07
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 6.64 0.0099 -6.55 2.54 -11.53 -1.57
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 21.99 0.0000 15.93 3.4 9.27 22.6
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 7.32 0.007 -7.14 2.64 -12.32 -1.97
Joint 8 70.39 0.0000
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A.3. Fairness and social appropriateness ratings per condition and
per site of stimulation
Figure 2.7: Fairness and social appropriateness ratings per condition and per site of
stimulation. Full sample.
Note: Fairness and social appropriateness ratings are displayed per stimulation and per
condition for each allocation bundle available to Proposers. Fairness ratings ranged from
1 (Very unfair) to 7 (Very fair) while Social appropriateness ratings ranged from 1 (Very
socially inappropriate) to 4 (Very socially appropriate).
A.4. Results considering the full sample
The section below presents the results from the full sample (i.e., weak reciprocators
included). Random-effects Tobit regressions for panel data left-censored at zero and
right-censored at +200 are run with standard errors clustered at the participant level.
Same specifications as reported for the regression conducted with the reduced sample.
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dlPFC x Cost -7.983 -29.38∗∗∗
(6.172) (7.193)




dlPFC x Receiver -12.26∗ -0.798
(5.845) (6.749)
mPFC x Receiver -16.72∗∗ -3.679
(5.873) (6.733)
Cost x Receiver -34.85∗∗∗ -0.226
(8.793) (10.19)
dlPFC x Cost x Receiver 8.889 5.517
(8.763) (10.19)








Trail Number 0.0199 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0262)
Session Number 2 14.19∗∗∗ 5.436∗
(2.256) (2.592)











Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TMS effect on Punishment - Full Sample
Below the marginal effects for punishment (Model 1 in Table 2.9) on the censored
expected value are computed, given that the observed values are censored at 0 and
+200. Control variables include fairness, appropriateness ratings, gender, trial number
and session number.
Table 2.10: Marginal effects for altruistic punishment. Full Sample (model 1 in
Table 2.9).
Condition df chi2 P>chi2 Contrast Std.Err. [95% CI]
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 5.40 0.0201 -7.72 3.32 -14.23 -1.21
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 3.52 0.0606 -3.96 2.11 -8.10 -0.18
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 0.35 0.5528 1.94 3.27 -4.46 8.34
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 1.40 0.2364 -2.75 2.32 -7.30 1.80
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 6.15 0.0132 -8.19 3.30 -14.67 -1.72
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 0.90 0.3418 -2.04 2.15 -6.24 2.17
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 2.30 0.1297 4.97 3.28 -1.46 11.40
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 5.05 0.0247 -5.18 2.30 -9.70 -0.66
Joint 8 18.31 0.0190
Figure 2.8: Effect of TMS stimulations on punishment. Full sample.
Note: The figure summarizes the marginal effect of R dlPFC and mPFC stimulation versus
sham stimulation on punishment of Greedy and Very Greedy offers for the whole sample.
The horizontal solid line at zero indicates the point estimate for sham treatment in the
different conditions. The black circle and the grey diamond markers represent the marginal
effects of R dlPFC and mPFC stimulation compared to sham, respectively. The bars indicate
the 95% confidence intervals based on the regression analysis.
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TMS effect on Reward - Full Sample
Below the marginal effect for reward (Model 2 in Table 2.9) on the censored expected
value are computed, given that the observed values are censored at 0 and +200.
Control variables include fairness, appropriateness ratings, gender, trial number and
session number.
Table 2.11: Marginal effects for altruistic reward. Full sample (model 2 in Table 2.9).
Condition df chi2 P>chi2 Contrast Std.Err. [95% CI]
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 14.61 0.0001 11.75 3.07 5.71 17.73
(dlpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 0.93 0.3353 -2.03 2.10 -6.14 2.09
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 16.20 0.0001 12.27 3.05 6.30 18.25
(dlpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 3.29 0.0695 -3.83 2.11 -7.97 0.31
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_NC 1 6.13 0.0133 7.49 3.03 1.56 13.42
(mpfc vs sham) Rec_C 1 4.23 0.0398 -4.32 2.10 -8.44 -0.02
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_NC 1 10.62 0.0011 9.86 3.02 3.93 15.79
(mpfc vs sham) Obs_C 1 2.75 0.0975 -3.52 2.13 -7.70 -0.64
Joint 8 40.14 0.0000
Figure 2.9: Effect of TMS stimulations on reward. Full sample.
Note: The figure summarizes the marginal effect of R dlPFC and mPFC stimulation versus
sham stimulation on reward of Equal, Generous and Very Generous offers for the whole
sample. The horizontal solid line at zero indicates the point estimate for sham treatment
in the different conditions. The black circle and the grey diamond markers represent the
marginal effects of R dlPFC and mPFC stimulation compared to sham, respectively. The bars
indicate the 95% confidence intervals based on the regression analysis.
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A.5. Differences between Weak and Strong reciprocators
dlPFC Punishment. Differently than the main results reported in the Chapter where
we observed a significant decrease in punishment after stimulation of the R dlPFC in
the Rec_C condition following Very Greedy and Greedy offers, when considering the
full sample this result is only marginally significant (t = −3.96, p = .06, FDR
correction not significant at 90% CI). Furthermore, no differences between right
dlPFC and sham stimulation were observed in the Obs_C condition (t = −2.75,
p = .23). Results for the Rec_NC and Obs_NC are the same of the ones reported in the
paper.
mPFC Punishment. In the main results reported in the Chapter we observe a
significant reduction in punishment of Very Greedy and Greedy offers in the Rec_C
condition and a marginally significant decrease in punishment in the Rec_NC
condition following downregulation of the mPFC. When considering the full sample
we observe no differences between mPFC and sham stimulation in the Rec_C
condition (t = −2.04, p = .34). Moreover, we find a significant decrease in
punishment in the Rec_NC condition compared to sham stimulation (t = −8.19,
p = .01, FDR corrected at 95% CI). No differences in results between the full and
partial sample were found for the Obs_NC and Obs_C conditions.
dlPFC Reward. Regarding reward, while I report in the Chapter a significant decrease
in reward of Equal, Generous and Very Generous offers following stimulation of the R
dlPFC compared to sham stimulation in the Obs_C condition, this result is only
marginally significant when considering the full sample of participants (t = −3.83,
p = .07, FDR corrected at 90% CI).
mPFC Reward. Differences between the full and partial sample were only found for
the Obs_C condition. While we observe a significant decrease in reward of Equal,
Generous and Very Generous offers in the Obs_C condition following mPFC stimulation
when considering the partial sample, this result in only marginally significant for the
full sample of participants (t = −3.52, p = .097, FDR corrected at 90% CI).
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A.6. Frequency of Reciprocation by Weak and Strong Reciprocators
Figure 2.10: Relative frequency of reciprocity (punishment and reward) in trials
under sham stimulation for weak reciprocators.
Note: The figure displays the frequency to which weak reciprocators chose to transfer
negative ECUs to Proposers (punishment) and positive ECUs to Proposers (reward) across
all four experimental conditions under sham. Participant IDs are displayed at the top of each
panel, Y axis represents the percentage of trials in sham stimulation (collapsed across the
four experimental conditions) and the x axis represents the number of ECUs transferred to
Proposers (negative ECUs represent punishment, while positive ECUs represent rewards).
For these participants, frequency of non-reciprocity was high, as they chose to not punish
or reward the Proposer in more than 50% of trials.
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Figure 2.11: Relative frequency of reciprocity (punishment and reward) in trials
under sham stimulation for strong and weak reciprocators.
Note: The figure displays how weak and strong reciprocators chose to respond to Proposers.
The left panel displays the pattern of response for 25 participants who punished or rewarded
Proposers in at least 50% of the trials (strong reciprocators), while the right panel displays
the pattern of responses of all participants who chose to not punish or reward Proposers
in more than 50% of trials (weak reciprocators). The y axis represents the percentage
of trials in sham stimulation (collapsed across the four experimental conditions) and the
x axis represents the number of ECUs transferred to Proposers (negative ECUs represent
punishment, while positive ECUs represent rewards).
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A.7. Effect of TMS for weak reciprocators.
For completeness, this section presents the results when considering only the Weak
Reciprocators who are excluded from the main analysis presented in the main text of
the paper because they did not punish or reward more than 50% of the times following
sham stimulation. Importantly, we report below the effect of brain stimulation for
this subset of participant to check whether TMS over dlPFC and mPFC changes their
behavior compared to sham. Results show that TMS over dlPFC and mPFC does not
change punishment of Greedy and Very Greedy offers. It also does not change reward
of Equal, Generous and Very Generous offers. This indicates that, as expected, brain
stimulation did not affect the behavior of Weak Reciprocators. Table 2.12 shows the
result of a random-effects Tobit regressions for panel data left-censored at zero and
right-censored at +200 with standard errors clustered at the participant level. The
dependent variable is participants’ decisions to punish or reward the Proposer when
the Proposer’s offer was Very Greedy or Greedy (Model 1) or Equal, Generous and Very
Generous (Model 2). Baseline is composed by the sham treatment.




















Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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6. Instructions
Welcome to this decision-making experiment. 6 The webcam on top of your computer
screen will be turned on and you will be filmed for part of this experiment. You will
be informed when the camera will be turned on and when it will be turned off. The
video will be seen only by the experimenters and will be destroyed once data have been
gathered from it. The content of the video will not affect your payment. If you disagree
with being filmed, you are free to leave at any time. In this case, you will receive the
show-up fee, but you will not receive additional payment.
While being filmed, we kindly ask you to pay attention to the following aspects:
• Please do not touch the camera or move the screen. If you think there is a
problem with the camera, please inform the experimenter.
• Please avoid placing your hands on your face.
• Please remove any caps or hats.
• Remain seated properly and please avoid leaning on the chair.
• Please do not turn away from your screen.
For your participation in this experiment, you will receive a fixed participation fee of
e7.5. In addition, you can earn money with the decisions you make. Please read these
instructions carefully. Importantly, we employ a strict non-deception policy. This
means that all information you receive from this experiment is truthful and when you
are told to interact with other participants these other participants do actually exist.
This experiment consists of a Practice Part, followed by a Task Part. The Practice
Part consists of these instructions and some comprehension questions. It is important
that you answer the comprehension questions correctly. When you have answered all
comprehension questions correctly you can proceed to the Task Part.
In the Task Part, you can earn money by making choices. These earnings depend
on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants of this experiment. This
will be explained in detail later in these instructions. In the experiment, we will use
ECU (Experimental Currency Units), which will be converted to Euro at the end of
the experiment. For all the participants in this experiment, each ECU will be converted
to Euros at a rate of 1 ECU to e0.10.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to you to answer your question in private.
Description of the decision situations
In this experiment, you have to make choices in different decision situations. Each
decision situation will be different and it will be explained in detail. In each decision
situation, there are three different participants, randomly matched with each other
(Figure 2.12). The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever
know the identity of the other individuals with whom he or she is matched. One
participant will be known as Person A, one participant will be known as Person B and
the other participant as Person C.
In each decision situation, Person A allocates money between him/herself and
Person B. Each decision situation consists of two stages:
The first stage
At the beginning of the first stage:
• Person A has 240 ECU at his/her disposal.
• Person B has 0 ECU at his/her own disposal.
6The text font, the size and the appearance of images have been adapted from the original
instruction version.
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Figure 2.12: Participants in each decision situation.
• Person C has 200 ECU at his/her disposal
Person A decides how to distribute his/her 240 ECU between him-/herself and
Person B. Person A is always represented by a red stylized human (Figure 2.13).
When making the decision, Person A can choose one of the following options:
• Keep 200 ECU (± 3 ECU) and Give 40 ECU (±3 ECU) to Person B
• Keep 160 ECU (±3 ECU) and Give 80 ECU (±3 ECU) to Person B
• Keep 120 ECU (±3 ECU) and Give 120 ECU (±3 ECU) to Person B
• Keep 80 ECU (±3 ECU) and Give 160 ECU (±3 ECU) to Person B
• Keep 40 ECU (±3 ECU) and Give 200 ECU (±3 ECU) to Person B
The indicated ± 3 ECU means that, for instance, if Person A chooses the fourth
option then it may be that Person A kept anything between 83 and 77 ECU and that
Person A gave anything between 163 and 157 ECU. The exact amount is randomly
decided. Equivalently for the other options.
Figure 2.13: Person A’s action.
The second stage
Your Role. In some decision situations you will be Person B and in some decision
situations you will be Person C. You will never be Person A. You will always be
represented by a blue stylized man in a rectangular shape.
In each decision situation, you will learn about Person A’s choice. Thereafter, you
can make the decision to increase, decrease or leave unchanged Person A’s payoff. How
exactly this can be done will be described in details later in the instructions.
In each decision situation, before you make your decisions, you will be informed
whether you are Person B or Person C.
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• If you are Person B: Figure 2.14 depicts a decision situation where you are
Person B. In this type of situation, Person A has chosen how to allocate the 240
ECU at his/her own disposal between him/herself and you. After having
learned about Person A’s allocation, you can decide to increase, decrease or
leave unchanged Person A’s payoff. In this case, Person C, who is another
participant of this experiment, has 200 ECU and will only be informed about
Person A’s decision, but he/she will not know what you decide. Person C cannot
modify yours or Person A’s payoffs.
Figure 2.14: Decision situation in which you are Person B.
• If you are Person C: Figure 2.15 below depicts a decision situation where you
are Person C. In this case, Person A has chosen how to allocate the 240 ECU at
his/her own disposal between him/herself and Person B, who is another
participant of this experiment. After having learned about Person A’s allocation,
you can decide to increase, decrease or leave unchanged Person A’s payoff. In
this case, you receive 200 ECU at the beginning of the decision situation.
Person B will only be informed about Person A’s decision, but he/she will not
know what you decide. Person B cannot modify yours or Person A’s payoffs.
Figure 2.15: Decision situation in which you are Person C.
52
Your decision
In some decision situations your decisions can be costly and in some other decision
situations, they will not be costly. In each decision situation, before having to make a
choice, you will be informed whether your decision is costly or non-costly.
• Costly decisions: In some decision situations, you will have to use some of your
ECU to modify Person A’s payoff (Figure 2.16). Specifically:
– if you choose to increase Person A’s payoff, you pay 1 ECU for each 5 ECU
by which Person A’s payoff is increased,
– if you choose to decrease Person A’s payoff, you pay 1 ECU for each 5 ECU
by which Person A’s payoff is decreased,
– if you choose to leave unchanged Person A’s payoff, you do not pay any
ECU.
Figure 2.16: Costly decisions. In this type of decision situations, you pay with your
ECU to modify Person A’s payoff.
• Non-Costly decisions: In some decision situations, you will not have to use your
ECU to modify Person A’s payoff (Figure 2.17). Specifically:
– if you choose to increase Person A’s payoff, you pay 0 ECU for each 5 ECU
by which Person A’s payoff is increased,
– if you choose to decrease Person A’s payoff, you pay 0 ECU for each 5 ECU
by which Person A’s payoff is decreased,
– if you choose to leave Person A’s payoff unchanged, you do not pay any
ECU.
Information
In a decision situation, each Person is informed regarding the options of the other
participants he/she is matched with. The rules are therefore common knowledge. For
instance, before choosing how to allocate the 240 ECU, Person A knows which are the
possible actions available to Person B and Person C and which information they receive.
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Figure 2.17: Non-costly decisions. In these type of decision situations, you will not pay
any ECU to modify Person A’s payoff.
Condition announcement
During the experiment, you first receive information regarding your role (i.e., Person B
or Person C) and the cost of your choice (i.e., Cost or no Cost) as shown below (Figure
2.18). Thereafter, you will be presented with several decision situations where your
role and the cost of your choice remain constant. You will be informed when your role
and/or the cost of your decision change again.
For instance, in the example in Figure 2.18 you are informed that in the next
multiple decision situations you will be Person C and that you pay 1 ECU for each 5
ECU by which Person A’s payoff is increased or decreased (i.e., Costly decision). Be
aware that you will face many decision situations in this experiment and that there
will be waiting periods.
Screen example
After seeing the condition announcement, you will face the decision situations. You
can see below an example of the screen of a decision situation you will face during
the experiment (Figure 2.19). Please note that for each decision situation, you will be
matched with two new participants. This means you will never be exposed to the same
participants more than once.
• On the top right part of the screen, you can see the remaining time you have
to make your decision. You have at most 20 seconds to make your decision and
click on the “Confirm” button. If you do not make a decision within this time
limit you will automatically move to the next decision situation.
• In the centre of the screen, the image with the stylized humans summarizes
the features of the decision situation you are facing. This picture is a reminder
of the condition announcement you saw before starting the decision situations.
You are informed about your role represented by a blue human (i.e., Person B or
Person C) and about the cost of your decision (i.e., cost or no-cost). You will be
presented with several decision situations where your role and the cost of your
decision remain constant. You will be informed when your role and/or the cost
of your decision vary.
• Above the picture, a two-letter ID associated to the Person A you are matched
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Figure 2.18: Condition announcement. You are informed about your role and the cost
of your choice for the following decision situations.
with in that decision situation is displayed. This ID changes in each decision
situation, since you are always matched with a different Person A.
• Below the picture, you learn about Person A’ decision to distribute his/her tokens
with Person B. Please pay particular attention to this because it might vary across
decision situations.
• Your decision consists of moving a slider to decrease or increase Person A’ payoff.
If you move the cursor to the left, you will decrease Person A’s payoff. If you
move the cursor to the right, you will increase Person A’ payoff. You can move
the cursor in the slider or click on the button on the left and on the right. You
can use up to 40 ECU of your own to modify Person A’s payoff. If you do not
move the cursor or click on any button, you leave Person A’s payoff unchanged.
• On the bottom of the screen, you are informed about your payoff and Person A’s
payoff. When you move the slider, this payoffs will automatically update.
• You need to click on Confirm to submit your decision.
Your identity
Your identity and the identity of all other participants is secret. You will never be asked
to reveal it to the other participants during the course of the experiment or after it. Your
name is recorded only at the end of the experiment to pay you. The other participants
will not be able to link your identity to any of the decisions you make. In order to
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.
All the interactions are anonymous and none of the participants can communicate or
influence the choices of the others.
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Figure 2.19: Screen Interface example.
Matching
Importantly, in this experiment, you will never face the same participant more than
once. Thus, you should consider each decision you make as completely independent
from the other decisions: in each decision situation, you will be matched with different
other participants. The actions of these participants have been recorded in a previous
experimental session.
Payment
For each experimental session, you receive a show up fee of e7.5. In addition, in each
experimental session, one of the decision situations you faced will be randomly selected
for payout. You and the other two Persons who participated in the selected decision
situation will be paid according to Person A’s and your choices. Please note that if you
did not make a decision within the time limit for the selected decision situation that
counts for payout, you receive e0 while the other two persons will be paid according
to the initial ECU allocation. All your earnings, including the e7.5 participation fees,
will be transferred to your bank account at the end of the three experimental sessions.
Your earnings will be transferred within one week from the end of the experiment.
Note: Recall, for each participant in this experiment, each ECU will be converted to
money at a rate of 1 ECU to e0.10.
This is the end of the instructions. You can now answer the comprehension questions.








People are often confronted with situations that involve a trade-off between
immediate and delayed benefits and costs, and between one’s own and others’
welfare. Despite the importance of these decisions, intertemporal and social
domains are traditionally analyzed separately. In this paper, we use modified
Dictator Games and examine the relationship between time delay and
generosity in a laboratory experiment. In a between-subjects design, we vary
the time of payout for the dictator and the receiver. Within-subjects, we vary
the endowment of the dictator as well as the price of giving and keeping and
the resulting relative price of giving. Our results show that, at the aggregate
level, time delay does not affect giving. This result holds also when taking into
account the differences in discount rates for own and the recipient’s payoffs.
However, we observe that time delay affects the sensitivity to different prices
of giving. Only when both dictator and recipient receive their payoff
immediately, is giving sensitive to price changes. Third, our data suggest that
the finding of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), that men are more sensitive to
the price of giving than women, extends to contexts with delayed payments.
This also holds for the finding that women give more than men when giving is
expensive, but not for the finding that men are more generous than women
when giving is cheap. Finally, we observe that giving decisions largely respect
GARP also in the presence of delayed payments, suggesting that choices can be
rationalized by a well-behaved utility function.
This paper is co-authored with Arno Riedl, Giang Tran & Matthias Wibral.
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1. Introduction
A large body of evidence shows that many people have social preferences, i.e.,
they care not only about their own payoff, but also the payoff of the persons
they are interacting with (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Chen and Li, 2009;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Camerer and Fehr, 2004). Such preferences have
important consequences for behavior in a wide range of contexts and domains
ranging from incentive systems or negotiations to charitable giving. So far, the
literature on prosocial behavior has typically studied allocation decisions
between an individual and another person, in which the decision and the
consequences occur at the same time. However, in many contexts, if not most,
prosocial behavior has an intertemporal dimension. For instance, the costs of
donating to a charitable organization are often immediate, but the benefits to
the ultimate recipient are delayed.1 Donors might also pledge a donation in
the future, postponing both the cost and the benefit (Andreoni and
Serra-Garcia, 2020). Despite the prevalence and importance of this type of
decisions, intertemporal and social preferences are traditionally analyzed
separately and surprisingly little research has been devoted to understanding
intertemporal social decision making (for exceptions see Kovarik, 2009;
Dreber et al., 2016; Kölle and Wenner, 2018; Rong et al., 2019). The aim of
this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of such decisions using a
laboratory experiment.
To put structure on our analysis while keeping it tractable we consider the
standard workhorse for studying prosocial behavior, the Dictator Game, in
four different treatments. The treatments vary at which of two points in time
(now or in five weeks) the payment to the dictator or the receiver, respectively,
is made. We analyze these differences in a between-subjects design. For a
more complete picture of intertemporal social preferences, we additionally
vary within-subjects the dictator’s endowments, the price of giving, and the
price of keeping (in the spirit of Andreoni & Miller, 2002). In addition, we
elicit both the discount rate for own and the recipient’s payoffs separately
using the convex budget method (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). This allows
to test whether dictators discount the utility received from own payoff and the
utility received from the other’s payoff at different rates and to analyze how
time preferences relate to giving in the different treatments.2
This approach has several advantages. First, it allows us to study whether
the sensitivity of giving to different prices changes with time delay. This is
especially important in the context of matching grants where a company or
institution promises to match the donations from individual donors. For
example, a 1:1 matching effectively halves the relative price of giving. In our
setup, we can study whether such changes in prices become less or more
effective when the money reaches the recipient with a delay. Second, we are
able to check whether the important finding by Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001) that men and women have different demand curves for altruism
replicates, and extends to settings with an intertemporal dimension. Third, we
1On a larger time scale one could think of carbon reduction efforts in this context. Adhering
to a carbon reduction agreement is costly in the short run for the current generation, while its
benefits will materialize in the future and mostly benefit other generations.
2For instance, if the dictator discount the utility received from her payoff more than the utility
received from the other’s payoff, one could predict that she will give more of her endowment
when both she and the recipient receive their payoff later compared to a situation where both
receive their payoff earlier.
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can test whether time delay affects the rationality of giving decisions
according to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Given the
additional layer of complexity, we might expect a lower degree of
rationalizability in treatments which involve time delay.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we do not find any significant
differences in giving between treatments when aggregating over all
endowments and prices. Dictators give around 15% of their endowment
irrespective of the timing of payments. Second, we do observe, however, that
the timing of payments affects the sensitivity to different prices. Only when
both dictator and recipient receive their payoff immediately, does giving
increase with the relative price of giving. This relationship holds also when
looking at the prices of keeping and the price of giving separately. That is,
dictators give more (less) when keeping (giving) is costly. In the other
treatments that involve time delays, dictators are not sensitive to changes in
the prices. Third, our data suggest that the finding of Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001) that men are more sensitive to the price of giving than women extends
to contexts with delayed payments. This holds also for the finding that women
give more than men when giving is expensive, but not for the finding that men
are more generous than women when giving is cheap. Fourth, giving decisions
respect GARP also in the presence of delayed payments, indicating that
choices can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function.
Our study differs from previous work in several important dimensions.
First, we focus on a comprehensive set of combinations of immediate and
delayed payments instead of comparing only a subset of these. Second, by
explicitly measuring discount rates for self and other we are able to test
potential channels through which time delay might affect giving behavior.
Third, we study behavior for a wide range of prices of keeping and giving. We
are thus able to investigate differences in rationalizability of choices. We
extend the analysis of the sensitivity of giving to different prices to contexts
involving time delays. Finally, our findings contribute to the literature on
discounting for others.
2. Literature review
Our study is related to several strands of the literature. Most importantly, it
contributes to the nascent literature on intertemporal social preferences by
providing a comprehensive analysis and empirical test. A few paper compare
giving in a Dictator Game when payments for both the dictator and the
recipient occur at a later point in time compared to a situation in which both
are paid immediately. The evidence so far is mixed. Both Kovarik (2009) and
Dreber et al. (2016) find that giving is lower when payments are postponed
for both the dictator and the recipient. The opposite finding, i.e., higher giving
when both payments are delayed is reported in a hypothetical Dictator Game
study by Yi et al. (2011).3 Higher giving when both payments are delayed, has
also been found in two studies on giving to charitable organizations. In a
natural field experiment, Breman (2011) investigates how donors to a
charitable organization react when asked to increase their monthly
contributions, either immediately or at a later date. The findings showed
3In line with this, Agerström and Björklund (2009) find that people report that they would
be less likely to choose selfish over altruistic behaviors when thinking about distant compared to
near future events.
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significantly higher donations when dictators are asked to commit to future
donations. Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2020) examine how donations are
affected when they are delayed and individuals commit in advance to their
giving decisions. More individuals decide to give when the decision is made in
advance, than when both the decision and payment take place immediately.
Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2020) suggest that individuals who dislike giving,
choose not to give when the gift is paid immediately, but might choose to give
when the cost of giving is delayed.
In a hypothetical study, Rogers and Bazerman (2008) show that people are
more likely to forgo an amount of money in order to donate it to a charity
when their choices are implemented in the distant future rather than
immediately. Another hypothetical study (Ida and Ogawa, 2012) finds lower
giving when the dictator receives the payoff immediately whereas the
receiver’s payoff is delayed, compared to a situation in which both receive
their payoff immediately. Our paper is also closely related to two recent papers
by Kölle and Wenner (2018) and Rong et al. (2019). Kölle and Wenner (2018)
study whether individuals exhibit present bias in a task where they have to
allocate real effort between themselves and others at different points in time.
In contrast to most of the literature, they assume that individuals discount
payoffs, and not utility. Using this model, they find substantial present bias in
generosity and a correlation between present bias in social and non-social
contexts at the individual level. Rong et al. (2019) study a framework in
which the discount rate a person uses in intertemporal decisions depends on
both the recipient at the earlier point in time (herself or someone else) and at
the later point in time (herself or someone else). This implies that in addition
to the conventional discount rates for self and other, they assume that
individuals have two additional specific discount rates: one for situations
involving an earlier payoff for the self and a later payoff for the other, and one
for situations involving an earlier payoff for the other and a later payoff for the
self. Using the convex time budget method they estimate the resulting four
different discount rates. Their main finding is that their participants have a
higher discount rate in situations in which the earlier payment is for
themselves and the payment at the later point in time for someone else
compared to situations in which both payments are for themselves or both
payments are for someone else.
3. Methods
In this section, we describe the different parts of the experimental design.
First, we explain in detail the modified version of the Dictator Game we
implemented, including the different prices of giving and prices of keeping.
Second, we present the different treatments where we vary the time delays
associated with the payoffs for the dictators and/or the recipients. Thereafter,
we describe the task we use to elicit intertemporal preferences of the dictators
for themselves and for others. Finally, we describe the experiment procedures.
3.1. Modified Dictator Game
Dictators played a series of Dictator Games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) in a
randomized order that varied the endowment that could be redistributed, the
prices of giving (pgive) and keeping (pkeep) and, as a consequence, the relative
price of giving k which is defined as k = pgive/pkeep. Table 3.1 shows the 15
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decision situations each dictator faced during the experiment. Decision
situations differ in the number of tokens to be divided with an anonymous
recipient and in the number of points a token was worth to each player. The
total amount of tokens to be divided is 40, 60, 72, 90 or 120 and tokens have
a hold or pass value of 1, 2, or 3 points each. This difference in values
generates situations where giving and keeping are more or less costly. As in
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002), we define
the inverse of the Hold Value is the price of self-payoff pkeep, and the inverse of
the Pass Value is the price of other payoff pgive.
For instance, in Situation 1 the prices are pkeep = 1/3 and pgive = 1. Hence,
transferring one token increases the recipient’s payoff by one point, but
decreases the dictator’s payoff by three points. The situations where
pkeep = pgive = 1 are standard Dictator Games. In situations where
pgive < pkeep, passing one token decreases the dictator’s payoff by one point,
but increases the recipient’s payoff by either two or three points. At the end of
the experiment, each point earned is converted to e0.10 and paid to the
dictators and recipients, respectively.
Table 3.1: Dictator Game. Experimental parameters
Situation Endowment Hold value Pass value pkeep pgive Relative price k
1 40 3 1 1/3 1 3
2 40 1 3 1 1/3 1/3
3 60 2 1 0.5 1 2
4 60 1 2 1 0.5 0.5
5 60 3 1 1/3 1 3
6 60 1 3 1 1/3 1/3
7 60 1 1 1 1 1
8 72 2 1 0.5 1 2
9 72 1 2 1 0.5 0.5
10 72 3 1 1/3 1 3
11 72 1 3 1 1/3 1/3
12 72 1 1 1 1 1
13 90 1 2 1 0.5 0.5
14 90 2 1 0.5 1 2
15 120 1 1 1 1 1
Note: The table describes the 15 decision situations which vary the resources that could be
redistributed (i..e, Endowment), pkeep, pgive and the relative price of giving k.
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3.2. Time delay treatments
We implemented a between-subjects design where the participants are allocated
to one of four time-delay treatments. In each treatment, a dictator decides how
to share the endowment with a recipient after being informed about the timing
when she and the recipient will receive the payoffs. The four treatments are
listed below, where the first term refers to the delay associated with the payoff
of the dictator and the second term to the delay associated with the payoff of
the recipient, respectively:
• NowNow. Both dictator and recipient receive their earnings on the day of
the experiment.
• NowLater. The dictator receives the earnings on the day of the
experiment, while the recipient receives the earnings 35 days after the
experiment took place.
• LaterLater. Both dictator and recipient receive their earnings 35 days after
the experiment took place.
• LaterNow. The dictator receives the earnings 35 days after the
experiment took place, while the recipient receives them on the day of
the experiment.
Table 3.2 shows the different time delays for the payoff of dictators and
recipients, in each of the four treatments. The last column shows the number
of dictators participating in each treatment.4
Table 3.2: Dictator Game. Time delays.
Treatment Payoff dictator (days) Payoff recipient (days) N. dictators
NowNow 0 0 89
NowLater 0 35 83
LaterLater 35 35 90
LaterNow 35 0 88
Note: Treatment descriptions and number of dictators.
3.3. Intertemporal decision task for Self and for Other
After the modified Dictator Game, the dictators completed two individual tasks
where they allocate money over time: in one task, they made decisions for
themselves (i.e., Self), and in another separate task they decided on behalf of
another participant who was assigned to the role of recipient in the Dictator
Game (i.e., Other).5 We elicit time preferences of each dictator for Self and for
Other using a modified version of the so-called Convex Budget Method
introduced by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The order of these tasks was
counterbalanced between subjects. The only difference between the task for
Self and the task for Other is that the allocation decisions affect either the
earnings of the dictator or the earnings of a recipient, respectively. Each task
consists of a list of 36 intertemporal allocation choices which were presented
in a randomized order. In each decision, dictators are asked to allocate 100
4A time delay of 5 weeks is similar to the one used in a treatment comparable to our LaterLater
in e.g., Kovarik (2009) or Dreber et al. (2016).
5For each dictator, the Other player was a randomly chosen participant who was assigned the
role of recipient. Thus, the chance that a recipient is matched with the same dictator in both the
Dictator Games and the Intertemporal Task is very small, but larger than zero.
64
tokens to a sooner and a later date. The sooner date t is 0, 14, 49 days after
the experiment took place and the later date h is 35, 49, 63, 77, 84 and 112
days after the experiment took place. Each token allocated to the sooner date
has a value at, and each token allocated to the later date has a value at+h. The
value of each token allocated to the later date is fixed at at+h = e0.20, while
the value of each token allocated to the sooner date at varies and takes the
values at= e0.19, e0.18, e0.17, e0.16, e0.15 and e0.14. Dictators are
informed that they can allocate any amount of tokens to one of the two dates.
Table 3.3 shows the experimental parameters for the intertemporal tasks.
Table 3.3: Intertemporal task. Experimental parameters.
Set t (sooner date) h (delay) 1+r Annual discount rates (%)
1 0 35 1.05; 1.11; 1.18; 1.25; 1.33; 1.43 54; 110; 170; 233; 301; 373
2 0 63 1,00; 1.05; 1.18; 1.25; 1.33; 1.54 0; 30; 94; 130; 167; 250
3 14 35 1.05; 1.11; 1.18; 1.25; 1.33; 1.43 54; 110; 170; 233; 301; 373
4 14 63 1,00; 1.05; 1.18; 1.25; 1.33; 1.54 0; 30; 94; 130; 167; 250
5 49 35 1.05; 1.11; 1.18; 1.25; 1.33; 1.43 54; 110; 170; 233; 301; 373
6 49 63 1,00; 1.05; 1.18; 1.25; 1.33; 1.54 0; 30; 94; 130; 167; 250
Note: (1 + r) is the experimental gross interest rate, defined as in Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012). 1 + r and the annual discount rates refer to each of the six intertemporal allocation
choices within a set. In both tasks (i.e., Self and Other), the parameters are identical.
3.4. Procedure and payments
A total of 700 participants took part in the experiments. The 350 dictators
were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was
computerized and took place at the BEElab of Maastricht University - School of
Business and Economics. The experiment was programmed with z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).6 We conducted 15 experimental sessions and the data
were collected in March and October 2017. In 7 experimental sessions, we
implemented the treatments NowNow and LaterLater. In the remaining 8
sessions, we collected data for the treatments NowLater and LaterNow. In each
experimental session, approximately half of the participants were randomly
allocated to one treatment implemented in that session. Each session took
about 110 minutes, including the time participants spent reading the
instructions at their own pace and a final questionnaire where they were asked
to report demographic information and to answer questions regarding their
spending attitudes and whether they believed the payment procedure. Around
80% of the dictators were students from the School of Business and
Economics. The remaining 20% were from other disciplines such as
psychology, biomedical sciences and law. Approximately 50% of the
participants were male and the average age was 21 years.7
6The 350 recipients were recruited from the subject pool of BonnEconLab (Bonn, Germany)
because of the limited number of participants registered at Maastricht University. Recipients
completed a Qualtrics survey where they answered some hypothetical questions and provided
their name, email address and IBAN. Recipients were told they would receive at least e4
for completing the survey and that additional earnings depended on the decisions of another
participant in the experiment. Dictators were informed that their decisions will affect the
earnings of another participant in the experiment, but they were not told that recipients were
students of another university.
7Men and women are equally distributed across treatments (χ2(3) = 2.41, p = 0.493). Men
in each treatment: NowLater: 57%; LaterLater: 47%; NowNow: 55%; LaterNow: 49%.
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Each dictator completed the experiment in a cubicle isolated from other
participants. In the Dictator Game, the decision situations (Table 3.1) were
randomized at the individual level and each situation was displayed
individually on the computer screen. In the experiment, dictators and
recipients were labeled as A and B, respectively. In each decision situation of
the Dictator Game, a dictator was randomly rematched with a new recipient.
In the intertemporal tasks, the order of the tasks was counterbalanced in each
experimental session and for each treatment: half of the participants
completed first the intertemporal task for Self, and vice-versa.8 When deciding
on behalf of someone else, a dictator was matched with the same recipient for
the whole duration of the task.
One randomly selected situation in each of the three tasks of the experiment
was selected to determine the payments for dictator and the recipient. The
earnings of the dictator therefore consists of the amount she decided to keep for
herself in the selected situation in the Dictator Game plus the earning from the
intertemporal choice task for Self. The earnings of recipients were determined
by the dictators they were matched with and consisted of the amount given
by the dictator in the Dictator Game task and of the allocation made by the
dictator in the intertemporal choice task for Other. Participants earned e25.2
on average and all the earnings were paid via bank transfers.9 Transfers were
made on the day of the experiment making sure that participants received the
earnings according to the decisions which were paid out. The possible payment
dates were chosen to ensure that they will not be on the weekend and national
holidays. In the Netherlands, bank transfers are usually received on the day of
the transaction.
Because of the time delay associated with the payments, it is important to
equalize transaction costs and credibility across treatments. To deal with this,
we employed a similar approach as Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). First, all
payments were transferred to the bank accounts that participants provided.
Participants were truthfully informed that payments were issued by research
assistants not otherwise involved in the experiment and that is was impossible
to link their identity to their behavior. A second challenge was removing any
convenience resulting from concentrating all payments in one period. To solve
this, before starting each intertemporal task, dictators were told that they or
the other participant would receive e1 sooner and e1 later, regardless of the
allocation decision. All experimental earnings were added to this e2 baseline
earning. Third, dictators were given a business card of the secretarial office of
the Department of Economics of the School of Business and Economics and
explicitly told to write an e-mail should they experience any problems with
payments. Fourth, at the end of the experiment dictators were asked to write
down the amounts they earned in each part of the experiment and the dates
when the transfers will be made on two invoices. They were instructed to keep
one invoice. Fifth, to minimize the cost of remembering the amounts they
8See Figures 3.7 and 3.8 in the Appendix for an example of the screen interface for the
Dictator Game and Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 for the screen interfaces of the intertemporal
tasks Self and Other, respectively.
9Bank accounts in the Netherlands and in Germany are linked to debit cards, which are widely
used in most stores such as supermarkets, restaurants, and pubs without any transaction fees.
The responses from the dictators in the post experimental questionnaire show that around 53%
of the dictators pay more than 70% of their general expenditures by debit card and that 87% pay
more than 30% of their general expenditures by debit card. 72% of the dictators prefer debit
cards as a method of payment over cash and credit card.
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earned, participants were told before starting the experiment that they would
receive an individual email from research assistants not otherwise involved in
the experiment with a summary of their earnings and the dates when the
transfers will be made.10
4. Hypotheses
In this section, we describe the hypotheses. First, we focus on the effect of time
delay on giving in the Dictator Game. Second, we study the relative price effect
on giving. Finally, we analyze separately how giving depends on pkeep and pgive,
and how different time delays affect this relationship. We base the hypotheses
on the empirical literature reviewed in Section 2.
The first hypothesis refers to the effect of time delay on giving in the Dictator
Game. The evidence in this domain is so far mixed. Therefore, we first focus on
the analysis of the effect of time delay on giving aggregating over the different
endowments and prices, and we propose the null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Aggregated over different endowments and prices, time delay does
not affect giving.
Based on standard microeconomic theory we assume that giving follows the
"law of demand" and that only the relative price matters. We therefore propose
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. At the aggregate level, giving decreases with increasing relative
price of giving. 2b. This relationship holds for all four treatments separately.
Our design allows to investigate how time delay affects the sensitivity to
different prices of keeping pkeep and prices of giving pgive. Even though
according to standard microeconomic theory only the relative prices should be
relevant, it is perceivable that it matters behaviorally if the absolute price of
giving or the absolute price of keeping changes. We expect that giving
decreases (increases) as the the price of giving (keeping) increases. We
therefore propose the following exploratory null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a. In absolute terms, the price sensitivity of giving is the same for
the price of giving pgive as for the price of keeping pkeep. 3b. This relationship
holds for all the four treatments separately.
5. Results
In this section, we first present the overall treatment (i.e., time delay) effect
on giving (Hypotheses 1), and test whether this effect holds when taking into
account the dictators’ discount rates for Self and Other. We then study the
relative price sensitivity and how this relationship is affected by time delays
(Hypothesis 2), and whether it matters if the absolute price of giving or the
absolute price of keeping changes (Hypothesis 3). We also discuss if previous
results obtained in a setup similar to our NowNow treatment replicate in the
10Dictators highly trusted that the payments will be transferred (on a scale from 0 to 10, where
0 means do not trust at all and 10 means fully trust, the average was 9.27 and the median 10)
and that it will be transferred on the designated day (average 8.84, median 10).
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more complex setup we study. Thereafter, we explore whether the choices we
observe are rationalizable and whether time delay affects the rationalizability
of choices.
5.1. Effects of time delay on giving
We first look at the effect of time delay on giving at the treatment level
aggregating over endowments and prices. Since endowments vary across
decision situations, we define giving as the ratio of the number of tokens the
dictator gives to the amount of tokens the dictator is endowed with.11 Figure
3.1 shows giving in each of the four treatments.
Figure 3.1: Dictator Game. Mean of giving per treatment.
Across all treatments, dictators share on average 14.6% of their
endowments, and giving is similar across treatments (Table 3.4).12 A
Kruskal-Wallis test confirms the impression of no differences in giving across
treatments (χ2(3) = 2.07, p = 0.55). Thus, when aggregating over all
endowments and prices, time delay does not affect giving.
Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows the estimates of a random-effects Tobit
regression including treatment dummy variables. The regression corroborates
the result of the non-parametric test that none of the treatments has a
different effect on giving compared to NowNow. Furthermore, a Wald test on
the restriction that all coefficients of the treatments are jointly equal to zero
does not reject this restriction (p = 0.537). Since time delay does not affect
giving, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.
Result 1 At the aggregate level, time delay does not affect giving.
11All the Wald tests presented are Holm corrected, unless otherwise stated. Regression tables
using absolute giving as dependent variable are shown in Table 3.10 and 3.13 in the Appendix.
12The average amount of giving we observe is lower than the amount reported in the widely
cited study by Engel (2011), where dictators allocate an average of 28% of the endowments.
Note, however, that this average includes both students and non-students. Engel (2011) shows
that on average, non-students give much more than students.
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Table 3.4: Effect of time delay on giving.
Treatment Mean Std. Dev. Median N
NowLater .153 .165 .089 83
LaterLater .163 .170 .097 90
NowNow .144 .156 .109 89
LaterNow .124 .154 .073 88
Total .146 .161 .083 350
Note: Mean, standard deviation, and median of giving in each treatment.












Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left and right censoring to account for the within-subject
design and the censoring at zero and one. The dependent variable is giving coded as the ratio between the
number of tokens shared with an anonymous participant over the amount of tokens endowed. NowNow is
the omitted treatment.
We note that this result does not take potentially important heterogeneity
in participants’ discount rates into account. Therefore, we estimate these
discount rates using the data of the intertemporal tasks and check whether
Result 1 is robust to taking these two aspects into account. For the estimation
of both the discount rates for Self and Other, we follow the approach of
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) which requires additional assumptions. We
thus assume a time separable constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility





(ct − ω1)α + βδh
1
α
(ct+h − ω2)α, (3.1)
where δ and β indicate the one period discount factor and the present bias
parameter, respectively. The values ct and ct+h are the payoffs in the
intertemporal choice task at the time t and t + h, respectively. α is the
curvature parameter of the CRRA utility function. The terms ω1 and ω2
capture background consumption (i.e., wealth). The values of β, δ, and α in
the intertemporal formulation of a Stone-Geary linear demand for ct (see
Equation 3.2) can be estimated using non-linear least squares. We do this
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separately for Self and Other. Following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), we
restrict ω1 = ω2 = 0 for the estimation of parameters at the individual level to
limit the number of estimated parameters. The parameter estimates are
reported in Table 3.11 in the Appendix. Overall, we do not observe a
difference in discount rates for Self and Other (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0.506).13 Several previous studies have found differences in discounting
for Self and Other. However, the findings are inconsistent regarding the
direction of the difference. While some studies have found that individuals are
more impatient when they make decisions for themselves than for others
(Albrecht et al., 2011; Shapiro, 2010) or a charity (Howard, 2013), others
report that individuals choose more impatiently (de Oliveira and Jacobson,






































) ](m− ω2) if t > 0

(3.2)
We can now replicate our analysis of treatment differences in giving taking
into account heterogeneity in discount rates for Self and Other. For this
robustuness check, we split our sample into three groups depending on
whether an individual’s discount rate for Self is smaller, equal to, or higher
than the discount rate for Other. We create the groups considering only the
dictators for whom we could estimate the discount rates both for Self and
Other (304/350). We classify the dictators in the three groups comparing their
discount rate values. We then analyze whether there are differences in giving
between treatments for each of the groups. In total, 114 dictators have a
higher discount rate for Self than Other, for 66 dictators both rates are exactly
equal, and for 124 dictators the discount rate for Self is lower than the one for
Other. Also when looking at these groups separately, we do not find significant
treatment differences in giving. Thus, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1 for any of
the groups.14
5.2. Relative price of giving
In this section, we focus on the relative price of giving to the other
participants, which we define as k = pgive/pkeep. Table 3.6 shows the estimates
of two random-effects Tobit regressions investigating the effect of the relative
price of giving k at the aggregate level and for each treatment, respectively. By
looking at giving relative to the endowment, we control for variation in
endowments.15 Column (1) in Table 3.6 shows that the coefficient of the
variable Relative price k is negative and significant (p ≤ 0.01). This suggests
that, at the aggregate level, giving decreases with increasing relative price of
giving and we thus confirm Hypothesis 2a. Column (2) in Table 3.6 shows the
13We do not observe differences between Self and Other in β (p = 0.212), while α for Self is
larger and significantly different from α for Other (p ≤ 0.001).
14Table 3.12 and 3.13 in the Appendix show the regression analysis for each of these groups.
15See Table 3.10 in the Appendix for the regressions with absolute giving and endowment as
control variable.
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coefficients of the treatments dummy variables and their interactions with the
Relative price k. The coefficient of Relative price k is negative and significant
(p ≤ 0.001), indicating that in NowNow, giving decreases with increasing
relative price of giving. All the interaction coefficients are significant
(p ≤ 0.001), indicating that Relative price k affects giving differently with time
delay compared to NowNow. In fact, Wald tests (i.e., Relative price k +
Treatment×Relative price k = 0) show that giving is insensitive to different
prices of giving when there is time delay (p ≥ 0.131).16 We thus reject
Hypothesis 2b.
Result 2 Giving decreases with increasing relative price of giving only in NowNow.
Table 3.6: Dictator Game. Random-effects Tobit regression on giving across treatments.
The effect of relative price k.
(1) (2)
giving giving








NowLater× Relative price k 0.065∗∗∗
(0.010)
LaterLater× Relative price k 0.071∗∗∗
(0.010)





Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left and right censoring to account for the within-subject
design and the censoring at zero and one. The dependent variable is giving coded as the ratio between the
number of tokens shared with an anonymous participant over the amount of tokens endowed. NowNow is
the omitted treatment.
16p-values for each of the treatments: NowLater, p = 0.556; LaterLater, p = 0.131; NowNow,
p ≤ 0.001; LaterNow, p = 0.629.
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5.3. Absolute price sensitivity and time delay
In this section, we take a closer look at the absolute price sensitivity. We analyze
separately the effect of pkeep and pgive on giving across different time delays.
(a) pkeep (b) pgive
Figure 3.2: Effect of price of keeping pkeep and price of giving pgive across time
delays.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 shows giving depending on the price of keeping pkeep,
pooling across all values of pgive. Panel (b) shows giving depending on the price
of giving pgive, pooling across all values of pkeep. Table 3.7 shows the coefficients
of two random-effects Tobit regressions investigating the effect of pkeep and
pgive at the aggregate level and for each treatment, respectively. Column (1)
in Table 3.7 indicates that, at the aggregate level, the coefficient of pkeep is
positive and significant (p = 0.022). This suggests that giving increases as pkeep
increases. However, the results show that coefficient of the variable pgive is not
significant. A test of pkeep = −pgive indicates that at the aggregate level the
price sensitivity of giving is the same for the price of keeping as for the price of
giving (p = 0.156).17 Thus, we partially reject Hypothesis 3a.
In Column (2) in Table 3.7, we investigate the relationship between pkeep
and pgive and giving in different treatments. Column (2) includes the variables
pkeep and pgive and their interactions with the treatments. A Wald test
investigating whether pkeep = −pgive for each of the treatments separately
shows that in each treatment the price sensitivity of giving is the same for the
price of keeping as for the price of giving (all p values ≥ 0.271).18
The coefficients of pkeep and pgive in NowNow are significantly positive and
negative (both p < 0.001), respectively. This indicates that in the absence of
time delay, dictators give more when it is relative more expensive to keep and
keep more when it is relative more expensive to give. To further investigate
the potential differences between NowNow and the other treatments, we first
focus on the effect of pkeep on giving. The interaction coefficients between
17We note that this is the only result that changes when using the absolute giving as the
dependent variable and controlling for the different endowment. In this case, we still observe
that at the aggregate level pgive is not statistically significant, but the sensitivity of giving is
significantly different between the pkeep and pgive (p = 0.065) (See Table 3.10 in the Appendix).
18E.g., for NowLater, we test if pkeep + NowLater× pkeep = −(pgive + NowLater× pgive).
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the treatment variables and pkeep indicate that the effect of pkeep on giving in
NowNow is significantly different from the effect in NowLater (p = 0.015) and
in LaterLater (p = 0.002), but it is not different from the effect in LaterNow
(p = 0.159). To test the direction of the effect of pkeep, we conduct a Wald test
that indicates that pkeep has a positive effect on giving in NowNow (p ≤ 0.001),
but the effect is not different from zero in the other treatments (NowLater,
p = 0.800; LaterLater, p = 0.984; LaterNow, p = 0.289).19
We now turn our attention to the effect of pgive on giving. The interaction
terms between pgive and the treatment variables are all significant
(all p ≤ 0.001), indicating that pgive has a different effect in all the other
treatments compared to NowNow. The Wald test we use to test the direction of
the effect of pgive indicates that pgive has a negative effect on giving in
NowNow (p ≤ 0.001), but the effect is not different from zero in the other
treatments (NowLater, p = 0.235; LaterLater, p = 0.271; LaterNow, p = 0.303).
We thus reject Hypothesis 3b and propose our third result:
Result 3 Only in NowNow, do dictators give more (less) when keeping (giving)
is more costly. In all treatments involving time delay, dictators are insensitive to
changes in the prices.
19To test for the direction of the effect of pkeep on giving, we use the test: pkeep+NowLater×
pkeep = 0; pkeep + LaterLater × pkeep = 0; pkeep + LaterNow × pkeep = 0, and pkeep = 0. For
testing the direction of the effect of pgive on giving we use the same approach, replacing pkeep
with pgive.
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Table 3.7: Dictator Game. Random-effects Tobit regression on giving across treatments.




























Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left and right censoring to account for the within-subject
design and the censoring at zero and one. The dependent variable is giving coded as the ratio between the
number of tokens shared with an anonymous participant over the amount of tokens endowed. NowNow is
the omitted treatment.
74
5.4. Comparison with previous findings in the literature
The data in Andreoni and Miller (2002) refer to a setup without time delay (i.e.,
our NowNow) and suggest that the amount of giving decreases in the price
of giving and increases in the price of keeping, although this is not formally
tested. However, NowNow seems to be special in this respect, as the dictators
are insensitive to prices in the treatments involving a time delay.20
Looking at giving decisions for different pgive and pkeep separately also allows
us to compare our results to some previous findings in the literature. In the
“classic” Dictator Game (NowNow, pgive and pkeep = 1), we find that average
giving is 14.8%. This is in line with the results documented in the review by
Camerer (2003) where dictators also allocate between 10% and 25%. The
amount we find is lower than what is reported in Andreoni and Miller (2002)
and Fisman et al. (2007) where dictators allocate approximately 23% and 19%
of the endowment to the recipient respectively. These differences are likely due
to the fact that in our experiment the role of participants was kept fixed in all
allocation situations whereas participants switch roles in Andreoni and Miller
(2002) and Fisman et al. (2007). By eliminating potential perceived reciprocity,
keeping roles fixed could lead to lower giving (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011).
Two previous incentivized studies (Kovarik, 2009; Dreber et al., 2016)
compare giving in a Dictator Game when the payment for both the dictator
and the recipient occur immediately relative to a situation in which both are
paid at a later point in time (NowNow vs. LaterLater). Both studies find that
giving is lower when payments are postponed for both the dictator and the
recipient. In Kovarik (2009), where pgive and pkeep = 1, average giving in
NowNow lies around 15% of the endowment, while giving decreases to around
5% of the endowment when the decision is implemented 22 days from the
experiment.21 In Dreber et al. (2016), where pgive = 0.5 and pkeep = 1 and the
experiment is conducted on the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk,
dictators give on average 38% of their endowment in NowNow, while the
average giving is around 33% of the endowment when the payments are
delayed by 30 days.22 In our experiment, we do not replicate these findings.
When pgive and pkeep = 1, average giving in NowNow is 14.8% of the
endowment and 17% in LaterLater (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.390). When
pgive = 0.5 and pkeep = 1, giving is 14.8% in NowNow and 13.9% in LaterLater
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.872).
Gender differences in sensitivity to the relative price of giving
In a widely cited paper, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that the demand
curves for altruism for men and women cross. That is, when giving is
expensive (i.e., k ≥ 1), women are more generous whereas when giving is
cheaper (i.e., k < 1), men are more generous.23 Their setup is equivalent to
20However, we note again that the effect of pkeep is not not different between NowNow and
LaterNow.
21Kovarik (2009) does not report the exact values and these numbers are inferred from
Figure 1 in his paper. Kovarik (2009) includes 24 observations for t = 0, and 30 observations for
the t = 22.
22In a footnote, Dreber et al. (2016) mention that in an initial pilot experiment with a student
sample, dictators kept 90% of their endowment. In contrast, the equivalent number for the
MTurk experiment was 62%.
23See also Croson and Gneezy (2009), Visser and Roelofs (2011), Boschini et al. (2012) for
similar results.
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our NowNow treatment. In the following analysis, we test whether this finding
replicates in settings that involve time delays.
(a) Women, N = 181 (b) Men, N = 169
Figure 3.3: Gender differences in giving across treatments for each relative price
of giving (k).
Figure 3.6 shows the differences in the sensitivity of giving to the relative
price of giving k for each treatment and both genders. A first glance at the figure
already suggests that men and women differ in their sensitivity to the relative
price of giving k in settings which involve time delays. At the aggregate level,
we observe that women are more generous than men (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p = 0.004). The finding that women are more generous than men when giving
is expensive (k ≥ 1) seems to hold independently of time delays (Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests for giving when k ≥ 1, all treatments p < 0.001). However, the
finding that men are more generous when giving is cheap (k < 1), does not
generalize to all treatments. When giving is cheap, men give more than women
in LaterLater and in NowNow (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for giving when k < 1,
p ≤ 0.001), while women give more than men in NowLater and in LaterNow
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for giving when k < 1, p ≤ 0.001). The demand
curves for altruism therefore do not cross in the latter two treatments.
To look at the gender differences more formally, we run a random-effects
Tobit regression for each treatment using giving as dependent variable. We
include a dummy for male participants, the relative price of giving k, and the
interaction term between male and the relative price k (Table 3.8). In all
treatments, we replicate the higher sensitivity of men to the relative price of
giving found by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)—the interaction term of
male and k is negative and significant (all p ≤ 0.012). The coefficient of
Relative price k is positive and significant in all treatments except in NowNow
(in all treatments, p ≤ 0.001; NowNow, p = 0.970). This suggests that, in the
presence of time delays, women give more as giving becomes more costly. A
Wald test on the restriction Relative price k + Male × Relative price k = 0,
indicates that men tend to be efficiency oriented and give less when giving
becomes more costly in all treatments, except LaterLater (in all treatments,
p ≤ 0.001; LaterLater, p = 0.685)
In sum, our results for NowNow tend to replicate the findings of Andreoni
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Table 3.8: Dictator Game. Effect of relative price of giving across treatments, by genders.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NowLater LaterLater NowNow LaterNow
Male -0.044 -0.050 0.071 -0.004
(0.066) (0.084) (0.094) (0.065)
Relative price k 0.034∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.000 0.031∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Male × Relative price k -0.063∗∗∗ -0.034∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012)
Constant 0.048 -0.011 -0.030 -0.028
(0.043) (0.060) (0.063) (0.048)
Observations 1245 1350 1335 1320
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left and right censoring to account for the within-subjects
design and the censoring at zero and at one. The dependent variable is the fraction of income passed. We
include dummy variables for male participants and the interaction term with relative price of giving k.
and Vesterlund (2001). The finding that women are more generous than men
when giving is expensive (k ≥ 1) also holds with time delay. However, when
giving is cheap (k < 1), giving is not higher for men in all treatments.24
5.5. Are choices rationalizable?
Our experimental design allows us not only to capture the potential effect of
delay on giving but also to investigate if individual choices are rationalizable.
That is, whether they can be represented by a utility function. This step is
important for both a better understanding of behavior and for a more accurate
modelling of decision making. We extend the analysis of Andreoni and Miller
(2002) to time-delay treatments. Given the additional layer of complexity, we
might expect a lower degree of rationalizability in treatments which involve
time delays.
Note that in the Netherlands, the interest rate over 5 weeks in 2017 was
very close to zero.25 Therefore, the interest rates in our budget constraints for
those treatments that involve payments made at a later point in time are set to
zero. We test the consistency with utility maximization using the Generalized
Axioms of Revealed Preference (GARP).26 Since we have linear budget
constraints, satisfying GARP is both a necessary and sufficient condition for
having well-behaved preferences (Varian, 1982).
One way to measure the severity of GARP violations is the Critical Cost
Efficiency Index (CCEI) (Afriat, 1972), which measures the amount by which
24See Figure 3.6 in the Appendix for a graph similar to the one in Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001) that shows the payoff passed as a fraction of income defined as Tokens passed×Pass valueEndowment×Hold value , on
the x-axis and the relative price of giving k on the y-axis.
25The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the ECB was 0% during 2017.
26GARP requires that if an option A is directly revealed preferred to an option B, then A is not
strictly within the budget set when B is chosen.
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budget sets should be relaxed to avoid GARP violations. The CCEI lies
between zero and one and the closer it is to one, the smaller the severity of
GARP violations. Table 3.9 lists for each treatment the number of subjects who
violate GARP at least once as well as the mean and median of the CCEI. Across
treatments, between 35.6% and 41% of the subjects violate GARP at least
once. In the literature, GARP violations have only been studied in contexts
similar to the NowNow treatment. In NowNow, we observe that 37.1% of
subjects violate GARP at least once and that 13.5% have a CCEI<0.95. These
values are comparable to the ones reported in Andreoni and Miller (2002). It
should be noted, however, that in our experiment subjects have many more
opportunities to violate GARP since they have to make choices for a larger
menu of budget sets. We do not observe a statically significant difference
across treatments in GARP violations (χ2(3) = 0.645, p = 0.886) as well as the
CCEI (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.772) suggesting that time delay does not affect
the degree of rationality in giving.
Table 3.9: Dictator game. GARP violations and CCEI per treatment
NowLater LaterLater NowNow LaterNow
# (%) subjects who violates GARP 34 (41.0%) 32 (35.6%) 33 (37.1%) 31 (35.2%)
Mean (median) of CCEI 0.994 (1) 0.987 (1) 0.977 (1) 0.989 (1)
N 83 90 89 88
Next, we generate a benchmark level of consistency with which we may
compare our CCEI values. Following Andreoni and Miller (2002), we employ
the test designed by Bronars (1987) that uses the choices of a hypothetical
subject who randomizes uniformly among all allocations on each budget line
as a benchmark. We calculate the CCEI generated by a sample of 25,000 of
such hypothetical subjects and this hypothetical distribution is significantly
different from our actual data in each of the treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test, p values < 0.001).27 It is clear that a significant majority of subjects came
much closer to consistency with utility maximization than random
hypothetical agents. We therefore conclude that most subjects exhibit behavior
that appears to be rationalizable in the sense that their choices nearly satisfy
GARP, so that the violations are minor enough for the purposes of recovering
preferences or constructing appropriate utility functions also when time delay
is involved.
6. Conclusion
In many contexts, prosocial behavior has an intertemporal dimension. From
the perspective of the experimental literature, an important question regarding
altruism is whether the findings of the substantial literature on Dictator Games
in a setting without delayed payments carry over to settings in which payments
are delayed. This paper provides a comprehensive exploratory analysis of giving
in Dictator Games with different time delays, and our findings help to close this
knowledge gap. In addition, we consider how giving is affected by different
prices of keeping and of giving, and how this relationship depends on time
delay.
In several aspects, the behavior observed in the treatments with delayed
27These two distributions of CCEI are shown in Figure 3.5 in the Appendix.
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payments is not different from that in NowNow. We find no differences in
aggregate giving between the four treatments and this result holds also when
taking into account the differences in discount rates for own and the
recipient’s payoffs. In all four treatments, men react differently then women to
the price of giving. We do find, however, also important differences. Dictators
react to different prices of giving and keeping only in NowNow, where
dictators give more when keeping is costly and give less when giving is costly.
In the other treatments which involve delayed payments, dictators are
insensitive to changes in prices. From a more applied perspective, campaigns
relying on matching donations to encourage giving could thus be less efficient
if they involve long time delays. Regarding gender, we provide evidence that
the finding that men give more than women when giving is cheap (Andreoni
and Vesterlund, 2001) does not replicate in two of the treatments involving
delayed payments.
The insensitivity to different prices in treatments that involve delayed
payments compared to NowNow does not seem to be driven by different
discount rates for self and other. In contrast to some findings in the literature
(e.g., Albrecht et al., 2011; Shapiro, 2010; Howard, 2013; de Oliveira and
Jacobson, 2020), we do not observe that dictators discount the utility received
from own payoff and the utility received from the other’s payoff at different
rates. Also the added layer of complexity in the treatments which involve time
delay does not seem the cause of this different sensitivity to prices. Dictators’
choices satisfy GARP in all the four treatments and for most subjects it appears
possible to rationalize their behavior by well-behaved utility function.
Anonymity of choices and reputational concerns were also kept constant
across treatments.
Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature that analyzes how
time delay affect social preferences. The picture that emerges from this
exploratory investigation can inform theoretical frameworks that aim to model
intertemporal social preferences (e.g., Dreber et al., 2016; Andreoni and
Serra-Garcia, 2020). Future research could focus on identifying the channels
that explain why the sensitivity to different prices in a treatment similar to our
NowNow differs from situation where there is a time delay. For instance, one
possible avenue could be design and experiment with more variation in time
delays for both self and other to test whether the decline in sensitivity to prices
occur as long as there is a short delay.
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7. Appendix
Figure 3.4: Dictator game. Giving across treatments.
Figure 3.5: CCEI distributions. CCEI generated by a sample of 25,000 hypothetical subjects
and actual experimental data. Note that the hypothetical subjects randomize uniformly among
all allocations on each budget line as a benchmark.
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Table 3.10: Dictator Game. Tobit regression using absolute giving as dependent variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
giving giving giving giving giving
Nowlater 4.334 -0.996 4.024
(3.869) (3.974) (5.761)
LaterLater 2.716 -2.865 3.143
(3.806) (3.912) (5.708)
LaterNow -0.749 -5.007 -2.425
(3.830) (3.936) (5.770)
Endowment 0.222∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Relative price k -0.779∗∗ -3.870∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.514)
NowLater× Relative price k 4.251∗∗∗
(0.702)
LaterLater× Relative price k 4.443∗∗∗
(0.699)


















Constant -19.557∗∗∗ -16.694∗∗∗ -14.406∗∗∗ -20.414∗∗∗ -21.706∗∗∗
(2.870) (1.712) (2.945) (2.074) (4.109)
N 5250 5250 5250 5250 5250
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left censoring to account for the within-subjects design and the
censoring at zero. The dependent variable is absolute giving. NowNow is the omitted treatment.
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A.1. Intertemporal tasks
Table 3.11: Intertemporal Task. Descriptive statistics of annual interest rate, present bias and
curvature parameters for Self and Other aggregating across treatment, and separately for each
treatment. All participants for whom we could estimate parameters are included.
Variable N Median 5th Percentile 95th Percentile Min Max
Interest rate Self 326 0.372 0.000 10.546 -1.000 4358.105
Interest rate Other 310 0.468 -0.013 9.206 -1.000 5.4e+35
Present Bias β Self 326 1.000 0.806 1.115 0.000 1678.386
Present Bias β Other 310 1.000 0.886 1.183 0.096 5.0e+04
CRRA Curvature: α Self 326 0.998 0.737 0.999 0.000 41.624
CRRA Curvature: α Other 310 0.986 0.733 0.999 0.000 1.000
Interest rate Self (NL) 79 0.842 0.054 18.339 -0.322 4358.105
Interest rate Self (LL) 82 0.226 0.000 7.628 -0.996 66.448
Interest rate Self (NN) 81 0.346 0.161 10.395 -0.200 39.925
Interest rate Self (LN) 84 0.382 -0.068 18.010 -1.000 697.990
Interest rate Other (NL) 73 0.469 0.000 6.452 -0.748 25.933
Interest rate Other (LL) 78 0.585 -0.013 3.882 -0.964 44.237
Interest rate Other (NN) 80 0.170 -0.115 8.349 -1.000 147.127
Interest rate Other (LN) 79 0.706 -0.119 39.532 -0.924 5.4e+35
Present Bias β Self (NL) 79 1.000 0.333 1.154 0.061 1.434
Present Bias β Self (LL) 82 1.000 0.806 1.069 0.000 2.016
Present Bias β Self (NN) 81 1.000 0.853 1.072 0.378 1.386
Present Bias β Self (LN) 84 1.000 0.893 1.119 0.082 1678.386
Present Bias β Other (NL) 73 1.000 0.888 1.140 0.804 2.428
Present Bias β Other (LL) 78 1.000 0.837 1.231 0.096 5.329
Present Bias β Other (NN) 80 1.000 0.852 1.253 0.301 91.126
Present Bias β Other (LN) 79 1.000 0.924 1.152 0.828 5.0e+04
CRRA Curvature: α Self (NL) 79 0.988 0.656 1.000 0.126 1.000
CRRA Curvature: α Self (LL) 82 0.998 0.737 0.999 0.000 1.000
CRRA Curvature: α Self (NN) 81 0.999 0.830 0.999 0.672 1.000
CRRA Curvature: α Self (LN) 84 0.996 0.621 0.999 0.422 41.624
CRRA Curvature: α Other (NL) 73 0.975 0.696 0.999 0.000 1.000
CRRA Curvature: α Other (LL) 78 0.988 0.737 0.999 0.003 1.000
CRRA Curvature: α Other (NN) 80 0.998 0.669 0.999 0.211 1.000
CRRA Curvature: α Other (LN) 79 0.975 0.827 0.999 0.538 1.000
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A.2. Treatment difference by subgroups depending on the discount
rates
Considering the dictators for whom we could estimate the discount rates both for Self
and Other, 114 dictators have a higher discount rate for Self than Other, for 66 dictators
both rates are equal, and for 124 dictators the discount rate for Self is lower than for
Other. Table 3.12 show the effect of time delay on giving for each of this subgroups. In
none of the subgroups we find significant treatment differences in giving. A Wald test
at the subgroup level on the restriction that all coefficients of the treatments are jointly
equal to zero does not reject this restriction (all p ≥ 0.465). Table 3.13 shows the same
analysis using absolute giving as dependent variable. Also in that case, we find that in
none of the subgroups we observe significant treatment differences in giving (all p ≥
0.475).
Table 3.12: Dictator Game. Tobit regression on giving across treatments, by subgroups of
discount rate Self vs. Other.
(1) (2) (3)
Self=Other Self<Other Self>Other
NowLater 0.039 0.035 0.023
(0.138) (0.090) (0.092)
LaterLater 0.028 -0.014 0.087
(0.136) (0.085) (0.097)
LaterNow -0.100 -0.026 -0.074
(0.164) (0.082) (0.095)
Constant -0.139 0.056 -0.071
(0.093) (0.067) (0.063)
Observations 990 1860 1710
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left and right censoring to account for the within-subjects
design and the censoring at zero and one. The dependent variable is giving coded as the ratio between the
number of tokens shared with an anonymous participant over the amount of tokens endowed. NowNow is
the omitted treatment.
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Table 3.13: Dictator Game. Tobit regression with absolute giving as dependent variable, by
subgroups of discount rate Self vs. Other.
(1) (2) (3)
Self=Other Self<Other Self>Other
NowLater 3.014 2.577 1.685
(9.791) (6.294) (6.576)
LaterLater 2.742 -0.963 6.129
(9.626) (5.929) (6.930)
LaterNow -6.729 -1.668 -5.311
(11.583) (5.749) (6.791)
Endowment 0.241∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.019) (0.022)
Constant -27.256∗∗∗ -11.201∗ -21.469∗∗∗
(7.060) (4.859) (4.809)
Observations 990 1860 1710
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We use a random-effects Tobit regression with left censoring to account for the within-subjects design and
the censoring at zero. The dependent variable is the absolute giving. NowNow is the omitted treatment.
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A.3. Gender differences using fraction of income passed
Here we follow the approach of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and in Figure 3.6
we show the differences in the sensitivity of giving to the relative price of giving k for
each treatment and both genders. The figure describes the fraction of the value of the
dictator’s endowment that is passed to the receiver, that is Tokens passed×Pass valueEndowment×Hold value , on the
x-axis and the relative price of giving k on the y-axis. The pattern shows that the payoff
passed by men and women decreases as the relative price of giving k increases, and
that the fraction of income passed by men and women differ in their sensitivity to the
relative price.
Figure 3.6: Dictator Game. Payoff passed as fraction of income. Gender differences across
treatments for each relative price of giving.
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7.4. Instructions Dictator Game
Welcome to this experiment! 28
In this experiment, each participant will be either in the role of PLAYER A or PLAYER
B. Throughout the entire experiment your role will not change. This experiment
consists of several parts. You will receive information on each part immediately before
the part starts. After you finish these parts, we also ask you to complete a questionnaire.
Before we begin, we need to remind you that the earnings from this experiment will
be paid by bank transfer, and you will be requested to provide a bank account number
on your name in a later stage of this experiment. The payment dates are exactly as
described in the decisions. We will send you today an email with a summary of your
earnings and payment dates. On your desk there is a business card with the contact
details of the Secretarial Office AE1 of the School of Business and Economics. Please
keep this in a safe place. Please get in touch with the Secretarial Office should there be
any problems with the payments. During and after the experiment, your identity will
remain unknown to all other participants. We ask you not to communicate with other
people during the experiment. If, at any stage, you have a question, please raise your
hand. An experimenter will come to answer your question in private.
Your personal information
At the end of the experiment we will need to collect the following information from
you: name, bank account number on your name, and email address. Your personal
information will only be seen by a third person not involved in the experiment and in
the subsequent data analysis and it will be used only for the purpose of payments. It
will therefore be impossible to connect your identity to your earnings and behavior.
Your anonymity is thus guaranteed. You have been randomly assigned the role of
PLAYER A. Throughout the entire experiment your role will not change.
Detailed instructions - PART 1
In PART 1 you are asked to make a series of 15 decisions about how to divide a set of
tokens between yourself and another participant who has been assigned the role of
PLAYER B. You and the other participant will be paired randomly and you will not be
told each other’s identity. In each decision situation you will be rematched randomly
with one participant who is in the role of PLAYER B. It is very unlikely that you will be
matched with the same PLAYER B more than once.
As you divide the tokens, you and the other participant will earn points. These points
will be converted into Euro at the rate of 1 point = 0.10e. For example, if you earn
58 points this would be worth 5.80e in this part of the experiment.
Both your earnings and PLAYER B’s earnings in this part will be transferred in
5 weeks from today.29
Figure 3.7 below represents an example of a decision situation you may face
during PART 1. Note: In the example below ‘today’ is the 9th of August 2017. In the
experiment ‘today’ will refer to the real date of today.
• The information related to YOU will be displayed in Brown.
The information related to PLAYER B will be displayed in Blue.
• On the top of the screen you see a calendar. The colored date in the calendar
indicates when a bank transfer with the earned money will be made to YOU
28This instructions are an adapted version of the instructions used for the treatment LaterLater
29This was rephrased in each treatments. In NowLater: In this part, your earnings will
be transferred today and PLAYER B’s earnings will be transferred in 5 weeks from today. In
LaterNow: In this part, your earnings will be transferred in 5 weeks from today and PLAYER
B’s earnings will be transferred today. In NowNow:Both your earnings and PLAYER B’s earnings
in this part will be transferred today.
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Figure 3.7: Dictator game - Example 1
and to PLAYER B. The date when the bank transfer will be made to YOU is
highlighted in Brown. The date when the bank transfer will be made to PLAYER
B is highlighted in Blue. The date of today is always bold and surrounded by a
square shape (in the example, today is the 9th of August 2017). In the example
shown in Figure 3.7, the bank transfers to YOU and PLAYER B will be made in
5 weeks from today (in the example 13th of September).
• Below the calendar you see the amount of tokens you are asked to divide. In the
example, you are given a total of 60 tokens. Note that in the experiment the
amount of tokens will vary across decision situations.
• In the lower part of the screen you see a table. The column in the middle of the
table displays a slider you should use to allocate tokens between YOU and
PLAYER B. To make your allocation decision, you have to either scroll the bar
or click the arrows. On the left column of the table you will see the amount of
tokens you are allocating to YOU and your corresponding earnings in points for
this decision situation. The amount of tokens you are allocating to PLAYER B
and his/her total earning in points will be displayed in the right column of the
table. Please note that you can keep all the tokens, keep some and pass some,
or pass all the tokens to PLAYER B.
Note: In different decision situations, tokens kept and tokens passed will have
different earnings consequences in points.
In this example, YOU will receive 1 point for every token you hold, and PLAYER B
will receive 2 points for every tokens you pass. For instance, if you hold 60 and pass 0
tokens, YOU will receive 60 points and PLAYER B will receive no points. If you hold 0
tokens and pass 60, YOU will receive no points and PLAYER B will receive 60 x 2 =
120 points. Note that you could choose any number between 0 and 60 tokens to hold.
For instance, you could choose to hold 29 tokens and pass 31. In this case YOU would
earn 29 x 1 = 29 points and PLAYER B would receive 31 x 2 = 62 points. The points
YOU earn will be displayed on the left column. The points PLAYER B earns will be
displayed on the right column of the table.
Note: Points will be exchanged to money at the rate of 1 point = 0.10e.
Here is another example:
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Figure 3.8: Dictator game - Example 2
In this example you are given a total of 40 tokens. Every token you keep earns
YOU 3 points, and every token you pass earns PLAYER B 1 point. You are free to
choose any position of the cursor. Before clicking on the Submit button on the right
bottom of the screen, you can change your decision as many times as you wish. After
you have confirmed your decision, changes are not possible anymore and you will
move to the next decision situation.
Important: You will make decisions in a number of different decision situations.
Consider each decision situation carefully because they may differ in the amount of
tokens you are asked to divide and in the value of each token you allocate to YOU and
to PLAYER B. All decision situations are completely independent of each other and in
each decision situation you will be randomly rematched with one participant who is in
the role of PLAYER B. Therefore, you should consider each choice independently and
carefully.
Determination of Earnings - PART 1
• PLAYER B will also face a series of decisions. However, the decisions of PLAYER
B are hypothetical and will not affect his/her own earnings nor your earnings.
Your decisions will entirely determine your own earnings and PLAYER B’s
earnings.
Selection of decision situation relevant for payout
• At the end of the experiment one of the decision situations in PART 1 will be
randomly selected by the computer. Each decision situation is equally likely to
be selected. Your decision in the selected decision situation will determine your
earnings and the earnings of PLAYER B. Therefore, you should consider each
decision situation independently and as the decision situation that counts
for the earnings to YOU and to PLAYER B.
• The bank transfers with the money that YOU and PLAYER B earn in PART 1 will
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be made in 5 weeks from today.
Your identity
• You will never get to know the identity of the participants in the role of PLAYER
B nor will these participants ever get to know your identity. Your anonymity is
thus guaranteed.
Short summary
• YOU are assigned to the role of PLAYER A throughout the whole experiment.
• At the end of the experiment, one of the decision situations in PART 1 will be
randomly selected to be the one relevant for the earnings that YOU and PLAYER
B will receive. Each decision situation is equally likely to be selected. Therefore
you should treat each decision situation as the one that counts for earnings.
• YOU will face several decision situations where you have to decide how to
allocate an amount of tokens between YOU and PLAYER B.
• In each decision situation, YOU will be randomly rematched with one participant
who is in the role of PLAYER B. It is very unlikely that you will be matched with
the same PLAYER B more than once.
• The amount of tokens you are asked to divide could vary across decision
situations.
• The value of each tokens you decide to allocate to YOU and to PLAYER B could
vary across decision situations.
• At the end of the experiment, the points YOU and PLAYER B earn are exchanged
to Euro at the rate of 1 point = 0.10e.
• Earnings will be transferred to your and PLAYER B’s bank accounts. Earnings
will be transferred exactly in 5 weeks.
• Your decisions will entirely determine your earnings and the earnings of
PLAYER B.
If you have any questions please do not ask them aloud but raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will come to you to answer your question in private.
If you have no questions and you are ready to start with the experiment, please click
Continue on the screen and you will be asked few comprehension questions.
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7.5. Instructions Intertemporal Task
Welcome to PART 2 of the experiment. In this part of the experiment the decisions
you make will only affect YOUR earnings.30
In this part, you are asked to make a series of 36 decisions about how to divide
100 tokens between two dates, an earlier date and a later date. Tokens will be
exchanged for Euro. The exchange rate varies between the earlier date and the later
date, and varies from one decision situation to the next. The tokens you allocate to
the later date will never be worth less money than tokens you allocate to the earlier
date. The difference in value of tokens will depend on the decision situation. The
decision situations will be displayed in six Decision Forms. Each Decision Form
contains six decision situations. Each decision situation is represented as a row in a
Decision Form. Figure 3.9 below represents an example of a decision situation you
may face during this part of the experiment. In the example below ‘today’ is the 9th
of August 2017. In the experiment ‘today’ will refer to the actual date of today.
Figure 3.9: Decision Situation - Example 1
In this example, the first decision situation on the screen shows the choice to
allocate 100 tokens between 16 August and 18 October.
• On the top of the screen you see a calendar.
Note that today’s date (in this example the 9 August) is always highlighted in
bold and is surrounded by a square shape. Also note that the earlier date (16
August) is highlighted in Yellow while the later date (18 October) is
highlighted in Purple. In each decision situation the dates are highlighted so
that you can easily see what the earlier date and later date are.
• In the lower part of the screen you see a table.
The column in the middle of the table displays a slider you should use to
allocate tokens between the earlier date and the later date. To make your
allocation decision, you have to either scroll the bar or click the arrows. The
computer will automatically calculate the earnings you will receive on both the
earlier and the later dates. The money you earn at the earlier date and at the
later date are displayed in the last two columns on the right of the table.
30In the experiment, the order of the intertemporal task for Self and for Other was
counterbalanced.
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Remember there are six Decision Forms in this part. You can switch between
Decision Forms by pressing the button with the number of the Decision Form.
You can revise your choices as often as you like, within and across Decision
Forms. Once you are satisfied with all of your choices, you can click on the
“Submit Decisions" button to submit ALL your decisions in the six Decision
Forms.
In this example, if you consider the first decision situation, each token you allocate to
16 August is worth 19 cents, while each token you allocate to 18 October is worth 20
cents.
Thus, if you allocate 100 tokens to 16 August you will earn 100 x 0.19e = 19e on
this date, and nothing on 18 October.
If you allocate all 100 tokens to 18 October you will receive 100 x 0.20e = 20e on
this date and nothing on 16 August.
You are also free to allocate some tokens to earlier date and some to the later date.
For instance, if you allocate 64 tokens to 16 August and 36 to 18 October, you will
earn
64 x 0.19e = 12.16e on 16 August and 36 x 0.20e = 7.2e on 18 October.
Note: In different decision situations, the exchange rate of tokens allocated to the
earlier date will vary.
Determination of Earnings - PART 2
• At the end of the experiment one of the decision situations in PART 2 will be
randomly selected by the computer. Each decision situation is equally likely
to be selected. Your decision in the selected decision situation will determine
your earnings in this part of the experiment. Therefore you should treat each
decision situation as the one that counts for YOUR earnings.
• In addition to the earnings from the selected decision, YOU will always receive
1e on the earlier date and 1e on the later date. Hence, YOU will always receive
payments twice, even if you allocate 0 tokens to one of the two dates.
• The bank transfers with the money that YOU will earn in PART 2 will be made
exactly on the scheduled days as in the decisions situations.
• The decisions in this part of the experiment affect only YOUR earnings.
Short summary
PART 2:
• You will face 36 decision situations where you have to decide how to allocate an
amount of tokens between an earlier date and a later date.
• The decisions in this part of the experiment affect only YOUR earnings.
• The exchange rate of tokens to Euro could vary across decision situations.
• The days of the earlier and later dates could vary across decision situations.
• At the end of the experiment, one of the decision situations in PART 2 will be
randomly selected to be the one relevant for determining your earnings. Each
decision situation is equally likely to be selected. Therefore you should treat
each decision situation as the one that counts for your earnings.
• Earnings will be transferred to your bank account. Earning will be transferred
exactly on the scheduled days as in the decisions.
• In addition to the earnings from the selected decision, YOU will always receive
1e on the earlier date and 1e on the later date. Hence, YOU will always receive
payments twice, even if you allocate 0 tokens to one of the two dates.
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Detailed instructions - PART 3
Welcome to PART 3 of the experiment. This part is similar to PART 2. However, this
time you will make a series of 36 decisions for another participant, a randomly chosen
PLAYER B. In this part of the experiment the decisions you make will affect only
the earnings of the selected PLAYER B.
As in PART 2, in this part you are asked to make a series of 36 decisions about how to
divide 100 tokens between two dates, an earlier date and a later date. Tokens will be
exchanged for Euro. The exchange rate varies between the earlier date and the later
date, and varies from one decision situation to the next. The tokens you allocate to the
later date will never be worth less money than tokens you allocate to the earlier date.
The difference in value of tokens will depend on the decision situation. The decision
situations will be displayed in six Decision Forms. Each Decision Form contains six
decision situations. Each decision situation is represented as a row in a Decision Form.
The difference from PART 2 is that now you are asked to make decision for a
randomly selected PLAYER B.
Figure 3.10 below represents an example of a decision situation you may face during
this part of the experiment. In the example below ‘today’ is the 9th of August 2017.
In the experiment ‘today’ will refer to the actual date of today.
Figure 3.10: Decision Situation - Example 1
In this example, the first decision on the screen shows the choice to allocate 100 tokens
between 16 August and 18 October.
• On the top of the screen you see a calendar.
Note that today’s date (in this example 9 August) is always highlighted in bold
and is surrounded by a square shape. Also note that the earlier date (16 August)
is highlighted in Yellow while the later date (18 October) is highlighted in
Purple. In each decision situation the dates are highlighted so that you can
easily see what the earlier date and later date are.
• In the lower part of the screen you see a table.
The column in the middle of the table displays a slider you should use to allocate
tokens between the earlier date and the later date. To make your allocation
decision, you have to either scroll the bar or click the arrows. The computer will
automatically calculate the earnings PLAYER B will receive on both the earlier
and the later dates. The money PLAYER B earns at the earlier and at later dates
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are displayed in the last two columns on the right of the table.
Remember that in this part you are making decisions for a randomly selected
PLAYER B. The money he/she earns in the earlier date and in later date are
displayed in the last two columns on the right of the table.
There are six Decision Forms in this part. You can switch between Decision
Forms by pressing the button with the number of the Decision Form. You can
revise your choices as often as you like, within and across Decision Forms. Once
you are satisfied with all of your choices, you can click on the “Submit Decisions"
button to submit ALL your decisions in the six Decision Forms.
In this example, if you consider the first decision situation, each token you allocate to
16 August is worth 19 cents, while each token you allocate to 18 October is worth 20
cents.
Thus, if you allocate 100 tokens to 16 August, PLAYER B will earn 100 x 0.19e =
19e on this date, and nothing on 18 October.
If you allocate all 100 tokens to 18 October, PLAYER B will receive 100 x 0.20e =
20e on this date and nothing on 16 August.
You are also free to allocate some tokens to earlier date and some to the later date.
For instance, if you allocate 64 tokens to 16 August and 36 to 18 October, PLAYER B
will earn
64 x 0.19e = 12.16e on 16 August and 36 x 0.20e = 7.2e on 18 October.
Note: In different decision situations, the exchange rate of tokens allocated to the
earlier date will vary.
Determination of earnings - PART 3
• You will make decisions for another participant, a randomly selected PLAYER B.
• At the end of the experiment one of the decision situations in PART 3 will be
randomly selected by the computer. Each decision situation is equally likely to
be selected. Your decision in the selected decision situation will determine the
earnings of PLAYER B. Therefore you should treat each decision situation as
the one that counts for his/her earnings.
• In addition to the earnings from the selected decision, PLAYER B will always
receive 1e on the earlier date and 1e on the later date. Hence, he/she will
always receive payments twice, even if you allocate 0 token to one of the two
dates. Except from these 2e, your decision in the selected situation will entirely
determine the earnings of PLAYER B.
• The earnings of PLAYER B in PART 3 will be transferred exactly on the scheduled
days as in the decisions.
Your identity
• You will never get to know the identity of the participants in the role of PLAYER




• You will face 36 decision situations where you have to decide how to allocate an
amount of tokens between two dates, an earlier date and a later date for another
participant assigned to the role of PLAYER B.
• The decision in this part of the experiment affect only the earnings of the selected
PLAYER B.
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• The exchange rate of tokens to Euro could vary across decision situations.
• The days of the earlier and later dates could vary across decision situations.
• At the end of the experiment, one of the decision situations in this part will be
randomly selected to be the one relevant for determining PLAYER B’s earnings.
Each decision situation is equally likely to be selected. Therefore you should
treat each decision situation as the one that counts for PLAYER B’s earnings.
• In addition to the earnings from the selected decision, PLAYER B will always
receive 1e on the earlier date and 1e on the later date. Hence, he/she will
always receive payments twice, even if you allocate 0 token to one of the two
dates. Except from these 2e, your decision in the selected situation will entirely
determine the earnings of PLAYER B.
• The earnings will be transferred to PLAYER B’s bank account. The earning will





In search of the sunk cost bias
Abstract
Evidence from hypothetical scenarios strongly suggests the existence of a sunk
cost bias, the tendency to ‘throw good money after bad money’. However, the
few studies using incentives are inconclusive. In addition, evidence on
potential psychological channels underlying such a bias is scarce. We present a
laboratory experiment designed to investigate the sunk cost bias and to test
some prominent psychological mechanisms. Inspired by the hypothetical
scenarios, we use a two-stage investment task in which an initial investment
needs to be made to start a project. In the initial investment stage, the size of
the investment and the responsibility of the investor are exogenously varied.
In the second investment stage, participants can either decide to terminate the
project or to make an additional investment to finish the project. We do not
find evidence for the sunk cost bias. To the contrary, we observe a robust
reverse sunk cost bias. That is, the larger the initial investment, the lower the
likelihood to continue investing in a project. Moreover, whether or not
subjects are responsible for the initial investment, does not affect their
additional investment. More waste aversion individuals also do not react more
strongly to sunk cost whereas being in the loss domain decreases additional
investment. Importantly, we replicate the sunk cost bias when using
hypothetical scenarios. However, the reverse sunk cost bias also holds for
those participants who exhibit a strong sunk cost bias in the hypothetical
scenarios.
This paper is co-authored with Matthias Wibral & Arno Riedl.
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1. Introduction
The sunk cost bias refers to the behavioral tendency to continue an endeavor
once an investment has been made, even if it is not optimal to do so (Arkes and
Blumer, 1985). The bulk of the evidence suggesting the existence of the sunk
cost bias consists of responses to hypothetical survey questions (e.g. Arkes and
Ayton, 1999; Fox and Staw, 1979; Molden and Hui, 2011; Soman and Cheema,
2001; Staw, 1976; Strough et al., 2008). For instance, in the seminal paper by
Arkes and Blumer (1985), participants are asked to imagine that they are the
owners of a company and have previously invested a large sum of money in
what seemed to be a promising project. When the project is almost finished,
they learn that a competitor is about to release a better product at a cheaper
price. Respondents then need to consider whether to stop investing in the
development of their product and realize the loss or to persist with the project
by making an additional investment. Participants overwhelmingly state to carry
out the additional investment and are thus considered to fall prey to the sunk
cost bias.
Examining the sunk cost bias is important because it has been implicated
in a wide spectrum of situations involving sunk costs in practice. For example,
the sunk cost bias has been put forward as an explanation for why politicians
continue public works that went over budget (Ross and Staw, 1993), why firms
continue to invest in hopeless projects (Arkes and Blumer, 1985), why people
stay in failing relationships (Strube, 1988), or why researchers continue less
promising projects instead of starting new ones.
Interestingly, despite the intuitive appeal of the concept and the substantial
body of evidence from survey studies, it has been hard to demonstrate the
sunk cost bias in incentivized studies, both in the field and the lab (e.g.
Friedman et al., 2007; Ashraf et al., 2010). Existing attempts to study the sunk
cost bias in the laboratory often have quite complicated designs and may be
prone to game form misconceptions (Cason and Plott, 2014), which might
explain the inconsistent evidence. Therefore, it is important to have a
workhorse for studying the bias that is simple to understand and easily
implementable, yet rich enough to allow learning more about the
psychological mechanisms underlying the sunk cost bias.
In this paper we present a novel design with incentivized choices to
investigate the sunk cost bias as well as important potential psychological
mechanisms that could drive the bias.1 The experimental design is inspired by
the classic project continuation example from the survey literature.
Specifically, we study a two-stage investment task in which an initial
investment needs to be made to start a project and to advance it to a second
investment stage. In the second investment stage, participants know the size
of the initial investment size and can either decide to terminate the project, or
to carry out an additional investment to finish the project. If an additional
investment is made, the project is successful and yields a high payoff with
some known probability.
When participants make the decision about the initial investment, the exact
cost of the initial investment are unknown to them, but they do know the
distribution of the potential costs. Participants learn the exact costs of their
initial investment only when they have to decide whether to make the
additional investment. The key idea here is that by varying the amount
1The study reported in the paper was preregistered at OSF (https://osf.io/c253e).
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initially invested (i.e., the sunk cost), we can study the impact of the size of
the sunk cost on the willingness to make the additional investment. A rational
decision-maker should ignore the initial investment and decide whether to
make the additional investment based solely on the expected utility of the
available options. If we observe that participants are more willing to make the
additional investment after larger initial investments, this is evidence in favor
of the sunk cost bias.
Our design also includes features that allow us to test several psychological
mechanisms that have been proposed as drivers of the sunk cost bias.
Specifically, we examine the roles of responsibility for the initial investment, of
waste aversion, and of being in the loss domain when making the additional
investment decision. Concerning the role of responsibility, self-justification and
cognitive dissonance theory (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1984; Brockner, 1992;
Staw, 1976) propose that abandoning a project after an initial investment
requires admitting that the initial investment was a bad decision. The sunk
cost bias arises because continuing to pour resources into a failing course of
action is a way to justify one’s own past decisions. Personal responsibility for
the sunk cost should thus increase the willingness to invest additional
resources for the continuation of a project. To test this, we compare two types
of situations, one in which participants are responsible for the initial
investment, and one in which they are not.
Another reason why the sunk cost bias may occur could be waste aversion.
Arkes and Blumer (1985) suggest that people are more willing to invest after
bad news because not investing constitutes an admission that the prior
expenses were wasted. To investigate this, we include a questionnaire measure
of waste aversion (Haller and Schwabe, 2014). If waste aversion drives the
sunk cost bias, we would expect that more waste averse participants display a
stronger sunk cost bias independent of responsibility for the initial investment.
In addition, the effect should increase with the size of the sunk cost.
Our exogenous variation of sunk cost at the individual level also allows us
to test whether the sunk cost bias depends on being in the loss domain.
Prospect Theory suggests that the value function is concave in the gain domain
and convex in the loss domain, relatively to a reference point (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). According to this S-shaped value function, individuals are risk
seeking in the domain of losses and risk averse in the gain domain. Being in
the loss domain may thus lead to the sunk cost bias because further losses do
not result in large decreases in value; however, comparable gains do result in
large increases in value.
There are two additional features of our design. First, it is simple and easy
to understand. As we discuss below, some of the previous work in experimental
economics has used relatively complicated designs which may have confused
subjects (Weigel, 2018). Second, we also replicate classic survey measures of
the sunk cost bias from the psychology literature (Arkes and Blumer, 1985) in
a post-experimental questionnaire. We can thus compare the results from our
incentivized task to classic survey measures within subject. This comparison
can shed light on the discrepancy of findings between surveys and incentivized
studies.
Most of the evidence in favor of the sunk cost bias comes from hypothetical
scenarios, whereas the evidence from incentivized studies is mixed (for
reviews, see, e.g., Sleesman et al., 2012; Roth et al., 2015). To account for the
inconsistent evidence, alternative explanations have been suggested. For
instance, responses in hypothetical vignette scenarios that have been
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interpreted as a sunk cost bias may actually be due to the fact that participants
do not fully adopt the preferences described in the scenarios, but use their
own homegrown preferences (Friedman et al., 2007).2 In addition, as noted
by Weigel (2018), subjects who are indifferent or confused might exhibit
choices that could be misinterpreted as the sunk cost bias.
Regarding field data, three recent papers report evidence that is consistent
with a sunk cost bias. Augenblick (2016) shows that data from penny auctions
are in line with the predictions of a theoretical model in which players’ value of
winning the good increases with their previous bid costs. Ratnadiwakara and
Yerramilli (2017) find that past property taxes in California lead to a significant
increase of the sellers’ chosen listing price. Ho et al. (2018) exploit changes
in the price of a government license to buy a car in Singapore and find that
an increase in sunk costs (i.e., the price of the license) leads to an increase in
driving.
Attempts to find the sunk cost bias in field experiments have been less
successful. Arkes and Blumer (1985) find that randomly providing discounts
to buyers of theatre season tickets decreases show attendance. However, this
effect is only observed for the first half of the theatre season and the sample is
quite small. Ashraf et al. (2010) conducted field experiments testing the
impact of transaction price on the usage of a certain product. They report no
evidence of a sunk cost bias as households paying a higher transaction price
are not more likely to use the product. Ketel et al. (2016) test for a sunk cost
bias in an educational setting. Students signing up for extra-curricular tutorial
sessions randomly received a discount on the tuition fee. The authors find that
on average the discount does not affect attendance or performance.
Overall, the picture emerging from field data and field experiments is thus
quite mixed. One potential reason is that it is hard to fully control for the
possible confounds of selection, reputation, and subjective beliefs (Weigel,
2018). Mcafee et al. (2010) also argue that conditioning behavior on sunk
costs could be rationalized, if agents react to sunk costs because of
informational content, reputation, or financial and time constraints.
There are only a few incentivized laboratory experiments investigating the
sunk cost bias. To our knowledge, the first attempt in economics is by Phillips
et al. (1991). They study whether identical lottery tickets are valued
differently depending on the price (i.e., the sunk cost) at which they were
bought. Only a quarter of participants value the ticket more as the price
increases and thus exhibit a sunk cost bias, while another quarter of subjects
show a reverse sunk cost bias, as they value the ticket less with an increased
price. In additional treatments with opportunities to learn in a market
environment, very few subjects exhibit a sunk cost bias. Heath (1995) studies
investments in a lottery where subjects can invest again in the same lottery
when they have lost. He finds a reverse sunk cost bias when the sum of
incremental and sunk cost leads to an overall loss. Offerman and Potters
(2006) show that higher entry fees paid to gain the right to operate in a
market lead some players to set prices in a more collusive way.
The most comprehensive laboratory investigation of the sunk cost bias to
2For example, a common scenario tells participants that they have accidentally booked
vacations for the same date at two different locations and now have to decide where to go.
They are told to imagine that they spent more money on location A, but that they actually prefer
location B. Choosing location A is interpreted as evidence for the sunk cost bias. However, if
the participant actually prefers A over B and chooses A for this reason then the response is not
necesarily biased.
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date is Friedman et al. (2007). The authors use a computer game where
participants decide whether to keep digging for a treasure on a virtual island
or to incur a cost to move to another island. They only find a very small sunk
cost bias that is inconsistent across treatments with some treatments even
showing a reverse sunk cost bias. Our design is similar in spirit to two recent
neuroeconomics papers (Bogdanov et al., 2017; Haller and Schwabe, 2014).
However, these papers use deception in a way that makes their findings hard
to interpret. In their setup, both a rational decision-maker and an individual
prone to the sunk cost bias may exhibit the same behavior.3 Haita-Falah
(2017) studies a potential sunk cost bias in a setup in which the channels of
loss aversion and cognitive dissonance cannot drive the effect. She finds weak
evidence for a sunk cost bias, which is significant only for high sunk costs.
Similar to Heath (1995), Weigel (2018) studies an individual decision-making
task inspired by penny auctions in which subjects endogenously accumulate
sunk cost. In contrast to Heath (1995), he reports that sunk costs increase the
decision maker’s willingness to continue along an unprofitable course of
action. Finally, Ronayne et al. (2020) find that 23% of participants in an
MTurk study who have worked for a ticket for a certain lottery do not switch
to a ticket for a dominant lottery when offered to do so.
Our experiment differs from all previous studies in at least one of the
following dimensions. First, our design allows us to test the impact of different
levels of sunk cost within subjects. Second, it considers both situations where
the participant is in the gain domain and situations in which the participant is
in the loss domain, relative to the initial endowment. Third, we use exogenous
variation to test the role of responsibility in a clean way at the individual level.
We have a larger sample per treatment and a simpler design than previous
studies.4 Fourth, we are also able to study the role of waste aversion. Finally,
our design differs from previous experimental studies (except Ashraf 2010 and
Ketel et al., 2016) as it allows us to compare the tendency to exhibit the sunk
cost bias in both an incentivized and a hypothetical setting.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, in contrast to studies using
hypothetical questions and all other incentivized studies (except for Heath,
1995), and in contrast to our pre-registered hypotheses, we do not observe a
sunk cost bias but a reverse sunk cost bias. That is, the larger the initial
investment, the lower the likelihood of continuing to invest in a project. This
result also holds when we only consider those participants who display the
sunk cost effect in the hypothetical choice scenarios. Second, contrary to our
hypothesis, we find no difference in behavior depending on whether subjects
are responsible for the initial investment or not. That is, the reverse sunk cost
bias is observed irrespective of whether or not participants are responsible for
the initial investment. Third, contrary to our expectation, we observe that
3Haller and Schwabe (2014) and Bogdanov et al. (2017) study a setup in which a risky
investment project is sometimes successful immediately after a first investment, and sometimes
further investments are needed. A higher willingness to make the second investment compared
to the first one is taken as evidence for a sunk cost bias. However, the true success probabilities
and the stated ones differ in a way such that first investments have a lower success probability. If
subjects learn this over time, then they will be less likely to make the first investment compared
to the second one even if they do not exhibit a sunk cost bias.
4For example, Friedman et al. (2007) state: “it took us several tries over a period of months to
get it [the equilibrium strategy in their experiment] right.” In a replication attempt of Haita-Falah
(2017) reported by Weigel (2018), numerous subjects complained that they did not understand
the instructions.
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participants are even less willing to continue investing when they find
themselves in the loss domain compared to the gain domain. Fourth, we
observe that higher self-reported waste aversion is positively correlated with
the willingness to make the additional investment. However, this effect is not
larger for higher higher levels of sunk cost. Finally, we replicate the findings
from the hypothetical scenarios of Arkes and Blumer (1985). Participants
generally exhibit the sunk cost bias in hypothetical scenarios, and especially
when they imagine they were responsible for them. Our reverse sunk cost bias
in the incentivized settings thus does not seem to be due to an idiosyncratic
sample. We do not find support that the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical
scenarios translates into a sunk cost bias in the incentivized investment task.
Even those participants who exhibit a strong sunk cost bias in the hypothetical
scenarios show a reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized investment task.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
experimental design. Section 3 describes the pre-registered testable
hypotheses. Section 4 shows the experimental results. Finally, Section 5
discusses the results and limitations of the study and concludes.
2. Experimental design
The main part of the experiment consisted of a repeated choice task
comprising two investment stages, which was followed by a questionnaire and
an additional choice task. Instructions were given prior to the start of each
respective part. The questionnaire included questions on sociodemographic
characteristics, waste aversion, and hypothetical scenarios (adapted from
Arkes and Blumer, 1985) to elicit the sunk cost bias. After the questionnaire,
participants played a lottery choice task developed by Gächter et al. (2007) to
measure individual loss aversion. The complete set of instructions used in the
experiment (including screenshots) are provided in the Appendix.
2.1. Investment task
The investment task is framed as investing in a project and is inspired by
project continuation scenarios used in some of the questionnaire studies
reporting a sunk cost bias. It consists of two investment stages: an initial
investment stage and a continuation stage. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of
the setup of the investment task. In total, each participant makes decisions in
36 investment tasks, which are evenly split into so-called Responsibility
projects and No Responsibility projects. These projects are presented in random
order and participants do not receive any feedback regarding the success of
the project during the task. In the following, we describe the set-up of a


















































































































































































































































































Responsibility projects. In the initial investment stage, participants receive an
endowment of e10 and decide whether to start a project of which they know
that it has a positive expected value.5 Participants know the distribution of
the potential costs Cinitial of the initial investment, but the realization of the
costs is ex-ante unknown to them. Cinitial is e0 in 10 out of the 18 projects
(No Initial Costs Projects), and e4, e8, e12 and e14, respectively, in two out
of the 18 projects (Initial Costs Projects).6 At this stage participants also know
that if they start a project they will move on to the continuation stage where
they can decide to continue the project or not. They are also informed that the
investment cost to continue the project will be Cadditional = e4 and that there
are two success probabilities, p = 0.4 or p = 0.6, which each will occur with
50% chance. In addition, participants know all potential outcomes and, thus,
earnings.
In the initial investment stage, those participants who decide not to make
the initial investment earn the initial endowment of e10 and move to the
initial investment stage of the next investment task. Those who decide to
make the initial investment learn about the realization of the associated
Cinitial and move to the continuation stage. In the continuation stage, they are
reminded of the initial investment costs Cinitial that are payed already and
that the additional investment is associated with a known cost Cadditional =
e4. They also learn about the actual success probability of the project.7
Participants also know all potential earnings associated with their decisions.
Given this information, participants have to decide whether to continue the
project by making an additional investment, or to abandon it.
The different payoffs associated with different courses of action in the
continuation stage are as follows. Participants receive e8 if they decide not to
make the additional investment. Thus, a participant who makes the initial
investment, but then abandons the project in the continuation stage earns e10
- Cinitial + e8 = e18 - Cinitial. If participants make the additional investment
and the project is unsuccessful, the investment returns e8. In case the project
is successful, the investment returns e16. Thus, a participant who makes the
additional investment in the continuation stage earns e10 - Cinitial – e4 + e8
= e14 - Cinitial if the project is unsuccessful, and e10 - Cinitial – e4 + e16 =
e22 - Cinitial if the project is successful.
No Responsibility projects. In the No Responsibility projects, participants are
also initially endowed with e10, but here the computer makes the initial
investment on their behalf. Thus, in this type of projects, participants are not
responsible for the initial investment and the associated sunk cost. After the
initial investment is made, participants are presented with the continuation
stage, which is identical in both the Responsibility and the No Responsibility
projects.
5Participants know the decision tree and thus can calculate the expected value of an initial
investment and later also of the additional investment.
6Participants did not know the exact number of decision situations for each level of sunk cost.
They were informed that: “If you make the initial investment, there will be an investment cost
associated to your decision. You will know the actual investment cost only after you have made
the initial investment. On average, you can expect the initial investment cost to be: e0 five out
of nine times; e4 one out of nine times; e8 one out of nine times; e12 one out of nine times;
e14 one out of nine times”.
7In fact, each success probability occurs in half of the investment tasks in a random order
across decision situations for each individual.
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We did not use the labels Responsibility and No Responsibility in the
experiment. Participants were informed that in some cases they could decide
to make the initial investment or not, and in other cases the computer would
make the initial investment on their behalf. In the experiment, we
implemented the decision screen such that at the beginning of the initial
investment stage in the Responsibility projects participants were reminded of
the distribution of Cinitial and were given the opportunity to make the initial
investment or not. In the No Responsibility projects, participants were again
reminded about the distribution of Cinitial, and informed that the computer
made the decision on their behalf. The decision screens can be found in the
Appendix.
Several considerations guided our choice of parameter values. First, as we
are interested in the behavior in the continuation stage, we chose the
parameters such that making the initial investment is attractive in expectation
for moderately risk averse participants. The expected value of making the
initial investment is e14.18 and thus substantially higher than the endowment
of e10. Ex-ante only someone with very strong risk aversion should not make
the initial investment.8 We chose the distribution of Cinitial (i.e., the sunk
cost) such that the probability of Cinitial = 0 is above 50% with the goal to
make the initial investment decision attractive, while at the same time still
having a fairly equal number of observations with Cinitial > 0.
Second, we chose the different levels of the sunk cost such that for half of
the decision situations in which there is a strictly positive sunk cost, abandoning
the project in the continuation stage does not lead to a loss compared to the
endowment. For Cinitial of e4, participants who decide to abandon the project
in the continuation stage receive a payoff of e14 and are better off than if they
had not made the initial investment and received their endowment of e10. For
a Cinitial of e8, they break exactly even. For the other two levels of Cinitial
(e12 and e14), participants make a loss compared to their endowment if they
decide to abandon the project. These values were chosen such that assuming
a reference point of e10, given the median estimated curvature parameters,
loss aversion coefficient, and probability weighting values from Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), Cumulative Prospect Theory would predict the following:
a participant will make the additional investment with success probability p ≥
0.4 only for Cinitial ≥ e12.9 Third, we chose to have two different success
probabilities in the continuation stage to minimize possible floor and ceiling
effects, thus having a greater chance of finding a sunk cost bias.
8For example, any decision maker with the CRRA utility function U(x) = 11−rx
1−r with an r
< 2.05 will always make the initial investment. For comparison, Holt and Laury (2002) do not
observe any participant with r > 1.37.
9 We apply Cumulative Prospect Theory as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), where the
prospect is the product of decision weights π(p) and value of the potential outcome, as shown by:
V (x) =
{
xα if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β if x < 0 . We assume a reference point of e10 (i.e., the initial endowment)
and the parameters as estimated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) of loss aversion λ = −2.25,
curvature coefficients in the positive domain (α) and in the negative domain (β) = 0.88, and a





with γ = 0.61 in the gain domain and γ = 0.69 in the loss
domain.
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2.2. Psychological measures related to the sunk cost bias
Waste aversion has been proposed as an explanation for the sunk cost bias
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985). To explore this mechanism, we ask participants fill
out a short questionnaire (Haller and Schwabe, 2014) that aims to assess their
desire not to waste resources after the investment task. This questionnaire
consists of four statements that are answered on a scale from 1 (“I do not
agree”) to 11 (“I completely agree): “It is important for me not to appear
wasteful”, “Wasted investments hurt me”, “People who know me think I am
wasteful” (inversely coded), and “It annoys me if investments are not
successful”. The scores for the 4 items are summed up and the total score is
taken as an indicator of the strength of the individual’s desire not to appear
wasteful. With our design, we can disentangle the role of waste aversion from
cognitive dissonance as its effect should be present both with and without
responsibility for incurring sunk costs, whereas cognitive dissonance should
only affect behavior in the Responsibility projects.
To examine whether the survey measure of the sunk cost bias used in the
literature correlates with our incentivized measure, participants also answer
four binary hypothetical questions related to the sunk cost bias. These
questions are slightly modified versions of four vignette studies in the seminal
paper by Arkes and Blumer (1985). To make them more relatable to our
subject pool, we changed the travel destinations and the monetary amounts
used in the hypothetical scenarios. The scenarios are reported in full in the
Appendix. For two scenarios, participants were instructed to imagine they
were responsible for the initial investment, while for the other two scenarios
they were told someone else was responsible for it. From the answers, we
construct an index ranging from 0 to 4 indicating the strength of the tendency
to show the sunk cost bias in hypothetical scenarios.
2.3. Loss aversion
To measure loss aversion, we use a task by Gächter et al. (2007).10 In this task,
participants decide for each of six lotteries whether they want to accept it or
reject it. Across lotteries, the winning prize is fixed at e6 while the potential
loss varies between e2 and e7, as shown in Table 4.12 in the Appendix.
Under Cumulative Prospect Theory, behavior in this task is jointly
determined by probability weighting, the curvatures of the utility function in
the gain and loss domain, and loss aversion. Under certain assumptions, in
particular, linearity of the value function, the task provides a simple measure
of the loss aversion parameter in cumulative prospect theory.11 In the context
of the sunk cost bias, the linearity assumption can influence predictions
10To keep the experiment within reasonable time limits, we decided against a full-blown
estimation of the parameters of a prospect theoretic utility function (e.g., Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2009)
11Gächter et al. (2007) assume that a participant is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
the lottery if w
+
(0.5)v(G) = w−(0.5)λ v(L), where L denotes the loss in a given lottery and G
the gain; v(x) is the utility of the outcome x ∈ {G,L}, λ denotes the coefficient of loss aversion




(0.5) denote the probability weights for the 0.50 chance




(0.5), only the ratio
v(G)
v(L) = λ defines an individual’s implied loss aversion in the lottery choice task. The additional
assumption that v(x) is linear (v(x) = x) for small amounts yields a very simple measure of loss
aversion: λ = G/L.
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substantially. For example, a loss averse individual who does not weight
probabilities and has a linear value function will not display a sunk cost bias in
our experiment. In fact, for a sufficiently high degree of loss aversion (λ > 2),
such an individual would be less likely to make the additional investment
around their reference point than when all outcomes lie either in the gain or
in the loss domain. In contrast, another individual with the median cumulative
prospect theory parameter values estimated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
would show an identical choice pattern in our loss aversion task as the
previous individual, but display a sunk cost bias in the investment task.12
In keeping with the convention, we call the switching point between
acceptance and rejection of the lottery “Loss aversion”, but the reader should
be aware that this switching point might also reflect factors other than loss
aversion such as probability weighting and curvature. We also ran all analyses
using the loss aversion λ coefficient as calculated by Gächter et al. (2007), i.e.,
assuming that the value function is linear, instead of the switching point
between acceptance and rejection lottery. All results are qualitatively robust to
this alternative specification.
2.4. Procedure
We recruited 108 participants (42 men; mean age = 21.5 years, s.d. =2.5
years) using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was programmed with
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the Behavioral and Experimental
Economics Laboratory (BEELab) of Maastricht University. Each participant
completed the experiment in a randomly assigned cubicle isolated from other
participants. In total, we conducted five experimental sessions and each
session lasted about 60 minutes. Each participant completed the incentivized
investment task first, followed by the psychological measures and finally by
the loss aversion task. At the end of the experiment, one randomly selected
decision of the investment task and one randomly selected decision in the loss
aversion task counted for payment. Participants were informed that any losses
in the loss aversion task would be deducted from a flat fee of e7 they earned
for answering the questionnaire and the hypothetical questions reported in
Section 2.2. During the investment task, participants did not know that there
would be other tasks or payments later in the experiment. Participants earned
e13.75 on average and all earnings were paid via bank transfers, a common
procedure in the Netherlands. Subjects were truthfully informed that the
payments were issued by research assistants unrelated to the experiment and
subsequent data analysis, and that their anonymity was thus assured.
3. Hypotheses
The hypotheses were preregistered and can be found at
(https://osf.io/c253e).13 Our main interest lies in the additional investment
decisions in the continuation stage. A rational decision-maker should base her
investment choice only on the costs and benefits that are expected to arise
from this choice. In our case, a rational decision-maker should base
12Such an individual would always make the additional investment for Cinitial ≥ 12, but not
for Cinitial < 12, assuming a reference point of 10, i.e., the initial endowment (see Footnote 9).
13Note that the hypotheses are the same as in the preregistration document, but their order
and exact formulation have been modified for reasons of clarity.
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investment decisions only on the expected utility of the investment project and
ignore any sunk cost. However, if a decision-maker is prone to the sunk cost
bias, the decision to make the additional investment should be affected by the
existence as well as level of the initial investment cost, Cinitial. Accordingly,
our null hypothesis is that participants’ decisions in the continuation stage are
independent of the investment costs incurred in the initial investment stage.
Our alternative hypotheses relate to the existence of a sunk cost bias.
Hypothesis 1 SUNK COST BIAS. (a) Participants are more likely to make the
additional investment when Cinitial > e 0 than when Cinitial = e 0. (b) The
higher Cinitial, the more likely it is that the additional investment is made.
According to the cognitive dissonance account, we expect a stronger sunk
cost bias for projects where participants are responsible for the initial
investment (Responsibility projects) than for projects where the computer
decides to make the initial investment on their behalf (No Responsibility
projects). The responsibility effect (Staw, 1976) states that when people are
confronted with negative feedback about the success of a decision, they
commit more resources to this course of action and persist with it for a longer
time if they were responsible for making the initial decision than if someone
else made this decision. Based on the findings of the psychological literature
(e.g., Staw, 1976; Bazerman et al., 1984; Kirby and Davis, 1998; Schoorman
and Holahan, 1996; Schulz and Cheng, 2002), we formulate our second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 RESPONSIBILITY EFFECT. (a) After an initial investment with
Cinitial > e 0, the likelihood of making the additional investment is larger in
Responsibility projects than in No Responsibility projects. (b) The increase in the
likelihood of making the additional investment as Cinitial increases is larger in
Responsibility projects than in No Responsibility projects. (c) When
Cinitial = e 0, there is no difference in the likelihood of making the additional
investment between Responsibility projects and No Responsibility projects.
Conditional on finding that participants exhibit a sunk cost bias, we
formulate further hypotheses relating to potential mechanisms behind the
sunk cost bias. If the desire not to waste resources or not to appear wasteful
drives the sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985), we expect that waste
aversion correlates with the sunk cost bias.
Hypothesis 3 WASTE AVERSION. (a) The higher the initial investment cost, the
more the waste aversion score positively correlates with the likelihood of making
the additional investment. (b) Hypothesis 2(c) is confirmed and, after initial
investment when Cinitial > e 0, there is no difference in the likelihood of making
an additional investment between Responsibility and No Responsibility projects.
The sunk cost bias may emerge when participants fall behind their initial
endowment of e10. That is, when they are in the loss domain relative to this
endowment. Recall that, for projects with Cinitial of e12 and e14, participants
who do not make an additional investment fall behind the initial endowment
for sure, because in that case they only earn e6 and e4, respectively. Thus,
based on Cumulative Prospect Theory (see Footnote 9) we formulate the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 LOSS DOMAIN (a) The likelihood of making the additional
investment when Cinitial is e12 or e14 is higher than for lower non-zero initial
investment costs. (b) This difference in the likelihood of making the additional
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investment is positively related to the loss aversion score.
4. Results
In this section, we describe our findings in relation to the preregistered
hypotheses. When a hypothesis is rejected, we present additional exploratory
analyses. First, we investigate whether we find evidence of a sunk cost bias.
Second, we describe the influence of responsibility for the sunk costs on the
willingness to continue to invest. Third, we investigate the impact of waste
aversion, and of being in the loss domain. Finally, we show whether the
tendency to exhibit a sunk cost in a hypothetical setting is correlated with the
findings in the incentivized setting.
We present results using both non-parametric tests and regression analyses.
All reported tests are two-sided. In the regression analyses, we use logit models
with standard errors clustered at the participant level. The dependent variable
is the decision to make the additional investment in the continuation stage,
coded as a binary variable taking on value 1 when the additional investment
was made and value 0 when it was not made. Depending on the hypotheses
considered, the sunk costs are coded in three different ways: (1) as a dummy
variable that takes on value 1 when the initial investment cost is strictly positive
(called Initial Cost > 0), (2) as a continuous variable with the values of Cinitial
(called Initial Cost), and (3) as a dummy variable that takes on value 1 if Cinitial
is e12 or e14 (called Loss Domain).
In the presentation of regression results we focus on those specifications
where control variables are included, but also report the results without
control variables for completeness. Control variables comprise the probability
of project success, the measure of loss aversion and waste aversion, the score
in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, gender, whether the field of study
is economics, and the repetitions of trials in the task, unless otherwise
specified.14 The coefficient estimates of the control variable estimates are
reported in the Appendix.
4.1. Is there evidence of a sunk cost bias?
According to the sunk cost hypothesis, we expected that participants should be
more likely to make the additional investment with Cinitial > e 0
(Hypothesis 1a). We also expected that the higher Cinitial, the more likely a
participant is to make the additional investment (Hypothesis 1b). In contrast,
however, we observe that participants are less willing to make the additional
investment when Cinitial > e 0 (61%) compared to when Cinitial = e 0 (79%).
This difference in the relative frequency of investment choices in the
continuation stage is statistically significant (N = 108, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p < 0.001). This result is corroborated by the negative and significant
coefficient of the dummy variable Cinitial > e 0 in Model (1) of the regression
analysis in Table 4.1 (p < 0.001). Thus, our result shows a pattern opposite to
the hypothesis, consistent with a reverse sunk cost bias.
14To measure loss aversion, we use the switching point in the loss aversion task described in
Section 2.3. We code the variable such that a lower value implies lower loss aversion. Using the
switching point in the loss aversion task, we code the variable such that it ranges from −6 to
0, which corresponds to a λ coefficient ranging from 0.87 to 3.01, as estimated in Gächter et al.
(2007).
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Table 4.1: The effect of initial investment on additional investment.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.380∗∗∗ -1.030∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.168)
Initial Cost -0.142∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.017)
Constant -6.288∗∗∗ -6.529∗∗∗ 1.564∗∗∗ 1.555∗∗∗
(0.879) (0.888) (0.161) (0.161)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 3619 3619 3691 3691
Note: Logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation
stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy
variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise.
In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost.
Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the measures of loss aversion,
waste aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in addition to
probability of success, gender, field of study economics and the repetitions of trials in the
task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
These results also indicate that, as Cinitial increases, participants are
progressively less willing to make the additional investment in the
continuation stage. Figure 4.2 shows that every increase in Cinitial is
accompanied by a decrease in the willingness to make the additional
investment. This is supported by the negative and significant coefficient of the
continuous variable Initial Cost in Model (2) in Table 4.1 (p < 0.001).
Figure 4.2: Average relative frequency of the additional investment for each
Cinitial. This figure includes both Responsibility and No Responsibility projects. The
vertical bars show the 95% confidence interval, using individual averages as the unit
of observation.
REVERSE SUNK COST BIAS. Participants’ willingness to make additional
investments decreases with Cinitial.
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4.2. Does being responsible for the initial investment matter?
Existing studies that investigate the sunk cost bias using monetary incentives
consider only the situation where participants are responsible for the initial
investment. According to the responsibility effect, they are more likely to be
prone to the sunk cost bias if they are responsible for the initial investment
than when someone else made this decision (Hypothesis 2).
Table 4.2: The effect of responsibility on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.377∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.178)
Initial Cost -0.142∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018)
Responsibility 0.034 0.029 0.033 0.022
(0.106) (0.104) (0.084) (0.081)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.007 -0.003
(0.160) (0.118)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.001 0.002
(0.015) (0.011)
Constant -6.303∗∗∗ -6.541∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗∗
(0.878) (0.883) (0.169) (0.167)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 3619 3619 3691 3691
Note: Logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation
stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy
variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise.
In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost.
Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the measures of loss aversion,
waste aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in addition to
probability of success, gender, field of study economics and the repetitions of trials in the
task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In Responsibility projects, participants made the initial investment about
90% of the time. For 99 out of the 108 participants (92%), we have at least
one observation for each Cinitial. In the No Responsibility projects the
computer made the initial investment on behalf of the participants in 100% of
the time. Comparing the frequency of additional investments in Responsibility
and No Responsibility projects we find no difference. Specifically, when
aggregating decisions over all Cinitial > 0, participants are equally likely to
make the additional investment in Responsibility and No Responsibility projects.
In both cases, the likelihood of making the additional investment was 60.5%
(N = 107; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.546).15 This result is corroborated
in the regression analysis of Model (1) in Table 4.2 by the insignificant
coefficient of the interaction between Initial Cost > 0 and a dummy variable
15N = 107 (instead of 108) because one participant did not invest in any of the responsibility
projects with Cinitial > 0. We note that there is also no difference between Responsibility and No
Responsibility projects if we only include those No Responsibility projects for which a participant
decided to enter in Responsibility projects (N = 107; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.518).
The result also holds if we exclude those who did not make an investment for all initial costs
(N = 99; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.5). The same holds if we conduct the analysis
separately for the two different success probabilities (p = 0.4: 38% in Responsibility and 40% in
No Responsibility; p = 0.6: 83% in Responsibility and 81% in No Responsibility).
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Responsibility which takes value 1 when the participant is responsible for
making the initial investment (p = 0.965). This indicates that, when Cinitial >
e0, there is no difference in the likelihood of making an additional investment
between Responsibility and No Responsibility projects. Hypothesis 2a is thus
rejected.
We also hypothesized that with increasing Cinitial, the increase in the
likelihood of making the additional investment would be stronger in
Responsibility than in No Responsibility projects (Hypothesis 2b). Figure 4.3
shows how frequently the additional investment is made for each Cinitial for
Responsibility and No Responsibility projects, respectively, and suggests that
there is no difference between the two types of projects. This is corroborated
in the regression analysis reported in Table 4.2 by the insignificant coefficient
of the interaction term between Initial Cost and Responsibility (p = 0.941) in
Model (2). As we do not find any difference in the likelihood of making the
additional investment between Responsibility and No Responsibility as Cinitial
increases, we thus reject Hypothesis 2b.16
Finally, we hypothesized that participants would be equally likely to make
the additional investment in Responsibility and No Responsibility projects when
Cinitial is zero (Hypothesis 2c). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test supports this
hypothesis (N = 108; p = 0.785), which is corroborated by the insignificant
coefficient of the variable Responsibility in Model (1) in Table 4.2
(p = 0.747).17
16In the linear probability model in Table 4.10 in the Appendix the coefficient of responsibility
is a quite precisely estimated zero.
17All results regarding the additional investment discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 hold (1)
when considering only the participants who always make the initial investment in Responsibility
Figure 4.3: Average relative frequency to make the additional investment for
each Cinitial, separately for Responsibility and No Responsibility projects. The
vertical bars show the 95% confidence interval, using individual averages as the unit
of observation.
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Table 4.3: The effect of waste aversion on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Waste aversion 0.040+ 0.081+ 0.040∗ 0.073∗
(0.024) (0.043) (0.018) (0.033)
Initial Cost > 0 0.700 0.700
(1.473) (1.107)
Initial Cost > 0 × Waste aversion -0.070 -0.058
(0.048) (0.037)
Constant -6.316∗∗∗ -7.377∗∗∗ -0.163 -0.629
(0.821) (1.287) (0.556) (0.970)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 3619 3619 3691 3691
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the
continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. The initial costs are coded as a dummy
variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise.
Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the measures of loss aversion
and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in addition to probability
of success, gender, field of study economics, and the repetitions of trials in the task.
Results hold when controlling also for responsibility of the initial investment. +
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
RESPONSIBILITY EFFECT. Responsibility for the initial investment does not
significantly influence the likelihood of making the additional investment.
4.3. Effects of waste aversion and of being in the loss domain
Given that we do not find evidence for a sunk cost bias, Hypothesis 3 and
Hypothesis 4 on the role of waste aversion and of being in the loss domain,
which were conditional on finding such an effect, are not directly tested as
preregistered. However, as we find evidence for a reverse sunk cost bias, we
present exploratory analyses in relation to this finding.
Model (1) in Table 4.3 tests whether higher Waste aversion, as measured by
our questionnaire, increases the likelihood to make the additional investment.
The coefficient of Waste aversion is positive and significant at p = 0.091. This
suggests that participants who have a stronger self-reported waste aversion are
generally more likely to make the additional investment. However, Model (2)
in Table 4.3 shows that the interaction between Waste aversion and the dummy
Initial Cost > 0 is not significant and even has the wrong sign (p = 0.146).
Thus, in contrast to the idea that waste aversion is an explanation for the sunk
cost bias, the influence of waste aversion is not stronger for situations in which
there is a “waste” in the form of sunk cost.
WASTE AVERSION. Waste aversion weakly increases the likelihood to make
the additional investment. However, stronger waste aversion does not correlate
positively with the willingness to make the additional investment when sunk
cost is present.
To analyze the role of being in the loss domain after an initial investment, we
compare projects with Cinitial of e12 and e14 with the other non-zero Cinitial
of e4 and e8. In the higher initial cost projects deciding not to make the
projects and (2) when analyzing only those who not always make the initial investment in
Responsibility projects. These robustness checks are reported in the Appendix.
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Table 4.4: The effect of being in the loss domain on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Loss domain -0.779∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗
(0.188) (0.475) (0.143) (0.359)
Loss aversion -0.315∗∗∗ -0.145 -0.234∗∗ -0.118
(0.095) (0.112) (0.074) (0.088)
Loss domain × Loss aversion -0.329+ -0.222+
(0.172) (0.131)
Constant -6.413∗∗∗ -6.098∗∗∗ 0.314 0.569∗
(1.044) (1.046) (0.210) (0.249)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 1612 1612 1612 1612
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation
stage is made, 0 otherwise. The initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Loss Domain
that takes value 1 when initial costs are e12 or e14, 0 otherwise. Only cases where
Cinitial > e0 are included. Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the
measures of waste aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in
addition to probability of success, gender, field of study economics, and the repetitions
of trials in the task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
additional investment implies to fall behind the initial endowment of e10 and
therefore to be in the loss domain, whereas this is not the case for the lower
initial cost projects. In Table 4.4, Cinitial is coded as a dummy variable (Loss
Domain), which takes value 1 if Cinitial is e12 or e14. Model (1) in Table 4.4
shows that the likelihood of making the additional investment in the projects
where Cinitial is e12 or e14 is lower than for the other non-zero initial cost
projects (p < 0.001), indicating that participants rather accept to incur a certain
loss relative to their initial endowment than making the additional investment.
That is, instead of gambling for recovery or at least trying to get closer to the
initial reference point, participants withdraw from further investments even
more once they find themselves in the loss domain.
The coefficient estimate of the variable Loss aversion is negative and
significant (p < 0.001), which indicates that those participants who are more
loss averse are generally less willing to make the additional investment. The
interaction between Loss Domain and Loss aversion in Model (2), is negative
and significant at p = 0.056.18 This shows that the more loss averse a
participant is, the less likely he or she is to make the additional investment
when Cinitial is e12 or e14. These results also hold when using the loss
aversion coefficient λ as calculated in Gächter et al. (2007).
LOSS DOMAIN. Being in the loss domain decreases the likelihood of making
the additional investment. Moreover, loss aversion decreases the likelihood to
make the additional investment.
4.4. Sunk cost in hypothetical settings vs. incentivized settings
At the end of the experiment, our participants answered four hypothetical
scenarios adapted from Arkes and Blumer (1985). This allows us to first
compare the answers of our participants to those reported in the sunk cost
literature and second to test whether participants’ reaction to sunk cost is
similar in our incentivized setting and the hypothetical scenarios. While the
18The distribution of the switching points and the implied loss aversion λ as calculated in
Gächter et al. (2007) are shown in the Appendix
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normative predictions are clear and indicate that a rational agent should
ignore sunk cost, we observe that only 15 participants out of 108 (14%)
answered accordingly and ignored the sunk cost in all four hypothetical
scenarios. The median participant answered two out of the four scenarios
consistent with the sunk cost bias, indicating a moderate tendency to be prone
to the sunk cost bias in hypothetical scenarios. This tendency is stronger for
the two hypothetical scenarios where participants are told to imagine they are
responsible for having invested some initial cost compared to the two
scenarios where they were not responsible (N = 108; Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.019).19
Thus, our results in the hypothetical scenarios are generally in line with the
findings reported in Arkes and Blumer (1985) and we replicate them using a
larger sample size. In addition, in our within-subject design in the hypothetical
scenarios, we also find support for the responsibility effect as participants show
a stronger tendency to show a sunk cost bias in the scenarios where they were
told to imagine to be responsible for the sunk cost compared to when they were
asked to imagined not to be responsible.
However, the evidence of a sunk cost bias in hypothetical scenarios does not
translate to behavior in the incentivized investment task. Figure 4.4 plots the
additional investment for each initial cost and each score of the hypothetical
sunk cost bias (measured from 0 to 4). It shows that participants exhibit the
reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized investment task, irrespective of the
strength of the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios. Even the subset
of participants with a strong tendency to consider sunk cost in the hypothetical
settings (3 or 4 out of 4 answers in line with a sunk cost bias) shows the reverse
sunk cost pattern in the incentivized task. Thus, the tendency to take sunk
costs into account measured by the hypothetical scenarios does not translate to
behavior in the incentivized investment task.
HYPOTHETICAL AND REVEALED SUNK COST BIAS. We replicate the sunk cost
bias using hypothetical scenarios. However, even the subjects who exhibit a
strong proneness to the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios show the
reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized setting.
19See Appendix for the distribution of sunk cost scores in the hypothetical scenarios.
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Figure 4.4: Additional investment by hypothetical sunk cost score. Mean decision to
make the additional investment, separately for each score in the hypothetical scenario.
The vertical bars show the 95% confidence interval, using individual averages as the
unit of observation.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Using a novel experimental design, we study the sunk cost bias in an
incentivized setting and assess potential channels underlying such an effect.
We find that participants do indeed react to exogenous variations in sunk cost,
but not in the direction predicted by the sunk cost bias. Instead, our main
finding is that participants are less likely to make an additional investment the
higher the sunk cost. Our data thus provide evidence for a reverse sunk cost
bias.
The overall pattern of our behavioral findings regarding the effect of sunk
cost can be rationalized in different ways. For example, a risk averse decision
maker with a CRRA utility function who thinks about the payoffs from the
experiment in isolation (i.e., considers only the money in the experiment in
the utility function instead of her total wealth) would be increasingly less likely
to make the additional investment as sunk costs increase.
A loss averse decision maker with linear utility in the loss and the gain
domain could also display a pattern of behavior that resembles the one we
observe. This would be the case if the reference point of the decision maker is
somewhat lower than the endowment of e10. Such a reference point could
reflect the amount a participant expects to (minimally) gain for the time spent
on the investment task. For instance, with a reference point of e7 making the
additional investment becomes a mixed gamble for initial costs of e8, e12,
and e14. A sufficiently loss averse decision maker would therefore be less
likely to make the additional investment compared to when initial costs are e0
and e4.
Our findings are also reminiscent of ideas suggested in two previous papers
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in the psychology literature. Heath (1995) argues that participants set a
mental limit for their expenditures when this is easily feasible. When an
expenditure reaches the mental limit, they quit investing. In a study with
hypothetical incentives, Zeelenberg and Van Dijk (1997) find that behavioral
sunk costs increase risk averse instead of risk seeking behavior in a subsequent
monetary gamble. The authors argue that this is more likely to occur when a
risk avoiding choice allows reaching an aspiration level. In our setup, an
aspiration level equal to earning a positive payoff in the task could explain
that participants are more willing to gamble when the “losing” outcome of the
additional investment is considered satisfactory (with low Cinitial), but not
when the “losing” outcome fails to satisfy the aspiration level (with high
Cinitial). We note however, that one could also argue in favor of the opposite.
If costs have been high, people could be far off their aspiration levels and
therefore willing to gamble in order to reach it. Exploring which exact channel
is at work would be an interesting question for future research.
Our results clearly show that findings using hypothetical scenarios do not
necessarily translate into behavior with real monetary consequences. Our
findings in the hypothetical scenarios replicate the ones in the seminal work by
Arkes and Blumer (1985). However, even when considering only the
participants who exhibit a strong hypothetical sunk cost bias, we observe a
reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized setting. We consider this as strong
evidence that stated preferences elicited with questionnaires and revealed
preferences using incentivized methods differ substantially, at least in the sunk
cost domain.
In addition to the incentives themselves, a potential explanation for this
discrepancy could be that the descriptions of the decision environments in the
vignette studies leave room for interpretation. The participants might therefore
interpret the incentives differently than the researchers intend and in a way that
actually makes reacting to sunk cost rational. Mcafee et al. (2010) characterize
a broad range of environments in which this may be the case. For example,
reputational concerns could play a role. Some decision makers might believe
that stopping investing and admitting that the project failed would ruin their
reputation as effective decision makers (Davis et al., 1997), especially when
they are responsible for the initial investment. Our results for the hypothetical
scenarios are consistent with this explanation as participants are more sunk cost
prone in the responsibility condition. Other misconceptions of the incentives
described in the hypothetical scenarios are also plausible. In contrast to this,
the incentives in our investment task are clear at every stage. Participants also
make their investment decisions privately and reputational concerns are thus
absent.
Studies with hypothetical decision situations have found that responsibility
leads to a greater sunk cost bias (Sleesman et al., 2012; Staw, 1976). In our
incentivized setting, we do not find that responsibility for the initial
investment affects the propensity to make the additional investment. In that
respect, a potential caveat regarding our within-subject design could be that
subjects would like to appear consistent. However, this should then also hold
for the hypothetical decision situations where we replicate, also
within-subject, the responsibility effect found in previous hypothetical studies.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the sunk cost bias and our
findings underline the need for more controlled laboratory experiments with
real consequences. For instance, one avenue of future research could be to test
whether a more vivid and engaging initial investment (e.g., real effort task) is
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a crucial component for the sunk cost bias to emerge. In addition, one could
also test the role of different proximity to project completion (Conlon and
Garland, 1993) and different accountability in terms of reputational loss (Fox
and Staw, 1979). In any case, the search for the sunk cost bias in the
laboratory needs to go on.
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6. Appendix
A.1. Models with coefficients of control variables reported
In this section we present the full regression models of the main text with coefficients of
control variables reported. The variable Initial Cost > 0 is coded as a dummy variable
that takes on value 1 when Cinitial > 0 (that is, when sunk costs are present) and the
variable Initial Cost is coded as a continuous variable taking on the values of Cinitial.
Responsibility is a dummy variable which takes on value 1 when the participant is
responsible for making the initial investment. The variable Loss aversion encodes the
switching point in the loss aversion task. Waste aversion is coded as a continuous
variable that reflects the individual tendency of disliking waste or to appear wasteful.
Hypothetical sunk cost score is a continuous variable that captures the extent to which a
participant exhibits a sunk cost bias at various degrees (0–4) in hypothetical scenarios.
The regression models display also the coefficient estimates for probability of success,
gender (1 if male), whether the field of study is economics (1 if yes), and the repetitions
of trials in the task (Period).
Table 4.5 reports the results of the logit panel regressions reported in Table 4.1 (Model
(1) and (2)) and Table 4.2 (Model (3) and (4)).
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Table 4.5: The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility
(Model 3 and 4) on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.380∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.229)




Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.007
(0.160)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.001
(0.015)
Loss aversion -0.182∗ -0.185∗ -0.181∗ -0.185∗
(0.080) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082)
Waste aversion 0.044+ 0.046+ 0.044+ 0.045+
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Period -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.178 0.173 0.178 0.173
(0.265) (0.272) (0.265) (0.272)
Economics 0.193 0.203 0.193 0.203
(0.266) (0.275) (0.266) (0.275)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.128 0.131 0.128 0.131
(0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.112)
Probability of success 13.063∗∗∗ 13.427∗∗∗ 13.063∗∗∗ 13.427∗∗∗
(0.906) (0.911) (0.906) (0.911)
Constant -6.288∗∗∗ -6.529∗∗∗ -6.303∗∗∗ -6.541∗∗∗
(0.879) (0.888) (0.878) (0.883)
N 3619 3619 3619 3619
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation
stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy
variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model
(2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost. + p < 0.10, ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.6 displays the coefficients of the variables of the logit panel regression reported
in Table 4.3 in the main text that investigates the effect of the waste aversion.
Table 4.6: The effect of waste aversion on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Waste aversion 0.040+ 0.081+
(0.024) (0.043)
Initial Cost > 0 0.700
(1.473)
Initial Cost > 0 × Waste aversion -0.070
(0.048)








Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.119 0.129
(0.100) (0.110)





Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the
additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0
otherwise. The initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial
Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.7 below displays the coefficients of the variables of the logit panel regression
reported in Table 4.4 in the main text reporting the role of being in the loss domain on
additional investment.
Table 4.7: The effect of being in the loss domain on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Loss domain -0.779∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗
(0.188) (0.475)
Loss aversion -0.315∗∗∗ -0.145
(0.095) (0.112)
Loss domain × Loss aversion -0.329+
(0.172)








Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.044 0.042
(0.110) (0.110)





Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if
the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0
otherwise. The initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Loss
Domain that takes value 1 when initial costs are e12 or e14,
0 otherwise. Only cases where Cinitial > e0 are included. +
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.2. Robustness checks
In this section we present different robustness checks of the regression model
investigating the role of the initial investment and the role of responsibility
(Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2). The main finding of a reverse sunk cost effect and
the null effect of responsibility are robust and present in all the different checks
reported below, such as when considering only the participants who always made the
initial investment when responsible for it, when analyzing only those who not always
make the initial investment when responsible for it, or when using a linear probability
model instead of a logit model.
A.3. Only participants who always made the initial investment
Table 4.8 includes only those participants who always made the initial investment when
responsible for it. Model (1) and (2) reports the effect of the initial investment on the
likelihood to make the additional investment (cf. Table 4.1 in the main text). Model
(3) and (4) report the effect of responsibility (cf. Table 4.2 in the main text).
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Table 4.8: The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility
(Model 3 and 4) on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.305∗∗∗ -1.295∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.317)




Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.021
(0.197)
Initial Cost × Responsibility -0.011
(0.018)
Loss aversion -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(0.126) (0.130) (0.126) (0.130)
Waste aversion 0.071∗ 0.073∗ 0.071∗ 0.073∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Period -0.017∗ -0.018∗ -0.017∗ -0.017∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Male 0.385 0.395 0.385 0.395
(0.415) (0.428) (0.415) (0.428)
Economics 0.133 0.140 0.133 0.140
(0.443) (0.455) (0.443) (0.455)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.236 0.241 0.236 0.241
(0.167) (0.171) (0.167) (0.171)
Probability of success 13.565∗∗∗ 13.914∗∗∗ 13.567∗∗∗ 13.918∗∗∗
(1.458) (1.483) (1.458) (1.485)
Constant -7.095∗∗∗ -7.302∗∗∗ -7.142∗∗∗ -7.371∗∗∗
(1.181) (1.187) (1.181) (1.184)
N 2196 2196 2196 2196
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
participant level. Includes only participants who always made the initial investment.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made,
0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial
Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2) and (4),
the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost. This table includes only the
participants who always made the initial investment when responsible for it. + p < 0.10, ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.4. Only participants who did not always make the initial
investment
Table 4.9 below includes only those participants who did not always made the initial
investment when responsible for it. Model (1) and (2) reports the effect of the initial
investment on the likelihood of making the additional investment (cf. Table 4.1 in
the main text). Model (3) and (4) reports the effect of responsibility of the initial
investment (cf. Table 4.2 in the main text).
Table 4.9: The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility
(Model 3 and 4) on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.474∗∗∗ -1.460∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.328)




Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.033
(0.253)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.014
(0.025)
Waste aversion 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Period -0.020∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.018∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male 0.009 -0.013 0.011 -0.010
(0.320) (0.328) (0.320) (0.328)
Economics 0.083 0.091 0.082 0.090
(0.326) (0.340) (0.325) (0.340)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.072
(0.138) (0.142) (0.138) (0.142)
Loss aversion -0.272∗∗ -0.278∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.279∗∗
(0.092) (0.095) (0.093) (0.095)
Probability of success 12.443∗∗∗ 12.827∗∗∗ 12.445∗∗∗ 12.821∗∗∗
(0.960) (0.913) (0.961) (0.911)
Constant -5.166∗∗∗ -5.451∗∗∗ -5.158∗∗∗ -5.406∗∗∗
(1.093) (1.133) (1.081) (1.116)
N 1423 1423 1423 1423
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
participant level. Includes only participants who did not always make the initial investment.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0
otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial
Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2) and
(4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost. This table includes only
the participants who did not always make the initial investment when responsible for it. +
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.5. Linear probability models
Table 4.10 presents regression results using a linear probability model instead of a logit
model. Model (1) and (2) reports the effect of the initial investment on the likelihood
of making the additional investment (cf. Table 4.1 in the main text). Model (3) and (4)
reports the effect of responsibility of the initial investment (cf. Table 4.2 in the main
text).
Table 4.10: The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility
(Model 3 and 4) on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)




Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility 0.000
(0.021)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.000
(0.002)
Waste aversion 0.006+ 0.006+ 0.006+ 0.006+
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Period -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Economics 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Loss aversion -0.022∗ -0.022∗ -0.022∗ -0.022∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Probability of success 1.828∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131)
Constant -0.359∗∗ -0.365∗∗ -0.361∗∗ -0.366∗∗
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
N 3619 3619 3619 3619
Note: Linear probability regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the
continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded
as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0
otherwise. In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable
Initial Cost. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.6. Initial cost as dummy variables
Table 4.11 shows the results of a logit panel regression testing for the effect of each
initial cost on the additional investment. Each initial cost is coded as a dummy variable.
The results of the comparison between levels is summarized below.
• All the estimated coefficients for each initial cost level are negative and
significantly different from Initial cost = 0 (p < 0.001).
• Initial cost = 4 is significantly different from all the other Initial cost level (p <
0.001).
• Initial cost = 8 is not significantly different from Initial cost = 12 (p = 0.122)
and from Initial cost = 14 (p = 0.018).
• Initial cost = 12 is not significantly different from Initial cost = 14 (p = 0.405).
Table 4.11: The effect of each initial investment coded as dummy on additional
investment.
Model: (1)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial cost = 4 -0.517∗∗
(0.163)
Initial cost = 8 -1.448∗∗∗
(0.246)
Initial cost = 12 -1.724∗∗∗
(0.302)





















Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the participant level. Dependent
variable = 1 if the additional investment in the
continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. The initial
costs are coded as a dummy variables for each level of
initial cost. The baseline category is Initial Cost = 0. +
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.7. Loss aversion
Table 4.12 shows the lottery choice task used to elicit loss aversion. Lotteries 1 to 5
all have a non-negative expected value. In our experiment, most participants rejected
gambles with a positive expected value (see Table 4.13). Specifically, around 67%
of the participants rejected at least lottery 4, some even lottery 1 to 3. The median
participant’s switching lottery is 2, that is, acceptance of lotteries 1 and 2 and rejection
of lotteries 3 to 6, which implies a loss-aversion coefficient λ = 2. This coefficient is
slightly higher than the one reported in Gächter et al. (2007) who used the same task.
Two participants have multiple switching points.
Table 4.12: Lottery choice task
Lottery Accept Reject
#1. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e2; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#2. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e3; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#3. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e4; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#4. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e5; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#5. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e6; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#6. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e7; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
Note: The winning prize is e6 for each lottery and the potential loss varies from e2 to e7.
Table 4.13: Loss aversion





7) Reject all lotteries 4.72 < e 2 > 3
6) Accept lottery #1, reject lotteries #2 to #6 20.75 e 2 3
5) Accept lottery #1 and #2, reject lotteries #3 to #6 41.51 e 3 2
4) Accept lottery #1 and #3, reject lotteries #4 to #6 19.81 e 4 1.5
3) Accept lottery #1 and #4, reject lotteries #5 to #6 8.49 e 5 1.2
2) Accept lottery #1 and #5, reject lotteries #6 1.89 e 6 1
1) Accept all lotteries 2.83 > e 7 ≤ 0.87
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A.8. Additional investment by responsibility and probability
Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of additional investment by responsibility and success
probability of the project, for each initial cost. The figure shows that participants invest
more often when the probability of success of a project is high (60%) than when it is
low (40%) and that participants make the additional investment less often in Initial
cost projects (i.e., Initial Cost > 0 Euros) vs. No initial cost projects (i.e., Initial Cost =
0 Euros). There is no difference between Responsibility and No Responsibility projects.
Figure 4.5: Additional investment by responsibility and probability of success.
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A.9. Hypothetical sunk cost score
Below are the hypothetical scenarios used in the sunk cost questionnaire. We adapted
vignettes 1, 3A, 8 and 9 used in Arkes and Blumer (1985). Textual changes to the
original versions are emphasized in italic. The original text is shown between brackets.
1. Responsibility. Imagine that you have spent e400 [$100] on a ticket for a weekend
ski trip to France [Michigan]. Several weeks later you buy a e200 [$50] ticket for a
weekend ski trip to Italy [Wisconsin]. You think you will enjoy the Italy [Wisconsin] ski
trip more than the France [Michigan] ski trip. As you are putting your just-purchased
Italy [Wisconsin] ski trip ticket in your wallet, you notice that the France [Michigan]
ski trip and the Italy [Wisconsin] ski trip are for the same weekend! It’s too late to sell
either ticket, and you cannot return either one. You must use one ticket and not the
other. Which ski trip will you go on?
Sunk cost answers: France (45/108 participants, 41.67%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 64%)
2. Responsibility. As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10
million Euros [dollars] of the company’s money into a research project. The
purpose was to build a plane that would not be detected by conventional
radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90%
completed, another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected by
radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane is much faster and far more
economical than the plane your company is building. The question is: should
you invest the last 10% of the research funds to finish your radar-blank plane?
Sunk cost answer: Yes (74/108 participants, 68.52%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 85%)
3. No Responsibility. The Acme Airline Company has invested 10 million Euros
[dollars] of the company’s money into a research project. The purpose was
to build a plane that would not be detected by conventional radar, in other
words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90% completed, another firm
begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is apparent
that their plane is much faster and more economical than the plane Acme is
building. The question is should Acme Airlines invest the last million Euros of
its research funds to finish the radar-blank plane?
Sunk cost answer: Yes (74/108 participants, 68.52%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 63%)
4. No Responsibility. As you are listening to the radio one morning, the disk
jockey calls you. He informs you that you have won a free ski trip to either
France [Michigan] or Italy [Wisconsin] the last weekend of skiing season
(which happens to be next weekend). You think you will prefer the trip to Italy
[Wisconsin] rather than the trip to France [Michigan]. You call a travel agent
and find out that the value of the Italy [Michigan] ski trip is e200 [$100], and
the value of the France [Wisconsin] ski trip is e400 [$50]. You must decide
which trip to take. Which trip will you go on?
Sunk cost answer: France (30/108 participants, 27.78%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 51%)
In our study, most people answer at least one time according to the sunk
cost bias predictions. Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of people for the
number of answers consistent with sunk cost bias in the hypothetical
scenarios. A score of 0 means that participants never answered in line with the
sunk cost bias. A score of 4 means that a participant always exhibited a the
sunk cost bias. Figure 4.7 shows the percentage of people for the number of
answers consistent with the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios, by
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responsibility. A score of 2 means that a participant always exhibited the sunk
cost bias in each category (Responsibility and No Responsibility).
Figure 4.6: Hypothetical scenario sunk cost
Figure 4.7: Hypothetical scenario sunk cost by responsibility
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Table 4.14 reports logit regression results of the effect of the initial investment
when considering only the participants who display a strong tendency to exhibit
the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios (that is, those participants who
answered 3 or 4 out of 4 answers consistent with the sunk cost bias).
Table 4.14: The effect of initial investment on additional investment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Cost > 0 -1.961∗∗∗ -2.232∗∗∗
(-5.85) (-6.16)




Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility 0.563∗
(1.98)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.0410
(1.50)
Waste aversion -0.0152 -0.0203 -0.0159 -0.0206
(-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.33) (-0.39)
Period -0.0167∗ -0.0180∗ -0.0164∗ -0.0181∗
(-2.02) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-2.01)
Male 0.144 0.130 0.146 0.134
(0.38) (0.31) (0.38) (0.32)
Economics 0.734+ 0.819+ 0.741+ 0.825+
(1.68) (1.73) (1.69) (1.73)
Hypothetical sunk cost score -0.176 -0.190 -0.175 -0.188
(-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.39)
Probability of success 12.64∗∗∗ 13.66∗∗∗ 12.70∗∗∗ 13.71∗∗∗
(10.19) (11.22) (10.27) (11.22)
Loss aversion -0.377∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(-3.35) (-3.31) (-3.36) (-3.32)
Constant -3.713+ -3.964 -3.617 -3.925
(-1.65) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.61)
N 1287 1287 1287 1287
Note: Logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment
in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1), the initial costs
are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk
costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2), the initial costs are coded as a
continuous variable Initial Cost. This table includes only the participants who
answered more than 2 questions out of 4 according to sunk cost predictions in




Welcome to this decision-making experiment.20 You will make choices in several
decision situations. All your decisions are private and you do not interact with
anyone. Your earnings only depend on your own decisions and chance events. This
will be explained in detail later in these instructions. If you have any questions during
the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter to come to you
to answer your question in private. It is not allowed to talk, exclaim, or try to
communicate with other participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally
violating the rules will be asked to leave the experiment and will forfeit any earnings.
This experiment consists of several parts. You will receive information on each part
right before the respective part will begin. The next pages contain the instructions for
the first part of the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. You will be
asked to answer comprehension questions before participating in this part of the
experiment.
Your Endowment
In the first part of the experiment, you receive an initial endowment of e10. Your
final earnings in this part of the experiment can be more or less than the e10 initial
endowment, depending on your decisions and chance events.
Decision situations
This part consists of 36 projects. Each project, consists of up to two decision situations
in which you have to decide whether you want to invest into the project or not. We
call the decisions situations investment stages. For each project, there are up to two
investment stages:
• An initial investment stage, where an initial investment is required for the project
to start.
– Sometimes, you can decide to make the initial investment or not.
– Sometimes, the computer decides on your behalf to make the initial
investment.
There are costs associated with an initial investment. These costs vary across
projects and can take any of these values: e0, e4, e8, e12 and e14.
• An additional investment stage. If you or the computer decides to make the
initial investment, an additional investment is required to complete the project.
– The additional investment costs are always e4.
– You can decide to make an additional investment or not.
Initial investment stage
• An initial investment is required to start the project.
• If the initial investment is made, there will be investment costs associated with
it. You will know the actual investment costs only after the initial investment is
made. On average, you can expect the initial investment costs to be:
– e0 five out of nine times;
– e4 one out of nine times;
– e8 one out of nine times;
20The text font, the size and order of images have been adapted from the original instruction
version.
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– e12 one out of nine times;
– e14 one out of nine times.
Figure 4.8: Probability of occurrence of initial investment costs, if an initial investment
is made
• Sometimes, you can decide to make the initial investment or not. In this case
you will see a screen like the one shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Example of a decision situation in which you can decide to make the initial
investment
• After you have made the initial investment, you will be informed about the actual
initial investment costs for the current project. This ends the initial investment
stage.
• 4.10 shows an example where you decided to make the initial investment and
you are informed that the initial investment costs are e14.
• Sometimes, the computer makes the initial investment on your behalf. In this
case you will see a screen like the one shown in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.12 shows an example where the computer made the initial investment and
the costs are e14.
If you or the computer do not make the initial investment, you will move to the next
project.
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Figure 4.10: Example of a decision situation in which the initial investment you made
is e14
Figure 4.11: Example of a decision situation in which the computer makes the initial
investment on your behalf
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Figure 4.12: Example of a decision situation in which the initial investment the
computer made is e14
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Additional investment stage
• If the initial investment is made (by you or by the computer), you proceed to the
additional investment stage.
• To complete the project, it is necessary to make an additional investment.
• The additional investment costs are always e4.
• If you make the additional investment, there is a probability that the project is
successful. This probability will be either 40% or 60%.
• For half of the projects, the probability of success is 40% and for the other half it
is 60%.
The example in Figure 4.13 shows a project with a probability of success of 40%.
Figure 4.13: Example of additional investment. You will see the additional investment
stage, only if the initial investment is made (by you or by the computer). You are
reminded about the amount invested in the initial investment stage and you are
presented with the additional investment costs and the probability of success of the
project.
• You earn different amounts depending on whether the project is successful or
unsuccessful.
• If the project is successful, you earn e16
• If the project is unsuccessful, you earn e8.
• You can also decide not to make the additional investment. In this case the
project is always unsuccessful.
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Your earnings after the additional investment stage:
If the additional investment is not made, the project is always unsuccessful. Your final
payment in this case is:
• Endowment (e10) – Initial investment + e8
If the additional investment is made, your final payment is:
• If the project is unsuccessful:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment – Additional investment (e4) + e8
• If the project is successful:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment– Additional investment (e4) + e16
Final payment calculation
Final payment = e10 Endowment - Initial investment – e4 Additional investment +
Project Payoff
• If the initial investment is not made, your final payment is: Endowment (e10).
• If the initial investment is made, the initial investment costs (i.e., e0, e4, e8,
e12 or e14) are deducted, and you proceed to the additional investment stage.
• If the additional investment is not made, the project is automatically
unsuccessful and your final payment is:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment + Unsuccessful Project payoff (e8).
• If the additional investment is made, you invest an additional e4 and the project
can be successful according to the probability of success of 40% or 60%.
– If the project is successful, your final payment is:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment – Additional investment (e4) +
Successful Project payoff (e16)
– If the project is unsuccessful, your final payment is:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment – Additional investment (e4) +
Unsuccessful Project payoff (e8)
Your Decisions
You will face 36 decision situations. We ask you to make your investment
decisions within the time limit you will see on the top right part of the screen.
Information: Until the end of the experiment you will not receive any feedback
regarding the success of the projects.
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Payment
At the end of the experiment, one of the 36 decision situations will be randomly
selected for payout. Each decision situation is equally likely and your decisions
in one decision situation do not affect any other decision situation. Thus, each
decision situation could be the one relevant for your payment. Therefore,
carefully consider your decisions in each decision situation. The amount you
earn will be transferred to your bank account at the end of the experimental
session. All bank transfers will be made on the same day of the experiment by
someone who is not directly involved in this study and who does not have
access to the data related to your decisions. Your anonymity is thus guaranteed.
Your Identity
For the entire duration of the experiment, your anonymity and the anonymity
of all other participants is guaranteed. You will never be asked to reveal your
choices to other participants during or after the experiment. Your decisions are
thus private. Your name and personal information are recorded only at the end
of the experiment to pay you. To keep your decisions private, please do not
reveal your choices to any other participant. All the interactions are anonymous
and none of the participants can communicate or influence the choices of the
others.
This is the end of the instructions for Part 1. You can now answer the
comprehension questions. If you have any questions please raise your hand and
wait for the experimenter.
Instructions loss aversion task
Welcome to this part of the experiment. You see below a list of lotteries. Each lottery
consists of a coin toss with 50% probability of success. You are asked to Accept or
Reject each of these lotteries. If you Accept the lottery, you can either win or lose
money. This amount will be added (if the lottery is successful) or subtracted (if the
lottery fails) from the e7 you earned by answering the questionnaire in the previous
part of the experiment. If you Reject the lottery, you will neither win nor lose money
and you receive the e7 you earned by completing the questionnaire. At the end of the
experiment, one of the lotteries will be randomly selected for payout and you will be
paid according to your decision. Any earnings from this part of the experiment will be
added to your previous earnings, and will be transferred to your bank account after the
end of this experimental session.







This dissertation presents three experimental projects that focus on the study
of fairness, altruism, and sunk cost bias. I analyze these concepts from an
interdisciplinary perspective, where insights from economics, psychology, and
neuroscience are integrated.
In Chapter 2, I show that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the
medial prefrontal cortex play distinct roles in punishment and reward. Despite
the common belief that punishment and reward are merely two sides of the
same coin, I discuss a surprising pattern of results showing distinct effects of
these brain regions in reciprocal punishment and reward. The results indicate
that while the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the medial prefrontal
cortex are broadly involved in overriding self-centered processing to facilitate
the retaliation of unfairness, these same brain regions are crucial to inhibit
both selfishness and reciprocity motivations when deciding how to reward
kindness. The study systematizes the current knowledge on the involvement of
the prefrontal cortex on reciprocal fairness. Using a within-subject design, it
directly compares how punishment and reward relate to each other and
provides the first evidence of the differences and similarities in the
engagement of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the medial
prefrontal cortex both for punishment and reward.
In Chapter 3, I describe a study where we experimentally examine the
relationship between time delay and generosity using modified dictator games.
First, I present evidence indicating that participants discount future payoff for
themselves or someone else at the same rate. This is in contrast to previous
findings in the literature suggesting that people discount future payoffs
differently when making decisions for themselves compared to when making
decisions for others. Second, no differences in aggregate giving between the
four treatments are observed and, in all four treatments, men are more
sensitive to the price of giving than women. Third, only when both dictator
and recipient receive their payoff immediately, is giving sensitive to price
changes.
In Chapter 4, I discuss an experimental study designed to investigate the
sunk cost bias and to test several psychological mechanisms associated with it.
Although the effect of sunk costs on decision-making has been widely
discussed, the findings of incentivized experimental studies that investigate it
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are mixed. Most of the evidence in favor of the sunk cost bias comes from
hypothetical scenarios of the psychological literature. It has been surprisingly
hard to investigate the sunk cost bias in incentivized settings, both in the field
and the lab.
In this study, we find that participants react to exogenous variation in sunk
cost, but not in the expected direction. The main finding is that participants
are less likely to make an additional investment the higher the sunk cost. I
discuss the potential explanations of this result, and why the same participants
display sunk cost bias in the hypothetical decision problems. The second main
finding concerns the effect of responsibility for the initial investment. Many
studies with hypothetical decision situations have found that responsibility
leads to a greater sunk cost effect. In our incentivized setting, we do not
observe that responsibility for the initial investment affects the propensity to






The research discussed in this dissertation contributes to the field of human decision
sciences and includes insights relevant to psychology, experimental economics, and
neuroeconomics. The studies and findings discussed can inform researchers and
practitioners interested in social preferences and their biological foundations (Chapter
2), in the relationship between social and intertemporal preferences (Chapter 3), and
biases in investment decisions (Chapter 4).
The study "Love and retaliation" presented in Chapter 2, provides new insights and
possible future avenues in the study of reciprocity in social interactions. This study is
an example of an interdisciplinary effort that has its roots in the discipline of
neuroeconomics, an emerging and dynamic field that combines insights and tools
from psychology, economics, and neuroscience to unravel the neural mechanisms
underlying our day-to-day decisions. This interdisciplinary approach has led to
insights on human decision-making that go far beyond what each separate discipline
could have achieved alone. The use of innovative methods such as Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation in the study of economic relevant decisions brings an important
academic contribution, by advancing the current understanding of why and when
people engage in norm enforcement in the form of punishment and reward and what
are the components involved in such decisions. Understanding the similarities and
differences between punishment and rewards could eventually increase cooperation
in society. Social punishments and rewards are important to our society to function
well. However, from an academic perspective, it is still unclear whether they are just
two sides of the same coin or whether they involve different psychological processes,
being employed by people in different ways. In addition, for a society to work well, it
is of utmost importance that social norms in place are respected and followed.
Punishment and reward are tools that are used to promote norm compliance.
Understanding how punishment and reward affect human behavior and how norm
enforcement is encoded in the brain can bring important insights to policy-making.
The idea that motivated the study “Intertemporal Social Preferences” described in
Chapter 3, is that charitable giving plays an important role in our society and
understanding the donors’ motivations and factors that influence giving is crucial to
promote effective donations. Charitable decisions are traditionally studied in the
domain of social preferences, i.e., as a decision between self and others at a certain
point in time. However, in many contexts, the timing of donation and consequences to
the beneficiary may not coincide or both may occur at a later point in time. For
instance, when donating to a charitable organization, the costs of giving are usually
immediate, but the benefits to the ultimate recipient are delayed. Also, donors could
pledge to donate in the future, postponing both the cost and benefit.
These examples show that people are often confronted with situations that involve
a trade-off between immediate and delayed benefits and costs (i.e., intertemporal
decisions) and between one’s own and others’ welfare (i.e., interpersonal decisions).
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To understand giving and helping behavior in such situations, it is crucial to
investigate not only how people care for others and how they care for the future, but
also if and how these two aspects interact. That is, the interaction between social
preferences and intertemporal choice. The findings discussed in this chapter indicate
that the effect of time delay on giving needs to be explored considering several factors
such as different prices of giving and can inform fund-raisers and policymakers that
aim at developing effective strategies to increase giving. For instance, campaigns
relying on matching donations to encourage giving could thus be less efficient if they
involve long time delays.
Chapter 4 discusses the study "In search of the sunk cost bias". This study
contributes to the experimental literature that investigates decision biases. The focus
is on the sunk-cost bias, which refers to the idea that makes their decision to continue
an endeavor based on the previously invested resources (e.g., money, time, and
effort). The sunk cost bias is considered a mistake in reasoning because sunk cost
costs are costs that have already been incurred and that should thus no longer be
considered relevant to future rational decision-making. Despite the intuitive appeal of
the concept and a substantial body of evidence from survey studies supporting the
existence of the sunk cost bias, it has been surprisingly hard to reliably demonstrate a
sunk cost effect in incentivized settings, both in the field and the lab. The findings
reported in this chapter are relevant to the discussion about the incentivization of
participants’ decisions in an experiment and shed light on the discrepancy of findings
between survey and incentivized studies observed in the literature.
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Public debate and promotion of Maastricht University
The work included in this dissertation has been presented and discussed in several
places in Europe, America, and Asia. Among others, they include Carnegie Mellon
University in Pennsylvania (2020), the European Economics Science Association
Conference in France (2019) and Guatemala (2018), the Workshop on Norms and
Behavioral Changes at the University of Pennsylvania (2018), the Summer school in
Neuroeconomics of NYU University in Shanghai (2019), the São Paulo Summer
School of Advanced Science on Social and Affective Neuroscience in Brazil (2018),
the Summer School on Behavioral Economics and Psychology in Prague, and the
Society for Neuroeconomics conference in Philadelphia (2018) ad Dublin (2019).
The study presented in Chapter 4 "In search of the sunk cost bias" was featuered in the
Dutch newspaper Trouw and in the UMIO Prime engagement platform.
Software and Data analyses
The experiments presented in this thesis are programmed using z-Tree and Qualtrics.
The data analyses are performed with the software STATA. The codes are available
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